tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-50213465651714829102024-02-07T00:20:31.593-05:00Jc_FreakThe Irish ProtestantJc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.comBlogger316125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-415327325319009772022-06-24T00:42:00.013-04:002022-07-14T05:20:43.802-04:00 Is Provisionism Semipelagian? Part 2: Centering<p>At the end of my<a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2022/01/is-provisionism-semipelagianian-part-1.html"> last post</a>, I concluded that while Provisionism is certainly closer to Semi-pelagianism than Arminianism is, there are certain factors that make it difficult to say that they are the same. The two big ones are its acceptance of eternal security and it viewing salvation being conditioned on belief rather than on moral living like the Semipelagian.</p><p>
However, I think a big reason why this is difficult is an over reliance on the 5 points of the Arminian/Calvinism debate. The 5 points of the Remonstrance and Dort are an excellent means of organizing the disagreements of these two positions. That does not mean, however, that it is a good way of assessing other positions which developed apart from the historical clash. A more thorough look I think comes from examining centeredness.</p><p><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">
Epistemic Centering</span></b></p><p>
I’ve written an <a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html">extensive piece </a>on what I call epistemic centers. Calvinists talk a lot about them being “God-centered” and others as being “man-centered”, which is essentially the same rhetorical trick that pro-choice activist use when they say we are “anti-women”. It’s not a real critique.</p><p>
However, the concept intrigued me: what does it mean for a theology to be centered on something? I ran through several possible answers to that, but the one that I found the most fruitful, the one that helped me to actually understand those that I disagreed with, was epistemic centering.</p><p>
Epistemology is the study of knowledge: what is knowledge, how do we acquire knowledge, how do we organize our ideas, etc. So, an epistemic center is where we organize our thoughts around certain sets of questions based on particular themes, and adjudicate their answers based on those same themes. In other words, epistemic centeredness refers to the controlling theme or idea that shapes the way someone thinks about a particular topic. For instance, I identified Calvinism’s center as being causal: being concerned with issues of cause and effect, and power. On the other hand, I identified Arminianism’s center as being relational: being concerned with issues pertaining to relationships and personal characteristics.</p><p><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">
Semi-pelagianism and Provisionism</span></b></p><p>
So how are the two positions we are here to talk about centered? Let’s talk first about the more established view: Semi-pelagianism.</p><p>
I refer to Semi-pelagianism as being pragmatically centered. Whether we are talking about John Cassian or Charles Finney, the principal concern is to accomplish particular goals in ministry. The concern for the classic Semi-pelagians was moral living, while for Finney it was efficaciousness in evangelism. Now, everyone is concerned with practical questions to some degree, just like Calvinists do care about God being good and Arminians do care about God being sovereign. Likewise, we all care about our ministries being effective. However, for the Semi-pelagian, it is the first concern; it is the issue upon which they’ll judge a doctrine’s veracity. This is also why Semi-pelagianism tends to emphasize human action, since the encouragement of that action tends to be the main goal of the theology. Is this the same for Provisionism?</p><p>
Clearly not. In my mind, this is the factor that makes Semi-pelagianism and Provisionism fundamentally different. It is very clear, listening to Flowers, that he puts veracity and the Bible before issues of pragmatics. Just like Arminians and Calvinists, he clearly cares about practical things, but he won’t assume something is false just because it is impractical. Indeed, you may notice that he does not actually claim that humans must act first like a Pelagian or Semi-pelagian would. Indeed, he considers the cross and the proclamation of the gospel to be the initiative of God. The only reason why he seems to reject prevenient grace is because he fails to see its need (though I think this is tied to his misunderstanding of faith, as stated in my last post).</p><p>
Instead, I would say that Flowers and other Provisionists are apologetically-centered. This puts them in a similar group as Amyraldians, Molinists, and the Trinity. Another way to think of this kind of centeredness is tradition management. Many times in history, certain theological conflicts break out. An apologetically centered theology is one that develops precisely to deal with these conflicts. This means that such theologies always assume a particular tradition and is attempting to preserve that tradition somehow.</p><p>
Apologetically-centered theologies can develop in two ways: irenically and polemically. An irenic theology is one that is attempting to resolve conflict by making a “middle-way” between the two sides. Amyraldism attempts to be a middle ground between Arminianism and Calvinism, while Molinism attempts to be a middle ground between libertarianism and determinism. A polemic theology is one that attempts define a clear line between their tradition and what they see as a significant error in an attempt to show why the tradition doesn’t need that error and thus anathematize it. The early debates about the Trinity and the hypostatic union are great examples of this.</p><p>
Provisionism is a polemical theology. It is attempting the clarify the Southern Baptist tradition in such a way as to show that there is no need for Calvinism. Part of the way that such theologies work is that they have to show that their view is (A) more true than the error and (B) more consistent with the tradition than the error is.</p><p><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">
What am I basing this on?</span></b></p><p>
So first of all, the historical context of this lines up. It is not simply that there is a conflict between Calvinists and non-Calvinists: Arminianism has been around for a while and one would simply expect them to embrace Arminianism if that was the sole issue. Where would there be a need to manifest a separate theology? Rather, what caused Provisionism to manifest was an attempted take over of the SBC by Calvinist theology (SBC is the Southern Baptist Convention). Leighton Flowers isn’t trying to protect the church at large from Calvinism, or trying to invent a new soteriology; he is protecting the SBC in particular from Calvinism.</p><p>
This makes sense of the unique properties of Provisionism. First of all, it rejects most of Calvinism. Indeed, it assumes any position of Calvinism to be false until proven true. This is fundamentally the reason why he resists Total Depravity so much. It doesn’t matter that the Arminian view of Total Depravity is operating in a different context: he’s attempting to exorcise Calvinism from the SBC and he doesn’t want it to have a foot in the door. Indeed, he often argues that he is better positioned to defeat Calvinists because he rejects Total Depravity. <a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2022/06/is-provisionism-semipelagian-part-2.html#1"><sup>1</sup></a></p><p>
But what about eternal security? Shouldn’t reject that as well? That would make sense, but if you know anything about the SBC, eternal security is VERY important within that denomination. In fact, most 4-point Arminians (that is Arminians who believe in eternal security) are SBC. Therefore, I doubt he really sees it as a Calvinist distinctive: he sees it as a Southern Baptist distinctive. Which means that it is part of what he is trying to protect. I could say that this is part of the reason for the rejection of Arminianism, but I actually know this not to be the case for Flowers in particular. He was willing to call himself a 4-point Arminianism until he understood our position on Total Depravity.</p><p>
I suspect that this is also the reason for the seemingly odd definition of faith. As I talked about in the last post, Flowers seems to equate faith with intellectual assent: i.e., belief or acceptance. Meanwhile, the Bible, and Arminians, have an understanding of faith that has to do with a trusting relationship: i.e. fidelity or loyalty or trust. However, this isn’t really that odd because this is the way that faith is talked about in the culture at large. I’m not sure if it has ever occurred to him to question this definition. I also suspect that this understanding of faith is very common within the SBC in general. Personally though, if there was one thing I could change the minds of Provisionists on, this would be it.</p><p><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">
Burden of Proof</span></b></p><p>
One final point I want to make is the issue of burden of proof. This is a concept that I care a lot about because I’ve debated Atheists, and they really abuse this concept. It is worthwhile to think about this more deeply.</p><p>
Now, Dr. Flowers has often argued that the burden of proof for Total Depravity is on the Arminian. Why? Because we are making the assertion. This is the same claim that Atheists make when they say that the affirmative case bears the burden of proof. However, the affirmative case is not really the same thing as the positive case (which is a case expressed without the words ‘not’ or ‘no’), and there is no reason to claim that the positive case bears the burden of proof.</p><p>
Indeed, the burden of proof is possessed by people, not positions. In other words, no quality of a particular viewpoint forces the burden on it. Rather it is the context of the discussion that puts the burden on a particular person. Indeed, the actual quality that determines the burden of proof is presumption.</p><p>
What do I mean by presumption? Let me put it this way: no one walks into a discussion as a clean state. We all enter a conversation with certain presumptions. A person bears a burden of proof if they want someone else to change their mind on their presumption. So, in an informal discussion, the presumption is whatever the people in the discussion believed at the beginning of the discussion. If you want me to change my mind, you have the burden of proof; if I want to change your mind, I bear the burden of proof; if we are both trying change a third person’s mind, we share the burden of proof.<a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2022/06/is-provisionism-semipelagian-part-2.html#2"><sup>2</sup></a></p><p>
“Hold on Martin,” you may say, “what about in a court of law? There, the prosecution always has the burden of proof.” Yes, but why? Is it because they are making the positive case? Is it because they are making an assertion? No. It is because the defendant is presumed innocent. In a court of law (in theory anyway), the defense isn’t trying to change the jury’s mind, because they already presume that the defense is right. The defense is merely trying to stop them from changing their minds. That is why he doesn’t have a burden of proof. However, the prosecution is trying to change the jury’s mind and so does bear the burden of proof. The issue therefore is presumption, and in formal contexts, presumption can be assigned.</p><p>
In theology, there is actually a formal structure that assigns the burden of proof: orthodoxy. In debate, orthodoxy is presumed to be true, and therefore, innovative doctrines bear a burden of proof. Now what is interesting here, is that orthodoxy is defined by tradition. So, for instance, if you are Catholic, you can’t simply go around proclaiming that the Council of Trent is false. Trent is presumed true within the Catholic Church, so you bear the burden of proof (indeed a very high burden in that case). Meanwhile, you would also have a burden of proof is you attempted to argue for Trent in a Lutheran Church. In any church, established tradition is presumed.<a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2022/06/is-provisionism-semipelagian-part-2.html#3"><sup>3</sup></a></p><p>
So, when Arminians and Provisionists are talking to each other, is there a common orthodox tradition that we can point to in order to establish a burden of proof? No. There is not. Arminianism enjoys the stasis of being the older and more established position generally, but we’re talking about Baptists here. They don’t play like that. (Unless they are Calvinist for some reason. Then they insist that a local synod in the Netherlands that was overturned 7 years later is binding for every Christian on Earth.)</p><p>
However, I think in Leighton Flowers’ mind, the question is always regarding SBC tradition. After all, he is centered on tradition management. Sure, I’m not Southern Baptist, but if I’m talking to him, on some level, I must be saying that SBC tradition should change. I may not think I’m doing that, but I think subconsciously he does. I am suspicious that this is where this ploy regarding the burden of proof is ultimately coming from. Either that, or he's been talking to too many atheists. If I am right about it being subconscious, though, it would explain why he often uses it where it is inappropriate. If he is having a one-on-one dialogue with an Arminian, he has just as much a burden of proof as the Arminian does. As Arminians, we must insist on this.</p><p><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">
Conclusion</span></b></p><p>
Is Provisionism Semi-pelagian? No. Is it Arminian? No. Is it a viable theology? So far, I must say no, since they do not tend to offer any proof apart from their own apprehension of Arminianism. Now there is more that I can say about Provisionism that I haven’t included here since it lay outside the scope of the question at hand. Additionally, even what I have said here is merely a proposal. I cannot insist that I am right on this, at least not at this point. But I offer it for internet consideration, and I would really appreciate any feedback one may give. Thank you.</p><p>
______________________________________________</p><p>
<a name="1"><sup>1</sup> Just to be clear, I find all such arguments dubious. I’ve heard many Arminians argue the reverse of this as well, and I’m not convinced of that either. In my experience, people are too complicated and their ideas too convoluted to actually predict this kind of thing. Many times, the people who seemed farthest from the gospel end up accepting the gospel, while those that seem like they were on the cusp of faith remain on the cusp for decades until their death. You never really know what will convince a person.</a></p><p>
<a name="2"><sup>2</sup> I wanted to explain what the affirmative case is, but that is going to get rather granular, so I put it down here. Only read this if you fully understand what I said above. First of all, in formal debates, the debate is often named after a particular question. The audience presumes that question to be false. Thus, the affirmative case, in that scenario, is the person who affirms this official proposition. This only applies to formal debates though where presumption can be officially assigned.</a></p><p>
In an informal debate though, the affirmative case kind of goes back and forth depending on what is being debating. For instance, what if one of the arguers puts forward a particular argument, like let’s say the Kalaam Cosmological Argument. Well, the conclusion of that argument is that God exists. Therefore, while discussing the Kalaam, the burden of proof is on the person who affirms that conclusion: that God exists. However, if we shift to talking about the Problem of Evil, then the conclusion of THAT argument is that God doesn’t exist. So, the burden of proof is on the person who affirms that conclusion: the atheist. This is because the purpose of an argument is to change someone’s mind. Therefore, the presumption that is trying to be changed is the person being told the argument. This is what sharing the burden of proof ultimately looks like. You bear the burden of proof for your arguments; he bears the burden of proof for his arguments.</p><p>
<a name="3"><sup>3</sup> This is basically my stance on the Trinity. The Trinity is such an ancient and established doctrine that any attempt to deny has a high burden of proof. Unless you can show that the Trinity is incompatible with Scripture, it should be the presumed reading of the text.</a></p><p></p>Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-36588701277551665762022-01-19T15:35:00.017-05:002022-08-01T23:49:33.170-04:00Is Provisionism Semipelagianian? Part 1: The FACTS<p class="MsoNormal"></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Preliminaries</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is a new term going around called Provisionalism. There are many who say that it is simply a repackaging of Semipelagianism. The problem is that Calvinists have so misused the label that the mere accusation can be easily scoffed at and dismissed without analysis. However, Semipelagianism is a real heresy and there really are Semipelagians. As such, we must at least consider the possiblity, while, at the same time, don't assume that it is true. Just because someone calls something Semipelagian, it doesn't mean that it is, but just because people throw the label around casually, doesn't mean that it isn't. What we must do is be very clear about what Semipelagianism is, and then see if Provisionalism matches. </p><p class="MsoNormal">I’m going to approach this question through two levels of
analysis: Analysis of the 5 points of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>the Arminianism/Calvinism debate and assessment of centeredness. But
first, let us define terms. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Semipelagian is an ancient heresy that was developed after
the church’s rejection of the teachings of Pelagius at the Council of Ephesus.
It was, itself, rejected in turn at the Synod of Orange which is the synod that
declares Arminianism (then known as Semi-Augustinism) as orthodox. In essence,
Semipelagianism teaches that each human is born with the innate capability of coming to God,
but that faith in God is sufficiently difficult that it generally requires God’s help
to accomplish. So, while divine intervention is often needed (indeed usually needed), it is not technically necessary. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Provisionism is a more recent perspective developed by
Leighton Flowers. Now Leighton Flowers argues that while divine intervention is
needed, it can be accomplished direct intervention. As such, the
need for such intervention arises from circumstances rather than from human nature. It is therefore not technically necessary, though it is practically necessary. Are
these positions basically the same? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At this point, it is important that this is my first attempt to
write about Provisionism, so if I am inaccurate with this assessment, I ask for
Provisionists to correct me. This applies not just to this paragraph, but for this
entire post. However, I feel that it is important for us to seriously explore
this issue. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So, since both Semipelagians and Provisionists believe that
divine intervention isn’t necessary, but is simply needed, and that this is the
clearest line of demarcation between Arminians and Semi-pelagians, does this
make Provisionism a new form of Semipelagianism? Like I said earlier, I’m going to analyze this on
two fronts. First, on the issue of the 5 points of the Arminian/Calvinist
debate and secondly from the perspective of a theological center. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Election and Conditions</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I’ve made a comparison between the Arminianism (The FACTS)
and Semipelagianism here: http://evangelicalarminians.org/mg-how-is-arminianism-different-from-pelagianism/.
One of the things that I insist is that Arminians and Semipelagians differ for
more than just on depravity. They may agree with us on the other 4 points, but
they differ in terms of why, and how they understand them. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A good example of this is in regards to <i>election</i>. We
agree with Semipelagians that salvation is conditional, but for us, that
condition is something completely unmeritorious: faith. To the Semipelagian
though, faith is more a reliance on God for support towards moral living. Being
a good person is too high a bar, but striving to be a good person with God’s
assistance is enough for salvation. The condition of salvation remains that
moral living though. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Here, Provisionists seem to take neither view. Instead, they
seem to take the view that salvation is conditioned upon belief. It is
important to stress that belief and faith are not the same thing. Faith is a
relational word while belief is an epistemological word. They do have some
cross over, but there are key differences.<a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2022/01/is-provisionism-semipelagianian-part-1.html#1"><sup>1</sup></a> If I say that I have faith in my
wife, it would imply that I think she exists and is my wife. If I say that I
have faith in my wife it means I trust her on rely on her. Provisionists seem
to think that what is necessary is that we believe or think that Jesus is the
Christ, rather than the Arminian view that we must trust in Jesus as the
Christ. Lieghton Flowers at one point said in his conversation with Brian
Abasciano, “I don’t think it takes a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit to
allow people to believe 2+2=4. Nor do I believe that it takes some supernatural
miracle of God within the nature of man… for them to believe that Jesus is the
Son of God.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(<a href="https://youtu.be/g4rMIt34ka4?t=2690">https://youtu.be/g4rMIt34ka4?t=2690</a>
at 45 minutes). These are not the same views on faith. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">But it isn’t the same view as the Semipelagian. The Provisionist
isn’t saying that we need God’s assistance to live a good life and it is by
that good life that we are saved. Rather, they seem to be saying that we simply
have to mentally accept the proposition that the gospel is true. So in this
regard, I have to say that Provisionism, while in error, is different than
Semipelagianism. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Total Depravity, Atonement for All, and Freed to Believe
by Grace</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For these three issues, I don’t see much difference between
the Provisionist and the Semipelagian. Both reject the belief in Total
Depravity, yet both also believe that humans still need God to save them.
The Semipelagian believes that God has to help them live morally while the Provisionist
believes that God has to present to them the gospel. However, they both accept that
it is an environmental problem rather than a nature problem. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">When it comes to prevenient grace, they both argue that God
does help people before salvation, but this grace isn’t necessary. The only
real difference between them here is what they think the condition of salvation
is, and thus what kind of help they require. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Mind you, these are the principal differences between the
Arminian and these two positions, and this is makes it very easy for them to appear
to be the same position to us. <br />
<br />
The third one, Atonement for All is something that all (Semipelagianism, Provisionism,
and Arminianism) really have in common. Quite frankly, Atonement for All is so
Scripturally obvious that I know only of one theology that has ever dared to
question it, so this is unsurprising. I don’t know though what the Provisionist
theory of atonement is though, so how that measures up with Semipelagianism,
I’ll have to leave to future assessment. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Security in Christ</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This one is interesting because it is here that the Provisionist
jumps onto the other side of the Arminian position and embraces the Calvinist
point of view. I, for one, find this move to be fascinating since I consider Perseverance
of the Saints to be one of the weak points of Calvinism, scripturally speaking
(though psychologically, it appears to be an asset). Now while I insist that
Arminians and Semipelagians differ on this issue as well (specifically security
being grounded in Christ as opposed to being grounded in the perseverance of
our works), it is here that the strongest line between the Provisionist and
Semipelagian can be drawn. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">One can only ask, is this simply a different flavor of
Semipelagianism, or an actually legitimately different position. To the Arminian,
this is hard to say. It is exactly on this point that 4-point Arminians differ
from 5-pointers like me. This is more of an issue that the logic of Calvinism
forces upon its believers; non-Calvinists are simply free to follow the
Scripture where it leads. One could say this is true of Semipelagianism as
well. So considering that the logic that forces the position onto the Calvinist
isn’t there for the Provisionist, the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>question becomes: why do Provisionists hold this position at all? I will
pick up this question again when I look at the issue of theological centers.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Preliminary Conclusions</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So, when analyzing the 5 points, are Provisionists
Semipelagian? I would say it is inclusive. The similarities are obvious, and it
is certainly true that they are closer to Semipelagianism that Arminianism is.
But then, so are many Catholics: there is a bit of room there. The unusual
stance of holding Perseverance of the Saints is especially interesting, showing
that there is a least something else happening here. I think we need to go at
least a little deeper, which I will in <a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2022/06/is-provisionism-semipelagian-part-2.html">the next post</a>.</p><p class="MsoNormal">________________________________________________</p><p class="MsoNormal"><a name="1"></a>1. It is important to understand that words have semantic range. The phrase "believe in" can both mean "have faith in" and "believe that it exists". This is the root of the confusion that I am attempting to clarify. So if I say, "I believe in Santa Claus", I don't mean, "I have faith in Santa Claus" but rather, "I think Santa is real". However, if I said, "I have believe in my wife" I would mean "I have faith in my wife". That said, "believe", as far as I am aware, only really takes on this meaning when followed by 'in'. The base notion of 'believe' is more tied to epistemology, and when we are trying to talk about nuanced theological ideas, strict syntax and vocabulary are to be preferred. </p><p></p>Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-72295857979833704572019-08-30T07:00:00.000-04:002019-08-30T15:48:37.363-04:00Response to "Got Questions: Limited Atonement- Is It Biblical" Part IIIn <a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2019/08/response-to-got-questions-limited.html" target="_blank">the last post</a> I was looking at an <a fbclid="IwAR012aw802-QYaXbff0wEGYSzlQnMgbQYPpgaJ8yaEoZIZ5WrO_UDOV1Mxw”" href="https://www.blogger.com/%E2%80%9D" https:="" limited-atonement.html="" www.gotquestions.org="">article on Limited Atonement</a>. There I talked about how the issue of Limited vs. Unlimited Atonement has less to do with the nature of the atonement and more to do with the relationship between God’s intent and His sovereignty. Most of post was me pointing out that the article in question fails to understand that and spends the meat of its content arguing for points that both sides agree with. <br />
<br />
However, he then shifts his attention from the general discussion to specific talking points. I’ll be spending this post addressing those points. <br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Points of Defense</span></b><br />
<b><br /></b>
So first the article makes an attempt to defend Limited Atonement to some objections. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">One common misunderstanding about the doctrine of limited atonement is that this view somehow lessens or limits the value of the atonement of Christ.</span></blockquote>
I won’t spend too much time here because I agree with him. This is a mischaracterization of the LA view, and in my article on the nature of the debate (referenced <a href="https://www.blogger.com/%E2%80%9Dhttps://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html%E2%80%9D">here</a>), this agreement is a major point in my claim that the atonement debate has nothing to do with the nature of the atonement itself.<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Another common misunderstanding about the doctrine of limited atonement is that it somehow lessens or diminishes the love of God for humanity. </span></blockquote>
This argument is interesting. Here he claims that Limited Atonement makes God more loving since the love that God has for the elect is more productive than the general love that God has for all humanity in Unlimited Atonement. For a very technical argument, he gives very little space to it. Therefore are two problems here. First of all, he doesn’t make his argument well. Second of all, his argument doesn’t actually deal with the objection it is supposed to be countering.<br />
<br />
Let’s think about this carefully. Do you really think that a husband is more loving to his wife if he does everything for her? If guarantees she gets everything, he thinks she should have? There is something flawed in the reasoning here. I think there is a way he could make this argument but he doesn’t do it. So let’s see if we can make his argument better. <br />
<br />
Let’s define love. <b>Love</b> is to desire what is best for someone. I think this is a good definition, and the one that he is using. Because God, unlike a human husband, actually <i>knows</i> what is best for someone, He would be justified in guaranteeing that end in the person’s life. This is the argument I think that the person wants to make. <br />
<br />
However, this fails to wrestle with the actual objection. No one is saying that God’s love for the elect on limited atonement is less than God’s love for the elect on unlimited atonement. I think the argument, even the better argument I made for him, is flawed in thinking that love is measured by what it accomplishes. Rather love is measured by what it is willing to sacrifice for those it loves. In this case, the sacrifice on Jesus. And, once again, this is something both sides share. The strength of God’s love is the same. <br />
<br />
What is different is that there exists no love for the reprobate. This is the actual objection: that God’s love for the reprobate is illusory. It’s a deception. After all, love is the pursuit of someone’s good, and there is no sense where God is actually pursuing the reprobates' good in Limited Atonement. Therefore, one cannot properly say that God loves them. Yet the Bible does say that He does (Matthew 18:4, John 3:16, II Peter 3:9, I Tim 2:3-4). Therefore, this isn’t an issue with the strength of God’s love, but the veracity of that love for the lost. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">How can God offer salvation to all, including those whom He has not elected or foreordained to be saved? </span></blockquote>
This is not an objection to the position. This is what the debate is! This is the heart. And his answer here is really frustrating because this is where I sit up and hope for a thorough answer. Yet, all he gives is “1) The call of the gospel is universal in the sense that anybody that hears it and believes in it will be saved. 2) Because everyone is dead in trespasses and sin, no one will believe the gospel and respond in faith unless God first makes those who are dead in their trespasses and sins alive” That’s not an answer. That doesn’t even address the question. It is just a restatement of the Limited Atonement position. It doesn’t explain how such an offer is genuine if God has no intention of following up on it. How can you say that God truly loves the reprobate if He has no intention of saving them? How can you say that an offer to save them is a true offer if He withholds the means of accepting it? He offers a contract with no pen and then proclaims, “Well they didn’t sign.” God is sovereign; He can do what He wants. But how is that honest?<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Another argument against limited atonement points to the passages in the Bible that speak of Christ’s atonement in a more general or unlimited sense… However, these verses are easily reconciled with the many other verses that support the doctrine of limited atonement simply by recognizing that often the Bible uses the words “world” or “all” in a limited sense.</span></blockquote>
This is partly correct. It is true that ‘all’ does not necessarily mean ‘all and sundry’. However, ‘all’ without qualifiers still should mean something universal and general. I also do not think that the Arminian interpretation of these texts have to be understood to mean each and every individual. But 'all' does include those who are lost since the lost are part of the world. And excluding the lost from these texts often does great damage to the context of the passages. But since he doesn’t address any particular texts, there isn’t really much more I can say. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Yet another argument against limited atonement is that it is a hindrance to the preaching of the gospel and to evangelism.</span></blockquote>
On a practical level, this accusation does seem to be false. Calvinist churches have a long history of being very active evangelists. What I think this article fails to recognize though is that the honest offer of the gospel for the reprobate is such a <b>powerful</b> motivator, that it is difficult for many Arminians to understand why the Calvinist would be motivated to do so at all. I think this is short sighted on their part. Calvinists are generally motivated to evangelize because God commanded them to do so. This is a sufficient motivator. But I do think that the motive given by the doctrine Unlimited Atonement is so powerful, that it does speak to the doctrine’s veracity. <br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Points of Offense</span></b><br />
<div>
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"><br /></span></b></div>
On the point of evangelism, the article then shifts its attention from criticisms of Limited Atonement to criticisms of Unlimited Atonement.<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">First of all, if the atonement was truly unlimited, then every person would be saved as all of their sins, including the sin of unbelief, would have been paid for by Christ on the cross. </span></blockquote>
This assumes Irresistible Grace, which Arminians reject. To overly isolate Unlimited Atonement like this is a straw-man. <br />
<br />
Here he also says, “<span style="color: #38761d;">The question, then, is not whether the Bible teaches a limited atonement but how or in what sense the atonement is limited</span>”. Yes! This is exactly true. Arminians are not universalists. Both Arminians and Calvinists agree that we are not born justified, so the atonement needs to be applied. And both Arminians and Calvinists agree that once applied, it completely justifies the person, so it is completely efficacious. We disagree on how God decides who to apply it to, but that is the discussion of election, not the atonement which has to do with God’s intent. And it is right here, this muddled mess of a paragraph that shows how little the article understands what this discussion is actually about.<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #38761d;">Is the power of the atonement limited in that it only makes salvation a possibility, or is its power to save unlimited and it actually results in the salvation of those whom God intended to save (the elect, His sheep)? </span>Its power to save is unlimited for all those to whom it is applied for they are justified fully.</li>
<li><span style="color: #38761d;">Does God do the limiting, or does man? </span>God’s election does the limiting.</li>
<li><span style="color: #38761d;">Does God’s sovereign grace and purpose dictate the ultimate success or failure of the redemptive work of Christ, or does the will of man decide whether God’s intentions and purposes will be realized?</span> God’s sovereign grace and purpose. </li>
</ol>
<br />
And these are the answers that all Arminians give. These questions are not toward an Arminian, but some straw-man that the Calvinist feels good about knocking down. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">A major problem with unlimited atonement is that it makes redemption merely a potential or hypothetical act. An unlimited atonement means that Christ’s sacrifice is not effectual until the sinner does his part in believing.</span></blockquote>
False. Are you born justified? If you say no, then you are in agreement with me that the sacrifice is not effectual until it is applied by the Holy Spirit to the believer. But it is God that does the applying, not man. I can have all of the faith of Abraham, but if the Holy Spirit does not apply Christ’s atonement to me, then I am condemned. My faith does not justify me. Christ does. <br />
<br />
There’s another really bad argument in this paragraph. He says, “ Logically, it makes no sense for God the Father to have Christ atone for the sins of people who were already suffering the wrath of God for their sin.” God is not bound in time. There is no reason to think that temporal considerations have any bearing on the nature of eternal punishment. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Still another problem with an unlimited view of the atonement is that it demeans the righteousness of God and destroys the grounds of a believer’s assurance. </span></blockquote>
This objection is grounded in something the article says a little early but I saved until now, and this is the issue of double jeopardy, and I’ve been dancing around this issue for awhile. That is, if Jesus died for the reprobate, then for them to suffer their punishment means that both Jesus and them suffer punishment for the same sin. This is an interesting objection. Now, if my point about application is true, then there is something odd about this objection. <br />
<br />
Every Calvinist I know agrees with the statement that they are not born justified. However, why is that? Why are we not born justified? And I think the Scripture demands this point, so denying it gets them in different trouble. There is some conceptual block on this issue. <br />
<br />
They claim that Christ’s atonement merely makes salvation possible. This is an example of the “merely” fallacy: that the insertion of the word ‘merely’ makes something bad. No, Christ’s atonement is the thing that is actually used to justify a person. But it has to be applied. And in the sense that it has to be applied, before it is applied, our justification is a potential rather than an actual. And this is true in both theologies. And I don’t think it is a problem, as long as, in the end, it is the application that justifies rather than the person’s actions. This makes salvation by faith a gift, and not some accomplishment, (Ephesians 2:8). Especially since time is not a factor, and necessarily so since we hadn’t committed our sins before Christ died on the cross anyway. <br />
<br />
So, what causes the double jeopardy? It is that the atonement wasn’t applied to the reprobate. Why wasn’t it? Because God didn’t apply it. That’s His choice. Nothing stopped Him other than His own decision not to apply it to the unbelieving. <br />
<br />
But does this mean that’s Christ’s blood was wasted? The power of Christ’s blood is infinite! You can’t waste an infinite resource. And who are you, oh man, to question God’s extravagance? I think all of this is the heart of the common Calvinist critique, and it strikes me as demanding that something is bad that actually isn’t a problem at all, but an inevitability regardless of the system. <br />
<b><br /></b>
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Conclusion</span></b><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Limited atonement, like all of the doctrines of grace, upholds and glorifies the unity of the triune Godhead as Father, Son and Holy Spirit all work in unison for the purpose of salvation. These doctrines build upon one another. The doctrine of total depravity establishes what the Bible teaches about the spiritual condition of unregenerate man and leaves one with the question “Who can be saved?” The doctrine of unconditional election then answers the question by declaring God’s sovereign choice in choosing to save people despite their depravity and based solely on God’s sovereign choice to redeem for Himself people from every tribe, tongue and nation. Next, the doctrine of limited atonement explains how God can be perfectly just and yet redeem those sinful people and reconcile them to Himself. The only solution to the depravity of man was for God to provide a Redeemer who would act as their substitute and suffer the wrath of God for their sins. He did this in the death of Christ, who, having been crucified, completely and totally “canceled out the certificate of debt…having nailed it to the cross” (Colossians 2:13-14).</span></blockquote>
Ironically, I think that Calvinism actually undermines the Trinity by making Christ and the Holy Spirit <i>merely</i> Father’s right and left hands. But I don't have space to actually make that argument here, so I won't. That’s a different post. <br />
<br />
I do agree though that TULIP is a full system that builds on itself. But this is ironic since much of the critique of Arminianism here fails to give it the same consideration. In the FACTS, ‘T’ (Total Depravity) is the who needs to be saved and what they need saving from. ‘A’ (Atonement For All) is God’s ardent heart to save those whom He had made. ‘C’ (Conditional Election) is His righteous commitment to save on His terms. ‘F’ (Freed to Believe by Grace) is the means through which He has sovereignly chosen to save. ‘S’ (Security in Christ) is the commitment to acknowledging that it is Christ that grounds assurance and security rather than unknowable decrees. It is a full system. And Calvinists would do well to learn that system before critiquing it. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-91965205314385344842019-08-29T07:00:00.000-04:002019-08-30T15:06:08.336-04:00Response to "Got Questions: Limited Atonement- Is It Biblical" Part I<a fbclid="IwAR012aw802-QYaXbff0wEGYSzlQnMgbQYPpgaJ8yaEoZIZ5WrO_UDOV1Mxw”" href="https://www.blogger.com/%E2%80%9D" https:="" limited-atonement.html="" www.gotquestions.org="">An article </a>was recently shared with me that had convinced an Arminian to become a Calvinist. It is an article which describes the doctrine of Limited Atonement. For those who are curious about my thoughts on the matter, I wrote an in-depth article on the issue <a href="https://www.blogger.com/%E2%80%9Dhttps://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html%E2%80%9D">here</a>. My thoughts haven’t really changed since then. But, for the purpose of this article, I’ll define the two positions as follows:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>Limited Atonement:</b> The belief that God only intended to save those who are actually saved.</li>
<li><b>Unlimited Atonement:</b> God both desires and acts with the intent to save all of mankind. </li>
</ul>
Now I have defined it this way because I find the usual definitions of the terms unhelpful, focusing on emphases rather than actual differences. I also don’t think that the debate has anything really to do with the nature of the atonement, but rather with the place the atonement takes within God’s overall plan. Both sides believe that God, on some level, wants to save everybody, that Christ’s death is sufficient to save everyone, is completely efficacious in securing that atonement, and that it accomplishes what it was intended to accomplish. All language to the contrary is simply misrepresentative. <br />
<br />
Now with the preliminaries out of the way, let’s get to the article. The article is in two pieces, so I’ll be writing two parts to this response: first to the main article, and then to the counterargument section. I won’t be responding to each and every line, so I encourage you to go and <a href="https://www.gotquestions.org/limited-atonement.html?fbclid=IwAR012aw802-QYaXbff0wEGYSzlQnMgbQYPpgaJ8yaEoZIZ5WrO_UDOV1Mxw" target="_blank">read the article</a> in full. So, let’s get into it:<span style="color: red;"><br />
</span><br />
<br />
Now, my basic reaction to this post is that it is very unimpressive. For the most part it relies on being vague about what Limited Atonement teaches and using caricatures of Unlimited Atonement. Though I've seen worse. His comments in the first paragraph about the Scripture mattering more than wording are well taken, but the fact that he is never clear on what he is proving with the Scripture quotes he gives means that I can simply say I affirm every quote he gives and see no reason to accept Limited Atonement. You can't just say a passage confirms your position. You have to show it.<br />
<br />
So he doesn’t really get into the meat of the issue until paragraph 2 where he defines Limited Atonement thusly:<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">The doctrine of limited atonement affirms that the Bible teaches Christ’s atoning work on the cross was done with a definite purpose in mind—to redeem for God people from every tribe, tongue and nation (Revelation 5:9). </span></blockquote>
Now this definition is a real problem. It is because no one disagrees with this sentence. Of course the atonement had a definite purpose in mind; and of course God wants to redeem people from every tribe, tongue, and nation. We all believe this. Since it doesn’t differentiate Limited Atonement, it can’t be a proper definition. <br />
<br />
He then goes on to quote several biblical passages which affirm that bit that we all agree with. That’s fine. I affirm these passages too, though I will quibble about the John 6:37-40 passage. This passage is later echoed in John 17, especially verse 12. Here we see that this language is specifically referring to disciples that Jesus had during His earthly ministry, and not every single believer. It is also worth noting that Judas is one that is “given to Him”, and yet he DOES walk away. But since that is more the P than the L in TULIP, I won’t press it too hard here. <br />
<br />
He ends the paragraph with: <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">These verses and many others talk about an atonement that was specific in whom it covered (God’s people), was substitutionary in nature (He actually bore their sins on the cross), and actually accomplished what God intended it to do (justify many). Clearly, here is a picture of an intentional, definite atonement. Christ died not simply to make justification a possibility but to actually justify those He died for. He died to save them, not to make them savable.</span></blockquote>
So again, he doesn’t say anything here that I technically disagree with, except that I know that he is defining terms differently than me. For instance, he understands “God’s people” to be the list of every individual who will enter into eternal life. I understand “God’s people” as the kingdom Christ, chosen through Christ, made up of whoever has faith in Him. I disagree with what he means, but I agree with the sentence that he utters. <br />
<br />
Also, “the atonement accomplishes what it was intended to do”. Yes. It accomplishes our atonement. “Christ died not simply to make justification a possibility but to actually justify those He died for. He died to save them, not to make them savable.” Correct. However, even though I agree with the sentences, I know that he thinks he is denying unlimited atonement. He’s not. I’ve never met any Arminian who says that the atonement makes us “savable”. That’s not a thing. <br />
<br />
Let’s think about this carefully. In Calvinism, are the elect born redeemed, or do they become redeemed? I’ve known no Calvinist who thinks that we are born redeemed. Yet Christ’s death was 2000 years ago (±15 years). In both systems our atonement was procured then and is applied now. So, the atonement is not efficacious until it is applied. We also all agree that once the atonement is applied, the person is 100% redeemed. Thus, we agree on efficaciousness. This whole “savable” thing is simply the gap between the point in which the atonement is procured and the point in which it is applied. While there is a difference in God’s choice in applying it, the NATURE of the atonement is the same. <br />
<br />
Next we get into substitutionary atonement: <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">The doctrine of limited atonement also recognizes that the Bible teaches Jesus’ death on the cross was a substitutionary atonement for sins. Many theologians use the word “vicarious” to describe Christ’s atonement. This word means “acting on behalf of” or “representing another” and is used to describe “something performed or suffered by one person with the results accruing to the benefit or advantage of another.” The vicarious atonement of Christ means He was acting as a representative for a specific group of people (the elect) who would receive a direct benefit (salvation) as the result of His death. This concept is clearly seen in 2 Corinthians 5:21: “He (God the Father) made Him (Christ) who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the righteousness of God in Him.” </span></blockquote>
Again, we believe in a substitutionary atonement. However, after this, he begins to get interesting. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">If Jesus actually stood in my place and bore my sin on the cross as the Bible teaches, then I can never be punished for that sin. In order for Christ’s atonement to truly be a substitutionary or vicarious atonement, then it must actually secure a real salvation for all for whom Christ died. If the atonement only makes salvation a possibility, then it cannot be a vicarious atonement. If Christ acted as a real and true substitute for those for whom He died, then all for whom He died will be saved. To say that Christ died a vicarious death in the place of all sinners but that not all sinners will be saved is a contradiction. </span></blockquote>
There is an assumption here. That assumption is that in order for a vicarious atonement to work, there must be a direct one to one correlation to the one sacrificed and to each and every beneficiary. I do not see why this has to be the case. People groups in the Bible are understood as true entities, and often are in the law as well. If a company is in debt, does that debt get distributed to each and every member of that company? No, not really. It is the company that is in debt. And if that debt is paid for by some outside donor, does that donor have to pay a distinct check for each and every member of the company? Of course not. And yet there is a very real sense in which the company is in debt, and that the company is redeemed. <br />
<br />
And we see this in Israel throughout the OT. When Israel sins, does that mean that each and every Israelite committed the same sin? No. Indeed, we know the prophets didn’t. When Israel is punished though, they are all punished together. And when Judah is restored, does that mean that each and every Jew has an individual restoration? No. I personally see no reason to accept this premise. As such, the conclusion doesn’t follow either. <br />
<br />
The next paragraph and the one after talk about how the terms ransom, reconciliation, propitiation and substitute imply a limited atonement. But since he has yet to give a definition of limited atonement that distinguishes it from unlimited atonement, and does not provide an argument as to why these terms imply a limited atonement, there is little for me to say here. <br />
<br />
Now let that sink in. We are five paragraphs in, and he has yet to give a clear definition of limited atonement that distinguishes it from unlimited atonement. Now, I know what he means. And there is a good chance you know what he means. But since this supposed to be explaining the basics, we shouldn’t HAVE to know what he means to understand what he is saying. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-80662890295580440862018-12-24T03:38:00.001-05:002018-12-28T15:29:16.612-05:00When Does The Day End?I’ve been thinking about this question for a little while now, but what actually determines when the day ends? I don’t mean physically, but rhetorically, like when someone says, “At the end of the day…”. Now why exactly is that the end of the day?<br />
<br />
Sometimes this is obvious, but I’m not wondering this in a vacuum. I’m really wondering this when it comes to Calvinists. One of the major claims that they make is “At the end of the day, Arminians believe they are responsible for their salvation.” Now, I’ve heard arguments that they’ve made to that effect, but for the life of me I don’t really know what they mean by “At the end of the day” in that sentence. It seems to simply be there to say, “Now I’ve thought about this really really hard,” but it doesn’t tell us anything about their actual thought process. <br />
<br />
So how do we determine who is responsible for salvation "at the end of the day"? How do we determine what determines responsibility for something? Well first, why do I think that God is responsible for salvation “at the end of the day”? For me, the answer is that He is not obligated to save us. Even if I have the faith of Abraham, He could still choose to not save me, and He would be completely justified in doing so. I’m confident that He won’t, but this is because He promised. My assurance is therefore grounded in His promises, not my faith. <br />
<br />
But Calvinists don’t see it that way. They claim that what makes us responsible for salvation is that our faith is the thing that differentiates us from those that are not saved. Now, as an Arminian, I cannot deny that that is the differentiating factor. After all, that is simply what it means for something to be a condition. However, that factor doesn’t strike me as determinative because, like I said earlier, it isn’t obligatory.<br />
<br />
So which of us is right? I could say that its me since Arminianism is my theology that we are talking about. Since the claim is with regarding consistency, then it is what I consider determinative that actually matters, not them. And, yeah, I think that’s right, but it’s also an easy answer and thus lazy. Maybe we can think a little deeper.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><b>Getting a Job</b></span><br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><b><br /></b></span>Before we tackle Calvinist/Arminian question head on, let's go more broad and talk about responsibility in general. We can do this with an analogy. Let’s say that there is a manager for a job named Mr. Smith. Smith is hiring for some well-paying position. He has two applicants. One comes in wearing a red tie, and the other comes in wearing a blue tie. <br />
<br />
Now Mr. Smith isn’t much of a thinker and he takes Leadership books a little too seriously. One of the things that these books say is that red ties give a better impression in interviews, and so he believes that he ought to judge someone on whether or not they have a red tie. Now neither applicant knows this beforehand, but Smith tells them afterwards that he has chosen the applicant with the red tie for this reason. <br />
<br />
So, what do we think? Why did Red Tie get the job? Was it because he wore a red tie when the other applicant didn’t? Or is it because Mr. Smith is a kook? At the end of the day, who determined who got the job? <br />
<br />
I think it is rather obvious that this falls on Smith. After all, he set the qualifications, and neither applicant was even aware of that qualification. Indeed, I think this becomes all the more obvious if we change tie color to skin color.<br />
<br />
But let’s alter the scenario. Instead of a red tie and a blue tie, the two applicants came in with completely different apparel. The first wore a black suit with a red tie, but the other came in with blue jeans, a Hawaiian shirt, and underneath a torn blue t-shirt with the words “Put Another Dime in the Jukebox, Baby.” Once again, Mr. Smith chooses the man in the red tie. <br />
<br />
But do we still completely credit Mr. Smith? Well no. Now we see the guy in blue as a schlub, and as such we know that he should have expected to have gotten a "No", coming dressed like that. <br />
<br />
So, it seems that predictability is a major determining factor of the “end of the day”. However, do we really think that Red Tie earned the position? Well, generally not. Rather we think that Blue, well, blew it. While we may think that Blue is responsible for rejection by not wearing a tie, we don’t think that Red Tie earned it simply by wearing a tie. Rather, we just agree with Mr. Smith’s evaluation and recognize that Blue should have known better. <br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">So, What Should Determine Things?</span></b><br />
<br />
OK, back to the question of the process of salvation. I think when we are talking about a process, we should take seriously the actual language of the phrase "At the end of the day...". What determines the “end of the day” is that which is at the actual end of the process. But I don’t think it is the final event, but it is the final decision made by all parties involved. After all, at the end of the day, Mr. Smith could have rejected both applicants. <br />
<br />
I think where Calvinists are coming from is how predictable God is in the process. If we have faith in Christ, then God <i>will</i> save us. Because He <i>will</i> save us, His actions after that don’t really factor in. They aren’t decisions, but just reactions to what our decision was. <br />
<br />
But I think this is a fundamental difference between Calvinists and Arminians, because, for personal beings, reactions are decisions. Even though God’s actions are enactments of things that He promised, He still has to make the decision to do what He promised. Therefore, for us Arminians, those decisions <i>do</i> count.<br />
<br />
Now I can speculate as to exactly why Calvinists don’t think they count. It might be because they view God’s will as compatibilist, so they don’t see His reactions as real choices. But again, the complaint is a complaint of consistency, and they of course know we hold a libertarian view of God’s will. Perhaps it is because Calvinists are casually-centered in their thinking, as I have argued <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html" target="_blank">elsewhere</a>, and simply view predictability as the same as an effect. It simply doesn’t occur to them to view His actions as choices. This is my hypothesis, but it’s only a hypothesis. In either case, I don’t think they’ve really thought through this problem from our perspective, but have merely isolated one bit of our theology, and deemed it inconsistent with their beliefs. Quite frankly, that’s an inconsistency I can live with. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-14434199555676433032018-08-09T22:22:00.000-04:002018-08-14T17:01:20.497-04:00William Lane Craig Gets Arminianism A Bit WrongI often listen to Dr. William Lane Craig’s podcasts, both his general podcast and his <a href="https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3">Defenders class</a>. They are very informative and I highly recommend them. In his most recent Defenders class, as of the date of this response (8/9/2-18), he compares the providential views of Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2018/08/william-lane-craig-gets-arminianism-bit.html#1">1</a></sup> Now I have no disagreement with his descriptions of Calvinism and Molinism but his description of Arminianism struck me as utterly foreign. I think he simply is confused on this matter. <br />
So, first, let me make some general points, and then I’ll get to his comment.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Some General Points</span></b><br />
<br />
First of all, I think that it is improper to speak of a strictly Arminian doctrine of providence. Arminianism is a soteriological position, not a providential one. This point will become very relevant as we get into the meat and potatoes. <br />
<br />
Now it is true that Arminianism has providential implications. And there are doctrines of providence associated with the Remonstrant and Wesleyan traditions. However, Arminianism isn’t a tradition in that sense, but a theological position. And that position is soteriological.<br />
<br />
This brings me to my second point. It is a point of debate within the Arminian camp whether or not Molinism is compatible with Arminianism. Unlike Arminianism, Molinism is a providential position. Therefore, the question isn’t which one is correct, but are they compatible. There are some who believe that Molinism is too deterministic to be compatible, and others who believe that any position which holds to Libertarian Free Will is, in fact, compatible. I am the latter, though I am not a Molinist. <br />
<br />
Indeed, let us consider the words of one of the leading modern teachers of Wesleyan and Arminian thought, the late Thomas Oden:<br />
<blockquote>A fine point must be sharpened in this connection: God not only grasps and understand what actually will happen, but also what could happen under varied possible contingencies. If God’s knowing is infinite, God knows even the potential effects of hypothetical but unactualized possibilities, just as well as god knows what has or will become actualized…<br />
This has been called “God’s knowledge of the hypothetical” or <i>Scientia media</i><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2018/08/william-lane-craig-gets-arminianism-bit.html#2"><sup>2</sup></a></blockquote>I think it is hard to consider Thomas Oden as not being Arminian in theology, yet the above quote, and others, clearly shows that he held to a Molinist view of providence. Or perhaps consider another prominent Arminian:<br />
<blockquote>He knows all things possible, which may be referred to three general classes (i.) Let the first be of those things to which the capability of God can immediately extend itself, or which may exist by his mere and sole act. (ii.) Let the second consist of those things which, by God’s preservation, motion, aid, concurrence and permission, may have an existence from the creatures, whether these creatures will themselves exist or not, and whether they might be placed in this or in that order, or in infinite orders of things; let it even consist of those things which might have an existence from the creatures, if this or that hypothesis were admitted… (iii) Let the third class be of those things which God can do from the acts of the creatures, in accordance wither with himself or with his acts. <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2018/08/william-lane-craig-gets-arminianism-bit.html#3"><sup>3</sup></a></blockquote>For those who don’t check the reference, that is Jacob Arminius. While he clearly taught middle knowledge, I’m not sure if whether or not he taught Molinism. But I’m also not <i>sure </i>whether or not he taught Molinism. It is disputable. Thus, it is hard for me to think that Molinism is outside the tent of Arminianism itself.<br />
<br />
So, let us instead refer to the position Craig is describing as SFV (of the Simple Foreknowledge View).<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What Craig Says</span></b><br />
<b><br />
</b> Now, as of the writing of this, Reasonable Faith does not have the transcript up, so I am transcribing this myself from the audio. So I apologize if I transcribe anything inaccurately. <br />
<blockquote>So how does the Arminian then explain divine sovereignty? Well, the Arminian appeals to God’s simple foreknowledge of the future in order to explain God’s foreordination of everything that happens. That is to say that on the basis of His knowledge of what people <i>will do</i>, God then foreordains that it will happen. And His foreknowing it in no way determines it. He just knows that’s what people will do; He knows what their free choices will be and therefore declares and ordains that that is what is going to happen. <br />
And that no more determines their choices as an infallible barometer determines the weather… The weather will determine the barometer. And similarly, God’s foreknowledge will give you absolute certainty what is going to happen, but it is not as though the foreknowledge determines what will happen. -timestamp 16:33, analogy details cut for space by me. </blockquote>Now this view definitely does not belong to Jacob Arminius, as we saw. But I am uncertain whether it belongs to any Arminian at all. In accordance to <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/11/richard-busheys-few-of-worst-arminian.html">the Joe Schmuck principle</a>, I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt on whether one exists. However, here it suffices to say that I am unaware of any Arminian who would say that, or more specifically any SFV advocate who says that. <br />
<br />
First of all, I think it confuses sovereignty and providence with foreordination. Sovereignty is the state of being king. God is sovereign because He is in charge. This comes with certain rights and privileges, as well as obligations on us as His subjects. But it communicates a kind of relationship with His creation. It doesn’t necessarily say something about causation. <br />
<br />
Likewise, providence is simply the working out of God’s governance. While we can talk about God’s providence of the future, and we can talk about God’s relationship to His providence in the present from the past, providence is not a concept which is bound to the topic of time. Indeed, my understanding of sovereignty and providence have a lot more to do with the present than the future. <br />
<br />
What Craig seems to be talking about is foreordination <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2018/08/william-lane-craig-gets-arminianism-bit.html#4"><sup>4</sup></a>. Foreordination explicitly deals with how God establishes what is going to happen in the future from the perspective of the past. Foreordination is certainly <i>a part</i> of providence, but providence doesn’t reduce to it. <br />
<br />
But, OK, does Craig’s description of how Arminians understand providence accurately describe how SFV describes foreordination?<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Well, no</span></b><br />
<b><br />
</b> I would stipulate, if not insist that the SFV is necessarily grounded in the B-theory of time. Indeed, the only reason I’ve ever had to question SFV is the doubts I currently have on the B-theory. The problem comes when one sees that Craig’s description of SFV is assuming A-theory categories. <br />
<br />
The fundamental mistake that the analysis makes is that it assumes that God’s providential activity is simply in declaring the future. This is false. Rather, God is already in the future, molding and shaping it, as He is also molding and shaping the present. <br />
<br />
Imagine a potter whose potter wheel is spinning clockwise. Does it make sense to say that the work of the right hand is merely to declare what the left hand is doing? Or are both hands working simultaneously on the same pot?<br />
<br />
Likewise, from the perspective of eternity, God has a hand in both the past and the future, and He is shaping both in reference to each other. God providence is simply the action of His hands, whatever action that may be. I see no reason why God acting eternally throughout history should be understood as merely Him declaring what will happen from the past. Rather, God's foreordination is grounded in Him actively being in the future.<br />
_______________________________________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1">1</a>: This is <a href="https://www.blogger.com/%E2%80%9Dhttps://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-creation/doctrine-of-creation-part-10/%E2%80%9D"> Defenders series 3, section 8, part 10.</a><br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2">2</a>: Thomas Oden, <u> The Living God</u>, (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 1992), pp. 72<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="3">3</a>: Jacob Arminius, Disputation 4: On The Nature of God, <a href="http://www.ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works1.v.v.html">www.ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works1.v.v.html</a>, section XXXIV<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="4">4</a>: Another word I could have used is predestination, but predestination is often more specifically linked to election and reprobation. But I didn’t want to confuse things by adding more and more words like regeneration, glorification, propitiation, expatiation, procrastination, consternation, and other words ending in nation and cation and ration, which are simply suffices to say that stuff happens in theology. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-61245424685403310702017-06-28T16:30:00.000-04:002017-06-28T16:30:25.844-04:00The Patronage Theory Of Biblical Inspiration<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">What Does
"Theory of Biblical Inspiration" Mean?</span><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">The inspiration of the Bible is an interesting
topic. The precise way God revealed Himself through Scripture isn't quite as
clear as in Islam or Mormonism, which simply has an angel showing up, and
telling Smith and Muhammad what to write. However, we have no such story when
it comes to our Scripture. The closest we have is Moses on Mt Sinai, and even
that doesn't translate over to a specific book of the Bible, let alone the
entire canon. This makes it difficult to say exactly what is meant by
inspiration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Yet we insist that it is inspired, and rightly
so. And we know basically what that means, and what it entails. To say that the
Bible is inspired is to say that God has ordained the content of the Bible. The
Bible says what it says because it is what God wanted it to say. And this
entails certain properties: authority, infallibility, and holiness to name a
few.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">But that still leaves the question, by what
process did God bring the Bible about, and how does the Bible come to possess
those attributes. That is what we mean by the "theory of
inspiration".<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">It is important to recognize that the theory of
inspiration does not inform us of what attributes the Bible has. Rather, it
seeks to explain the origin of the attributes we know to be there. The
authority of Scripture is epistemically prior to the theory of inspiration, and
if your theory does not justify a particular feature of Scripture, we reject
the theory, not the attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Now for those who are interested in what I mean
by the "Patronage Theory", skip to the last to sections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">What Properties Does
the Bible Have?</span><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Ultimately, when we say that the Bible is
inspired, what we really want to say is that the Bible is authoritative because
it comes from God. But this also implies that the Bible has certain attributes.
So, what a theory of inspiration has to do is fully and naturally account for
all of those attributes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">So, what attributes does the Bible have? Well
first of all, the Bible is holy. Holy means that something is set apart in an
honorable sense. It is established to be for something important. Generally,
what we mean by holy is that it is set apart for God. So, the Bible is
different from other books. And we understand this difference to be connected
to the idea that in some sense it comes from God. So, the holiness of the
Scripture describes two attributes: that the Bible is unique, and that the
Bible has a divine origin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Second, we have the scope of the inspiration. We
say that every single word of the Bible is part of that inspiration. This means
that all of the Bible has these properties, not just some. It isn’t as if
Matthew, Mark, and Luke are inspired but John is just a really interesting
expansion of their ideas. All of the Bible is included. The word for this is
plenary, or complete. But this also goes down to the very word choice. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN">1.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN">Holy/unique<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN">2.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN">Holy/Divine origin<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN">3.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN">Verbal<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN">4.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN">Plenary/complete<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN">5.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN">Confluent<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">Alternate Theories<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">Dictation</span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">The dictation theory of inspiration is the view
that God has told the authors of Scripture precisely what to write. Now
dictation in the most literal sense is clearly inaccurate. The text of
Scripture clearly isn’t not always written in the Lord’s voice. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Most who ascribe to a dictation theory usually
hold to something called accommodationism. On this view, not only does God
directly determine each word that goes into Scripture, He intentionally does so
in such a way that we can better understand. So instead of giving us direct
statements, like in the prophets, He communicates in a variety of different
genres in the authors’ voice so that we could better understand and accept what
it is that is being communicated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Dictation hits most of the checkmarks of our list
above. Indeed, it is the most natural theory to explain the properties of verbal
and completeness. However, it doesn’t sufficiently account for confluence.
While accommodationism does dull that problem a little bit, it is only a little
bit. After all, we are not just dealing with the mere simplification of
language or selection of genre, but the authors’ personal sentiments and
passions being included within the text. You would have to limit your
conception of confluence to such a point that it seems a mere charade than an
actual property. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">Providential</span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">A providential view of inspiration is when one
uses the features of one’s general view of providence to explain the properties
of scripture. This is popular among determinists and Molinists. Again, this
checks most of the boxes. Because providence views everything that happens as
planned by God in some regard, it can than say that each word of God is planned
by God in the same way. Therefore, God can simply make sure that the words are
what they are supposed to be. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Additionally, it explains confluence. After all,
if everything we say or do belongs to use, and yet falls under God’s
providence, then it follows the text of Scripture can be properly ascribed to
the Biblical authors while falling under God’s problem as well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">However, the think the principle problem is that
it doesn’t account for the uniqueness of Scripture. At the end of the day,
there is no difference, providentially, between the writing of Romans, Pride
& Prejudice, and Percy Jackson. In this sense, providence can be a feature
in an inspiration theory, and can be used to prop any theory up really, but it
is insufficient. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">Supervision</span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">The supervision theory is the belief that the
human authors are the ones who are writing the text, but God oversees the
process. So, God is giving advice, and commanding the person to change something
if they get it wrong, etc. Now, this nails both the uniqueness and confluence
properties that the formal views failed in. However, there seems to be some
difficulty in explaining how exactly inspiration is verbal. How is every word
considered to come from God if it is the human that is actually coming up with
the words?<br />
<br />
Personally, I think this can be overcome just by having God’s supervision be
more intimate. It isn’t as if God has to go into the other room, wait until the
author is done, and then see how He did. If He is every present, then every
word that the author puts into the text is approved of by Him. Also, God would
be directly saying, “don’t forget to say this.” Indeed, we can simply combine
this theory with a providential theory pretty easily and get the best of both
worlds. In the end, I think this view has it pretty close. My view is similar,
but it does add some additional components that I believe shore up the verbal
component. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Patronage Theory</span><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">So, I think the Patronage Theory is pretty
simple, but at its core is the understanding that canonization is not separate
from inspiration, but is part of it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">Canonization is the process by which a text is
recognized as belonging to the biblical canon. Generally, this is considered
separate from inspiration, where inspiration is understood as the God governing
the writing of the text, and the canonization is how the Holy Spirit helps the
church to recognize which texts are inspired. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">But if one thinks about it, our assurance of the
Bible is actually more dependent on the canonization process than it is the
writing process. Now the writing process is important too, for otherwise we
cannot say that it is of divine origin. But in terms of authority, canonization
has to be given a great deal more attention. After all, if God inspires a text
to be written, but it is not included in the canon, what good is that to us?
Likewise, if a text in included in the canon but is not inspired, then our
trust in it is misplaced, even if it is properly placed in God’s ability to
inspire. So, both need to be included. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">So, what is the theory? Let us start with an
analogy. Back during the Renaissance, if an artist wanted to make money, they
would usually be commissioned by a patron. The patron may come to the painter
and say, “I would like a painting on The Last Supper”. The artist would accept
the commission and begin to paint for what his patron wanted. Afterwards, if
the patron liked the painting, he’d pay for it. A more modern example of the
patronage relationship could be the relationship between the producer and the
director of a movie. What is especially interesting is that both the producer
and the director often get credit for the vision of a movie. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">However, a second analogy is a bit closer. Imagine
that you are in a class, and the teacher assigns a writing assignment. She
tells you what she wants you to write, and sets the parameters within which you
are expected to work. You then get to work writing the text. Now occasionally
you’ll go to the teacher asking for assistance. Also, the teacher asks to see
the rough draft of the paper to make sure that you are on the right track.
After you hand in your paper, the teacher comes up to you and says that your
paper made absolutely no mistakes, and she’ll like to keep it as an example to
show her future students what it is that she is looking for. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">The idea is that there are three steps. First
there is the commissioning of the text. God comes to the author of the book and
tells them that He wants them to write a text, and what it is He wants them to
write about and how. This is done through the internal witness of the Spirit of
course, but for the sake of simplicity I won’t keep making this caveat. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">The second step is the actual writing process.
Here the author is writing what God told him to write. But God is still
present, so assuming the author is writing in a state a prayer (a pretty safe
assumption I’d say), then God would be consistently correcting any mistakes
that He may see. While the author is still the one doing the writing, the Holy
Spirit is speaking with him, ensuring that there are no mistakes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">The third step is the acceptance from the patron.
This is when God is satisfied enough with the work that He wants to preserve it
for generations that follow. Here the Holy Spirit is at work within His people,
preserving the text, and inspiring them to recognize His fingerprints upon it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span lang="EN"><span style="color: #b45f06;">Stacking It Up with
Our Criteria</span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">This theory, in my opinion, holds up to the above
criteria better than the other theories we mentioned. Additionally, it is not
ad hoc either, but rather a fairly simple understanding based off of seeing how
things are done in other contexts. So, let’s look at our criteria and see how
well it does<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="1" style="margin-top: 0in;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><span lang="EN">Holy/Unique-</span></b><span lang="EN"> Only the Biblical
texts can be considered to be both originated from God on this theory, and
to have been approved by the Spirit in canonization. Because only the
Bible is commissioned in the way described above, and preserved in the way
described above, it is distinct from all other forms of writing.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><span lang="EN">Holy/Divine Origin-</span></b><span lang="EN"> It is divine in origin
because it is commissioned by God, and God is guiding the writers as they
are writing the text.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><span lang="EN">Verbal-</span></b><span lang="EN"> While the exact
language is chosen by the human authors, every word is approved of by God,
or He would not have excepted it as canon. Therefore, we can be confident
that every word choice communicates what God wants communicated.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><span lang="EN">Plenary-</span></b><span lang="EN"> This is applied to the
canonization process. Because the canonization is part of the theory, all
of the Bible is naturally implied by the theory. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><span lang="EN">Confluence- </span></b><span lang="EN">And here is where I
think the theory really shines. Unlike the dictation theory, confluence
would be expected from this theory, since the writers really are writing
the books. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">So, I would argue that patronage theory of
inspiration naturally leads to all the attributes of Scripture rather than just
some of them. I would also add that the theory will work with any theory of
providence: Determinism, Libertarianism, Molinism, or even open theism. It
doesn’t presuppose how providence works, only that the Spirit is guiding those
involved in the process. This is something that I also think is a strength of
the theory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN">So, I want to end with something funny, or
clever, but I can’t come up with anything: there. That’s the patronage theory
of biblical inspiration and you should all believe it because it’s right. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-5348714959080640252017-04-24T11:56:00.000-04:002017-04-24T11:56:36.647-04:00Understanding Necessity In Arminianism And CalvinismThe concept of necessity is one that, on the one hand, seems really simple, and yet proves itself to be rather difficult to track. When talking about theology, we usually are referring to the concept of ontological necessity, or what must exist. Another way of thinking about it is that it is impossible for necessary things to not exist.<br />
<br />
In Christianity, there exists only one necessary thing: God. Everything else is what we call contingent, that is reliant on something else. The belief that God is the only necessary thing is called <i style="font-weight: bold;">aseity</i>, that God exists <i>a se</i>, or "by Himself". Now the question that I want to ask here is how does this affect Arminianism and Calvinism?<br />
<br />
Now I wrote a post a while ago called <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/10/the-teological-argument-for-existance.html" target="_blank">The Teological Argument For The Existance Of Libertarian Free Will</a>, and the point I'll be making here will cover some common ground. But rather than simply arguing for the existance of LFW, I am instead seeking to explore the effect of compatibilism and necessity.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What In God Is Necessary?</span></b><br />
<br />
So the first question is, what is it that makes something necessary? The answer is that something is necessary if it must exist. In other words, it is impossible for it not to exist. This would be true of God. This would also need to be true of any of God's essential attributes. After all, it would be nonsense to say that God exists necessarily, but He could be someone and something completely different than He is. Rather, we need to also affirm those aspects of God that make God God. For instance, God is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, incorporeal, and eternal. He is necessarily tri-personal, which grounds His essential goodness. Without these properties, God would simply not be God.<br />
<br />
But there are divine attributes that God need not have which He does. Those are any attributes that define God's relationship to something outside of Himself. For instance, God is not necessarily creator, for He could have chosen not to create. God is not necessarily the God of Israel, for Israel need not exist. God is not necessarily just, for God does not need to be in the company of sinners (though He is necessarily righteous/good).<sup>1</sup> So even though God is necessary, it does not entail that everything we can say about God is also necessary.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What Will The Will Do?</span></b><br />
<br />
This brings us to the most important question. Are God's choices necessary? Now the Arminian clearly says no. This is because the Arminian believes that God possesses LFW, and thus His choices are not necessary since that is basically what LFW means.<br />
<br />
But what about compatibilism? This is a bit more difficult since I've heard half a dozen different definitions of compatibilism. One basic one is that compatibilism is the belief the free will and determinism are compatible, which isn't particularly helpful. One holding to this definition without any further development could simply say that God's choices are not necessary but couldn't have been anything else. Because they said so. This has always struck me as saying "I believe in A and not A".<br />
<br />
However, most Calvinists that I have met generally argue that by compatilibilism they mean that one acts in accordance to one's nature. That is, you chose what you chose because it is in your nature to make that choice, and because it is YOUR nature, it rightly belongs to you. Thus your will is free. To be frank, this actually makes perfect sense to me. This is basically how I understand the operation of the wills of animals.<sup>2</sup><br />
<br />
So for God, these compatibilists will argue that the choices that God makes He makes because they are the natural result of His nature. So because God is perfect, and good, etc... He inevitably creates the universe. Therefore, if God did other than what He has done, He wouldn't truly be God!<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Problems</span></b><br />
<br />
However there are problems when applying this understanding to God. If God's decisions are the expression of God's nature, and God's nature is necessary, than logically all of God's choices are necessary. God could not have acted other than He has.<br />
<br />
However, if all of God's choices are necessary, the effects or those choices are equally necessary. This would collapse the distinction I made in the above section. God would necessarily be Creator, so He would need to create. God would necessarily be the God of Israel, so He would need to commission Israel. God would necessarily just, so He would need to be in the company of sinners to judge them.<br />
<br />
The fundamental result is that everything is necessary, and nothing is contingent. This makes God dependent on His creation, since He needs to create it. It is not dependent like I am dependent on my heart, but dependent like I am dependent on eating: I must do it or I cease to be. This strikes me as a challenge to divine aseity, and a diminishing of God's glory.<br />
<br />
I find this to be ironic since most compatibilist think that they are bringing God glory through their theology. However, I believe it is quite the opposite. Compatibilism makes God smaller, mechanical, and dependent on His creatures. While the idea of making human actions necessary may sound appealing to the Calvinist, a flat our rejection of libertarian free will makes that extend to God as well, diminishing His glory and honor.<br />
<br />
So to my Calvinist friends, I suggest that you embrace the notion of LFW for God, just as I embrace the notion of CFW for animals. Then we can quibble and argue over the free will of humans.<br />
_____________________________________________________________<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"><sup>1</sup> </a>For more on this, see my post: <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2014/06/essential-attributes-verses-relational.html">http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2014/06/essential-attributes-verses-relational.html</a><br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"></a><sup>2</sup> Though, of course, animals are not moral agents.This is why I do not believe it would make sense with humans or angels who are moral agents.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-20958355762291265242017-02-14T23:38:00.002-05:002017-02-14T23:57:26.225-05:00What If Spiderman 3 Was Good?A couple of years ago I made a post about how I would have done <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2014/02/what-if-green-lantern-movie-was-good.html">the Green Lantern movie</a> differently. I've thought about the same question when it comes to some other movies, especially comic book movies, and I thought I would share one that I feel was especially disappointing: Spiderman 3.<br />
<br />
Spiderman 3 was disappointing for several reasons, but the principle reason was because it didn't have to be. Spiderman 2 left us with a great set-up for the third film, but when the movie came, it felt like they just didn't want to tell the story that the second movie set-up. All of the story around Harry Osburn felt like it was there because it had to be there. <br />
<br />
Furthermore, the fundamental flaw of the film is obvious: too much story for too little movie. Your telling the story of Venom (which is already a necessarily complicated story), Harry getting amnisia, Peter and MJ having relationship problems, a reworking of the Uncle Ben story along with Sandman, and the background theme of Peter letting fame get to his head. That is way too much, leaving the movie horribly cluttered and unfocused. But what's worse is that we didn't get the story that we really wanted, a solid conclusion for the relationship arc between Peter and Harry. The most important part of the movie for us seemed to be the least important for the writers and director. <br />
<br />
So two things should be at the heart of this correction: #1 the focus of the story should be the restoration of the relationship of Peter and Harry. #2 one villain besides 2nd Green Goblin. However, we want a villain that is going to influence Peter and Harry's relationship. I don't see how that'll be true of Sandman, so Venom makes significantly more sense. Also, with the Venom story, you can have the fascinating reversal of guilt within the relationship. <br />
<br />
So what follows is the story I would have told, with 4 main fights:<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Plot</span></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"><br /></span></b>
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Beginning</span></i><br />
<i><br /></i>
During the opening credits, we see the symbiote crash land on earth. We then can see it go on various adventures, maybe taking hold of various animals briefly, until it ends up in the sewers. <br />
<br />
We can start the movie the same way the original movie starts: with Spiderman being celebrated by the community and Peter trying to talk to Harry but being ignored. It is a pretty good starting point, so why change. However, once all of that is basically established, I would have Peter proposing to MJ, and MJ saying yes. Right after the proposal, Peter hears of a fire somewhere in the city, and goes to investigate.<br />
<br />
When he arrives, he discovers that it was an abandoned building, and Harry is there waiting for him. They fight, in a similar way in the movie (that scene was actually pretty good), but the fight ends with Harry being victorious, and Peter having to escape through the sewers. It is in the sewers that the symbiote attaches to him. <br />
<br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Black Spiderman</span></i><br />
<i><br /></i>
He returns home, tired, with the symbiote covering him as he sleeps. When he awakes, he has the black suit (which should be smoother IMO). He eventually shows it to MJ, but instead of being impressed by it, she is concerned. So Peter promises to take it to Dr. Connors, and he does so. Connors promises to look into it, and tells Peter stay away from it until he gets a chance. Peter agrees...<br />
<br />
And then immediately after we get a montage of him using it to fight crime; and having a lot of fun doing it too. This then leads to Peter bringing in pictures of the new suit to JJ. He has a conniption over it. This leads to the introduction of Eddy Brock, and the reward that JJ offers for evidence of Spiderman breaking the law. <br />
<br />
Peter comes home to MJ, and they have a talk about the black suit, and MJ's career, and simply enjoy each others' company. Eventually Harry comes up, and MJ suggests that maybe she'll be able to talk to him. Peter thinks this is a bad idea, and they go to bed. In the morning, MJ gets up, and leaves a note telling Peter that she is off to talk Harry. Harry sees this through a camera that he has apparently been using to spy on them. <br />
<br />
Harry then leaves his own note, or gives Pete a message in some manner, that he has taken MJ to some location. Peter goes there to save her, yelling at Harry for involving MJ in their disagreement. They have a second fight. This time, Peter is much more aggressive, due to the suit beginning to have an effect on him. During the fight, Brock shows up to try and take a picture and Spiderman destroys his camera infuriating him. <br />
<br />
Eventually Peter wins the fight, and Harry reveals that MJ isn't actually there, and that he never took her to begin with. Peter tells Harry that he's crossed a line. So far he has not wanted to fight Harry because they are friends, but next time Harry attacks him, he will not hold back. <br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Reversing roles</span></b><br />
<b><br /></b>
Harry, downcast, returns home to find MJ waiting for him. He doesn't want to talk to her, but she doesn't take no for an answer. (maybe some explanation of how she got in will be necessary, but that'll be for the director to decide). Harry and MJ have an argument, where MJ challenges Harry to reconsider his devotion for his father. Point out that while it was reasonable to be mad before he knew who his father was, at this point he's just being ridiculous. Harry than yells, "he killed my father", to which MJ replies, "Yeah, 10 minutes after your father threw me from a bridge!" She mentions that he died by his own glider at some point. Then Harry tells her to get out, and she does. <br />
<br />
We then cut to Harry looking off his balcony a bit later, when he calls to his butler to get his father's autopsy report. He looks it over, and then looks tired, and we cut away. <br />
<br />
We then see MJ returning home to Peter, and they argue about her not listening to him. He doesn't talk to her the way he normally does, and she questions this. Pete backs down and apologizes, saying that he was just really worried. She says she understands, and they move on. <br />
<br />
The next day, he goes to the Daily Bugle to find that Brock has won the award with his fake photo. Enraged, Peter goes after Brock, but JJ and Robby pull them apart. Peter storms out, and returns later with evidence that Eddy faked his photo. Eddy is fired.<br />
<br />
We then turn to a montage of Peter turning evil. Not emo, but actually wicked. The idea of an emo Peter actually kind of works for me since it would make sense that Peter doesn't really know how to be bad. But still, what we have in the film was executed poorly (especially that very uncomfortable dance scene), but I don't have any better ideas here. Perhaps it simply could have been done better. But the basic idea, with Connors commenting on the symbiote in the background, makes logical sense to me, and I think it could be done well. Be we should see him fighting more violently, flirting with other women, and acting like a jerk. <br />
<br />
MJ complains to Peter about his recent behavior, eventually blaming the suit which gets Peter really upset about. Afterwards she runs out. We find that she ends up going to Harry to tell him that Peter is changing and she needs his help. Harry asks how he could help, and she replies that she doesn't know, but she can't reach him anymore. Harry says that he'll try. <br />
<br />
Just then Peter shows up, asking what MJ is doing there. Harry attempts to explain, and talk to him, but Peter instead is simply enraged that they are plotting against him. Peter then attacks Harry, and now it is Harry who is trying to stop the fight. However he does defend himself, using some more advanced weapons than he had before. However, Peter decimates him in the end. <br />
<br />
He is about to kill him when MJ stops him. Peter than raises a hand to strike her, but then realizes what he is about to do. He takes a few steps back in shock. He then looks down at Harry, and then at his hands, and then back at MJ. He says, "take care of him" and webs away. MJ then begins to take care of Harry. <br />
<br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Return to the Red and Blue</span></i><br />
<i><br /></i>
Peter then goes to the church, where we get the famous church scene, complete with Brock getting the symbiote. However, he doesn't smile, ever. <br />
<br />
Peter returns home, naked. MJ is packing. MJ looks at him and questions where his suit is. He says he got rid of it, and he is sorry about what happened earlier. She says that a simple apology doesn't make everything better, and Peter agrees. He says, "hopefully time will. I still love you, but there is something in me I have to fix." MJ says she is staying with Harry which Peter clearly doesn't like. But he asks her to apologize for him to Harry as well, and she says that she will. <br />
<br />
At this point, Peter takes a sabbatical from being Spiderman, focusing on being Peter Parker and getting his head right. He also stops watching the news and ignores various calls from the Daily Bugle. Meanwhile, Venom has taken over Peter's role as Spiderman and is framing him for various crimes. He is destroying Spiderman's reputation and Peter is completely unaware because of his seclusion. <br />
<br />
At some point, Venom attacks Harry , or perhaps just commits a crime near him. When this happens, Harry realizes that Venom is not Peter and something is going on. He quickly calls MJ, but while he is on the phone with her, Venom captures him. <br />
<br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Denouement</span></i><br />
<i><br /></i>
Peter tracks down Venom (how doesn't really matter) and brings Harry's gear with him. He rescues Harry and gets Harry his gear. They have a brief period of forgiveness, and then the two of them fight Venom together (which, let's face it, was the only good part of the actual movie). The fight goes public and people see the red and blue Spiderman fighting the black Spiderman, and begins to cheer for Spiderman again. <br />
<br />
Harry eventually does some "death-defying" move to get a sonic bomb close to Venom, allowing Peter to defeat him. In the process, Harry is impaled by his own glider. The two of them talk about their past, and what could have been, and laugh. Harry says that he loves Pete, and then dies. <br />
<br />
Peter than returns to MJ. She forgives him, as he cries in her arms. The movie ends with MJ giving the final speach, interpreting the events, who Spiderman is, etc...<br />
<br />
Role creditsJc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-4442428747201912162017-02-11T00:19:00.001-05:002017-02-14T23:40:10.985-05:00Naming A Few FallaciesI've been thinking about the kind of conversion I typically see on-line, and in light of that, I've spotted a couple of fallacies that are commonly made that do not seem to have names. And so, I have named them. I offer them to the internet in the hope that people can recognize these as fallacious and, hopefully but not likely, improve the quality of internet conversation. They are<br />
<ol>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#SMB">Same Mind Bias</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#OF">Opposite Fallacy</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#MPF">Misplaced Proposition Fallacy</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#CF">Counter-argument Fallacy</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#LCF">Leading Counter-argument Fallacy</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#TF">Transubstantiation Fallacy</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#AC">Analogy/Allegory Confusion</a></li>
</ol>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="SMB"></a><b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Same Mind Bias</span></b><br />
<b><br />
</b> This is similar to the bias known as the False-Consensus Effect, where someone believes that more people agree with them than they actually do. However, this isn't connected to knowledge, but to thought process. <br />
<br />
The assumption here is that people usually think the same way that you do, and when they come to different conclusions than you, you make assumptions about how they got there. In reality, of course, people have radically different ways of thinking, and even sometimes come to the same conclusion for entirely different reasons. However, this generally doesn't stop people from generally assuming that people think in the same manner.<br />
<br />
A couple of examples are in order. First would be the well established Historian's Fallacy, where you judge a decision that someone made in the past based off of modern sensitivities. Another is the tendency for an empathetic person to think that someone doesn't care about others, because that person isn't being as sensitive, when in reality that person may care a lot, but is focusing on helping the person's practical needs. A third example is the expectation that someone would come to believe the same as you do, if they are presented with the same evidence and arguments which convinced you, and then become incredulous when they do not. Often, in the last scenario, one assumes the other person is ignoring you, or is uninterested in truth, but the possibility that the person may simply be ingratiated by a different <i>kind</i> of evidence rarely comes up. <br />
<br />
All of this is a lead up to the first fallacy I named here:<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OF"></a><i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Opposite Fallacy</span></i><sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/02/naming-few-fallacies.html#1">1</a></sup><br />
<br />
This is a fallacy that is based off of the Same Mind Bias and a specific example of an Appeal to Motivation. This is when someone has an opposite opinion of you, so you assume that they have opposite premises or motivations. Therefore, you are assuming that they are thinking the same way that you do, even though their conclusion is different. <br />
<br />
My favorite example of this is the abortion debate. Many times, people who are pro-choice assume that those who are pro-life are somehow "against women", which is strikingly odd. Pro-life people are quite open about the fact that we are motivated by belief that fetuses are children, and thus shouldn't be unceremoniously killed. But because pro-choice people are motivated by women's issues, they are assuming that those who disagree with them have opposite motivations. In reality both the pro-life and the pro-choice movements have a greater variety of beliefs thaN either side typically acknowledges. <br />
<br />
<blockquote>
<b><i>Definition </i></b>The Opposite Fallacy: The assumption that if one has an opposite opinion, they also have opposite motivations.</blockquote>
<b><br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="MPF"></a></b> <span style="color: #b45f06;"><b>Misplaced </b><b>Proposition Fallacy</b></span><br />
<br />
I honestly don't know why this isn't already a named fallacy, and perhaps it is but simply listed in places of which I am unaware. The concept is fairly simple. In the midst of a debate, a person misunderstands a particular claim's role in the other person's argument, or misunderstands the role of their own claim. When an argument is laid out mathematically like this:<br />
<ol>
<li>p -> q</li>
<li>p</li>
<li>therefore, q</li>
</ol>
the role of each proposition is quite clear. But in more complex arguments, and especially ones couched in colloquial speech, it is often easy to lose track what exactly an argument is doing. Therefore, it is quite common for people to just simply misunderstand what it is that is going on.<br />
<br />
The most famous example of this is the fallacy fallacy. This is the mistake that your counterargument works as an argument against the person's position. I can make a bad argument for something that is actually true. For instance, I could claim that everything that is made of water is blue, the sky is made of water, therefore the sky is blue. Neither of those premises is true, yet the conclusion is. Proving the argument wrong does not mean that the conclusion is wrong. It would simply mean that I will have to justify the conclusion for different reasons. But fundamental to this mistake is a misunderstanding of the role of counter-argumentation. What follows are some other examples of this kind of mistake. <br />
<i><br />
</i> <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="CF"></a><i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Counterargument Fallacy</span></i><br />
<br />
This fallacy is actually intimately connected with the Fallacy Fallacy. Indeed, it is essentially its opposite. The counterargument fallacy is when someone discounts a counterargument due to it being insufficient to counter to person's position. <br />
<br />
I often hear these kinds of arguments when dealing with the arguments from God's existence. For instance, if an atheist argues that God doesn't exist because of the existence of evil, I could counter with the simple point that God could have justifications for the allowance of evil. It is unfortunately not uncommon for an atheist to then say, "That doesn't mean that God exists!" Well, yes. It doesn't mean that. My point wasn't that therefore God exists, but that your argument is merely insufficient to prove His non-existence. <br />
<br />
I actually run into this a lot and, again, I am amazed that no one has named this fallacy already. <br />
<blockquote>
<b><i>Definition </i></b>The Counterargument Fallacy: The rejection of a counterargument because it is insufficient to defeat the whole position.</blockquote>
<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="LCF"></a><span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>Leading </i><i>Counterargument Fallacy</i></span><br />
<br />
This basically is an example of the Fallacy Fallacy, but usually when we think of the Fallacy Fallacy, we think of it in terms of the middle of a debate, where someone names a fallacy, and thinks that that is sufficient to win the argument. However, a bit more confusing is when someone starts the conversation with a counterargument.<br />
<br />
The most famous example of this is when an atheist argues, "If God created the universe, then who created God." Many use this as a stand alone argument against God's existence, which is simply confusing. The argument, as presented by Dawkins, was a counterargument against the teleological argument. But I could simply reject the teleological argument, or believe in God for other reasons, and the point because irrelevant. Now I don't think that it is a good argument even in that respect, but when an atheist leads with this, it is merely confused. <br />
<blockquote>
<b><i>Definition </i></b>Leading Counterargument Fallacy: When a person leads a discussion with a counterargument.</blockquote>
<i><br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="TF"></a></i> <i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Transubstantiation Fallacy</span></i><br />
<br />
Now the name here is actually a pun, and has nothing to do with the Catholic view of the Eucharist. Rather the Transubstantiation Fallacy is where a person thinks of a substantiating argument as a major argument. So for instance, one could present the Kalaam Cosmological Argument as follows:<br />
<ol>
<li>Whatever begins to exist must have a cause</li>
<li>The universe began to exist<br />
<ol type="a">
<li>An infinite amount of anything cannot exist in the real world</li>
<li>If the universe were eternal, then it there would have been an infinate amount of seconds</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Therefore the universe must have a cause</li>
</ol>
Now above are basically two arguments. One is the main argument which are propositions 1, 2, 3. But under premise 2 is a separate argument which argues for premise 2. This is a substantiating argument since it is arguing for the soundness of the premise rather than for the final conclusion. Whenever you present an argument, it must be both valid and sound. A valid argument is one where the conclusion logically follows from the premises while a sound argument is a valid argument whose premises are true. The process of showing that the premises are true is called substantiating your premises. Hence the name "substantiating argument".<br />
<br />
OK, so what do I mean by Transubstantiating Fallacy? It is where someone takes a substantiating argument to be part of the main argument. So, using the above example, if I were to argue that the universe cannot be infinitely old, because an actual infinite cannot exist, they may reply, "OK, but that doesn't prove anything! That doesn't mean that God created the universe!" Correct. It doesn't prove that. All it proves is that the universe must have begun to exist. That is why there is more to the argument. <br />
<blockquote>
<b><i>Definition </i></b>The Transubstantiation Fallacy: When someone takes a substantiating argument to be part of the main argument.</blockquote>
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><i><br />
</i></span> <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="AC"></a><i><span style="color: #b45f06;"> </span></i> <span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>Analogy/Allegory Confusion</i> </span><br />
<br />
I am someone that uses a good deal of analogical thinking as I reason through things. As such, I have found it extremely frustrating when using analogies in debates. This is because people often over-extend the analogy, claiming that it fails because it doesn't do what it isn't designed to do. Part of the problem is that analogies require effort on the opponents part to understand. They are fantastic at explaining concepts, but only if the other person actually <i>wants</i> to understand. If a person is simply trying to defeat you, they can easily pick apart even the best analogies.<br />
<br />
There's an old saying about the Trinity: all analogies fall short. I find this saying to be a tad obtuse though. Of course all analogies fall short of explaining the Trinity. This is because all analogies fall short of explaining anything. After all, if an analogy worked perfectly, it wouldn't be an analogy, but an example. At its core, an analogy is a kind of metaphor, and metaphors work by talking about something different, but has a tiny sliver of overlap, as a way of isolating that sliver. Analogies, by their very nature, are trying to merely explain part of an idea, rather than the whole thing. To say that an analogy doesn't work because it fails to take into account the rest of the discussion is a mistake. The entire point is to isolate the concept away from the rest discussion in the first place.<br />
<br />
Now part of this is because people also have a tendency to use analogies poorly. This is because people often mistake what the role of an analogy in a discussion is. Many think of an analogy as a kind of argument: a way of demonstrating the truth of what it is that you are saying. But by their very nature, an analogy can never be used to show an argument's soundness, only its validity. The purpose of an analogy is to be understood, but being understood is not the same thing as being convincing. Something can make sense and still be false, like fantasy stories. <br />
<br />
Part of the root cause of all of this that most people seem to want win a debate as quickly as possible. The dream is to have that one comment that shuts the other person down. However, in real conversation, dialogue takes time. For analogical reasoning this poses a problem, for understanding an analogy requires a sympathetic ear. The listener has to try to make the analogy make sense, for it naturally will not on its own. But if a environment of mutual respect isn't garnered, then such sympathy from an opponent is impossible. Instead they are going to see all of the ways in which the analogy falls short of the discussion.<br />
<br />
But we shouldn't do this, even if our opponent is using the analogy as an argument, for it is still good for us to understand his point. Just because the presenter doesn't understand the purpose of analogies doesn't mean we don't have to either. We can still seek to understand what is being said, and as such we have to avoid the tendency to allegorize. Unlike an analogy, an allegory is a way of re-framing an entire topic using different images, to get us to look at the issue a new way. In an allegory, there does exist perfect correspondence, or at least some facsimile to it. But analogies are not allegories. Allegories get us to emotionally connect. Analogies explain. Allegories paint in broad strokes. Analogies surgically isolate particular components. <br />
<br />
And this one is probably the one that I am the most passionate about, because the frequency of this mistake is what I truly lament the most when it comes to most conversations: people are in too much of a hurry. Arguments have pieces to them, and it is usually good to talk about each piece individually and carefully before moving on. If you are constantly trying to talk about the whole issue, it is very unlikely you'll accomplish anything. To convince, you usually need to go deep. And to go deep, you have to tease out the particular assumptions that the two of you have. Often our debates are merely symptoms of much deeper differences. ______________________________________________________________<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1">1</a></sup>I originally called this the "Same Difference Fallacy", but I didn't really like this name I don't particularly like this name either. Suggestions are welcome. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-6780604412357625552017-01-21T17:25:00.001-05:002017-02-21T08:15:07.632-05:00What The Atonement Debate Is Really AboutIn the Arminian/Calvinism debate, the most aggravating topic for me has been the Atonement debate. Calvinists will argue that Christ died only for the elect while Arminians argue that Christ died for everyone. Now the reason why I find it aggravating is not because it is difficult for me to defend my view, or that Calvinists are annoying about it. The reason for the aggravation is that the entire debate is kind of a misnomer. The argument has nothing to do with the nature of the atonement. <br />
<br />
Now some of you may find that shocking, but I assure you that the nature of the atonement is not what is actually being talked about. Rather the debate is about the intention for the atonement. Now when I first got into this debate, I somewhat laid the issue of the atonement aside, because more so than any other facet of the debate I could tell that we were just talking past each other here. Then I compared what we were arguing in terms of the nature of the atonement and concluded that we were saying the same thing, but simply using different words. This convinced me that the debate was an irrelevance. However, I've come to realize that the debate has to do with an undercurrent issue that we end up ignoring because of the way that we've named the issue. <br />
<br />
Now to demonstrate that we aren't really talking about the nature of the atonement, consider the following list:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">Both agree that a person is not born justified</li>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">Both sides agree that a person becomes justified when they have faith</li>
<ul>
<li>So we agree on the atonement's provisional nature</li>
</ul>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">Both sides agree that a person is completely justified once the atonement is applied to them<ul>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">So we agree on efficacy</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">Both sides agree that Christ's atonement was substitutionary</li>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">Both sides agree that Christ's atonement is infinite in power<ul>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">So no difference in "spilt blood"</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li style="line-height: 20.8px;">Both sides agree that it is particular in application</li>
</ol>
So this leaves the basic question, what is the debate about?<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Some Logic</span></b><br />
<br />
This issue is based off of a question regarding how God manifests His sovereignty. Consider the following propositions.<br />
<br />
A= God desires to save all people<br />
D= Some people are damned<br />
E= God gets everything He desires<br />
<br />
Now these three ideas as a group are mutually exclusive. You can accept any set of two of them, but not all three. This is because if God desires to save all people, and some people are damned, then clearly God does not get everything He desires. [(A and D)-> ~E] From this one basic premise, we can see what the fundamental logic is for Arminianism and Calvinism:<br />
<br />
Arminianism:<br />
<blockquote>
1. (A and D)-> ~E<br />
2. A<sup><a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html#1" target="_blank">1</a></sup><br />
3. D<sup><a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html#2" target="_blank">2</a></sup><br />
4. Therefore, ~E</blockquote>
Calvinism<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
1. (A and D)-> ~E<br />
2. E<sup><a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html#3" target="_blank">3</a></sup><br />
3. Therefore, ~A or ~D<sup><a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html#4" target="_blank">4</a></sup><br />
4. D<sup><a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html#2" target="_blank">2</a></sup><br />
5. Therefore, ~A</blockquote>
So the question before us is how do we settle this while maintaining God's sovereignty and upholding the witness of Scripture?<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Calvinist Solution</span></b><br />
<br />
For the Calvinist, there is simply no way to logically reconcile their view of God's sovereignty with the notion that God would want something and then not obtain it. Therefore, they conclude that God cannot desire everyone to be saved, or at least He does not desire everyone to be saved as much as He wants to condemn them. This seems to contradict several passages of Scripture<sup><a href="https://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2017/01/what-atonement-debate-is-really-about.html#1" target="_blank">1</a></sup>. So how do they avoid this?<br />
<br />
There have been a couple of different ways they have attempted to do so. One possibility is accommodation, where God's inscrutable will is simplified in the Bible so that we can understand at least an element of it. Another possible route is to understand these passages as describing all kinds of people rather than every individual person. Yet another method is the two will theory, which I half-halfheartedly expressed above. Here, God is understood to ambivalently want to save and condemn, and for some the desire to save is stronger, and for some the desire to condemn is stronger.<br />
<br />
Now I've criticized each of these positions elsewhere, and I won't do so here. For now, it is sufficient to point out that this is what the Calvinist view of the atonement comes down to: not efficacy, but a defense of God obtaining anything which He desires.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><b>The Arminian Solution </b></span><br />
<br />
For the Arminian, there is simply no getting around these Biblical texts. From our perspective, we are biblically obligated to accept the assertion that God desires to save everyone, even those that ultimately are not saved. As such, we must answer the theological question, "How is God sovereign if His will can be thwarted?"<br />
<br />
The answer is, that it isn't thwarted. There are two important challenges that need to be discussed. First of all, is it true that not obtaining a desire is the same thing as being thwarted? If it is true, then the Calvinist would be correct in affirming E (That God gets everything He desires). The second is how do we understand God desiring to save certain people, yet not obtaining that desire.<br />
<br />
The first point seems simple. To be thwarted simply isn't to not obtain something you want, but it is to be defeated or overcome in attempt to obtain it. Thwarting is a response to action, not desire. If I desire my son to go to bed so I can watch a movie, but then say nothing to him, I am not thwarted when he decides to stay up a little later. I did not act on the desire, and so I was not thwarted.<br />
<br />
"Hold on", one may say. "The problem isn't that God <i>merely</i> desired salvation and didn't obtain it. Even many compatibilists will say that. The problem is that God actively pursues their salvation, and He does not obtain it. Because God does act with the purpose of obtaining their salvation, and yet does not obtain it, He is therefore thwarted."<br />
<br />
Well, no. While action is necessary for thwarting, it is not sufficient. If God acts in such a way as to promote what it is that He desires, and yet intentionally does not act sufficiently to guarantee it, then as long as the actions that He <i>does</i> undertake are not overcome or prevented, then not obtaining His desire would not be the same as being thwarted. That's a bit of a dense sentence, so let's rephrase. It depends on how He acts. If He doesn't try to force His desire, than even acting to bring about His desire would not be sufficient to have been thwarted if denied. Let's consider again the example of my son. Consider if I turn to him and say, "Hey, would like you to get ready for bed?" Assuming this is a real offer and not a rhetorical question, if my son says no, that would hardly be considered being thwarted. This is especially true since it is in my power to force him to go to bed if I chose to exercise that power. So him staying up, in either scenario, is no challenge to my sovereignty over him. Therefore, the first challenge to the Arminian position is met.<br />
<br />
So this leads us to our second challenge. How could God desire the salvation of people who are ultimately damned? While we have shown it is logically possible, that doesn't mean that it makes sense in the case of salvation. After all, if He really wants to save them, then why wouldn't He act in such a way as to guarantee it?<br />
<br />
So here I appeal to the concept of a contextualized desire. Some can express a desire to have something when in reality they would only want that thing if obtained in a certain way. For instance, Lebron James may say that he wants to put the basketball through the hoop. However, he won't exercise his full power to do so. He won't push other players out of his way, or hold onto the ball as he gets closer to the hoop, or go and get a ladder or something. This is because, while he may merely <i>say</i> that he is trying to get the ball through the hoop, we understand that he doesn't merely <i>want </i> to get the ball through the hoop. He only desires to do so within the context of a basketball game.<br />
<br />
The classic Arminian analogy for this notion is romance. If you are wooing a woman, you want her to love you in return. If you had access to love potion #9, and used it to make her love you, it would feel hollow. Rather, you want her to love you back. This is rather analogous to the way we view God's desire in the context of salvation. Salvation isn't simply God saving us from Hell, but saving us to an eternal life with God. It makes sense that God would only want those who want to be there.<br />
<br />
Now there is significantly more to salvation than <i>just </i> this, of course. We have to deal with the need of redemption, and sanctification, and justification, and all the rest. The point here is rather an isolated question of why God would only want to save people in a way that they could reject. In answer to this question, the idea that God wants us to want to be with Him makes sense as an explanation for this feature.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Some Objections</span></b><br />
<br />
Now what might the Calvinist say to all of this? The first response may be to say that this would make salvation meritorious on wanting God. This is a very misguided objection. Again, if we return to the analogy of romance, if a woman does not want to be with you, does that mean that she is less worthy of you? In my wife's case, wanting to be married to me may be her only flaw! Ah, but wanting God is different because God is the greatest good, while I am most certainly not. Even then, it doesn't seem that wanting to be with God has earned you anything, because even if you wanted to be with God, that doesn't take away your sin. Only Christ's atonement actually does that. Thus wanting to be with God simply is not meritorious. Rather it simply represents the reasons for God's sovereign choice. As long as God could have chosen otherwise, we are not dealing with merit.<br />
<br />
A second objection may be that this would make the atonement of Christ merely provisional. It is the faith that causes the atonement to work, not the power of the atonement itself! This is a gross error. It is not as if you have faith and the atonement automatically kicks in or something. Rather God applies Christ's atoning work to the faithful. But again, He need not. I can have faith, and God could refrain from applying Christ's atonement, and I would still be dead in my sins. It is God's act that causes the atonement to be active in my life, not my act. Thus the atonement being provisional does not entail that it is <i>merely</i> provisional. It is still the atonement that does the actual justifying. Also, as stated in the introduction, this is just as true on the Calvinist system. Therefore the provisional nature of the atonement in Arminianism, as inconsequential as it is, could not ingratiate us toward Calvinism.<br />
<br />
A final objection that we'll consider here is that this leads to the fact that all which distinguishes the reprobate from the elect is faith, and that this makes faith meritorious, regardless of my earlier point. Well, first of all this is a criticism on conditional election, not universal atonement. There are other critiques of conditional election one may import into this conversation as well, but I'll just consider this one as a way of addressing that category. But look else where for answers to those concerns. To the specific objection, this is simply confusing merit with condition. If one starts out with the assumption that conditionality is sufficient to demonstrate merit, then this might go through, but I reject that premise. God having a reason for choosing something in no which way, shape, or form implies that He was obligated to make that choice. I have said significantly more about this else where, but I'll leave the objection here for the purposes of this post.<br />
<br />
So in the end, I think the Arminian is quite justified is criticizing the Calvinist for reinterpreting the plain sense of the atonement passages. While the Calvinists' theological concerns are duly noted, they are not enough for us to alter what God's word has revealed to us.<br />
<br />
<br />
______________________________________________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"></a><sup>1</sup> John 1:29, John 3:16-17, John 4:42, John 6:33, 51, John 12:32, 47, I Timothy 4:10, II Peter 3:9, I John 4:14, Revelation 22:17 and others. See <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2013/07/why-i-am-arminian-part-vi-convinced-by.html#atonement">here</a>.<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"></a><sup>2</sup> Matthew 25, Acts 4:12, John 3, and many others. Since this is a point we agree on, I won't belabor it. <br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="3"></a><sup>3</sup> Based off of their definition of sovereignty.<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="4"></a><sup>4</sup> Normally I wouldn't bother showing a rather obvious step like this. However, I want to point out that Calvinists seem to make this step very consciously. This is basically saying that either Calvinism or universalism must be true. This seems to be where they get the idea that Arminianism leads to universalism. But I think this is based off of their inability to recognize that their definition of sovereignty is neither obvious nor necessary. Indeed, I think they believe E to be more obvious than D, and many are simply unwilling to imagine sovereignty without affirming E. Therefore any attempt to object to universal atonement by way of universalism is merely a symptom of not listening.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-44219775054342463262016-12-07T20:07:00.000-05:002017-02-14T23:40:31.114-05:00Who Speaks For Arminianism?What is Arminianism? This sounds like it should be a simple matter. Simply look it up a dictionary and read what's there. But there is a problem. Different people seem to define Arminianism differently. You will certainly get a different definition at SEA than you will at Monergism.com. Then there is the question of whether Molinists or Open Theists are Arminians. And who gets to determine this? I'm going to dive into these questions here.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Language, Calvinists, and History</span></b><br />
<br />
First of all, there is the question of what determines the definition of any word. You can't say the dictionary since A) words existed before there were dictionaries and B) dictionaries are always changing. So what gives a word its definition.<br />
<br />
Well, the simple answer is use. A word develops its meaning over time through how it is used by others. Dictionaries are simply places for us to look up how a word is being used. This isn't to say though that language is simply a subjective matter. A meaning of a term is agreed upon by us for the purposes of communication. I can't simply use a word any way I want and say, "well that's what it means because that's how I use it." Rather it means what it means because that is how we, as a people, use the word in general conversation. The goal is communication, not merely self-expression.<br />
<br />
But this is a bit different when we are talking about the labels of ideas. Labels that we use for ideas, like any label/word, is simply a shorthand that we use to talk about something complex. It is easier for me to say, "capitalism" then for me to say "the belief that markets by nature are influenced by the routine decisions of people driven by their own self-interest". Imagine using that long definition every time you wanted to refer to the concept! So instead, we assign the idea a label. This can make the idea more ambiguous if people misunderstand what the concept is (indeed, it is difficult to detach misconceptions from labels often due to emotional attachment to the label), but it is also necessary or else conversation would be way to cumbersome.<br />
<br />
But unlike words such as 'phone' or 'car' or 'fridge', ideas are usually named very intentionally. And because they are controversial, they are constantly being managed by both those that ascribe to those ideas, and to the opponents of those ideas. Nobody generally gets into a fight about what the word 'car' means. Therefore, unlike 'car', names for ideas need to have some kind of objective referent to protect it from the white-washing of its allies and the mud-slinging of its opponents. This is why founders are so important to these conversations, and why so many beliefs are named after particular people. Calvinism isn't defined by what John Piper said or what John Wesley said, but by what John Calvin said. Likewise, Armininism is defined by James Arminius.<br />
<br />
Indeed, the biggest problem that Arminianism has is that for the past 100 years or so, the terms have been primarily maintained by Calvinists, and they've done a lousy job. If you go to the average Calvinist website which defines the word 'Arminianism', you would be hard-pressed to find a self-ascribed Arminian who actually agrees with what they describe. Indeed, the small handful of times I've met such people, its often taken about a 15 minute conversation to get them to either change their beliefs to match Arminius, or for them to stop calling themselves Arminian.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/12/who-speaks-for-arminianism.html#1" target="_blank">1</a></sup> This is because, in general, Arminians care more about the work of the church then they do about theological dispute than Calvinists typically do.<br />
<br />
This is why I always go back to the Articles of Remonstrance. I am aware that Arminianism has had a history beyond simply the Remonstrance. But the Articles are where I start because ideas need an objective standard that defines it, or else the terms becomes useless.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Borders, Centers, Open Theism and Molinism</span></b><br />
<br />
Now this leads to a second question. If we should define Arminianism off of Arminius and his comrades, does that mean any deviation from their precise beliefs fall out of bounds. Well here the answer seems to be no. It would seem ridiculous to suggest, for instance, that John Wesley was not an Arminian, though he disagreed with Arminius on quite a bit. So, I think the first clarification here is that we should focus in on how they summarized their position, rather than looking at Arminius as a whole. Again this brings us back again to the Articles, rather than all of Arminius's works.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/12/who-speaks-for-arminianism.html#2" target="_blank">2</a></sup><br />
<br />
Second though, I don't think we should restrict ourselves to the letter of the articles, but to the heart of the articles. Roger Olson makes an interesting point in terms of naming things. We can think of two different kinds of sets: bordered sets and centered sets.<br />
<br />
A bordered set is one where the set is defined by what falls into a particular number of boundaries. If we think about this in terms of sheep, it would be if one defined the flock by a fence. Those sheep in the fence are part of the flock, those outside the fence are not. This is the way that Statements of Faith work. If you affirm the precise wording of the Statement of faith, then you are within the boundries, and are therefore part of the group. Bordered sets work pretty well for organizations.<br />
<br />
A centered set is defined by a particular reference point. And the idea here is whether or not you feel as if you are in agreement with that reference point. If we think about this in terms of sheep, it would be defined by the shepherd. Those sheep that follow a particular shepherd are part of that flock. Those that do not know that shepherd are not. This is the way most movements actually work. There is usually some kind of person or event which defines a movement, and someone uses a label if they support that person or event. For instance, Pentecostalism is defined by the Azuza Street Revival. There is a lot of variety in terms of exactly what Pentecostals believe, but all of them look to that event as inspiration.<br />
<br />
Now the argument here is that Arminianism should be treated as a centered set, one where the Articles are used as a rallying point. It isn't as if you have to agree with the Articles perfectly to be an Arminian, but the closer you are to the Articles the "stronger" your Arminianism is.<br />
<br />
So with this in mind, let's consider two cases that people often ask if they are Arminian, and I'll give you my thoughts. It is worth pointing out that what follows is simply my opinion on the matter, since neither of these two position represent Arminius or the Articles. Rather, people have noted that there are some similarities there, and the question is, are they close enough to the Articles to be a kind of Arminianism?<br />
<br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Open Theism</span></i><br />
<br />
Open Theism is the belief that the future doesn't exist. Therefore any statement about the future has no truth content. So if someone says, "I will go to the store tomorrow", that statement is neither true or false. It is undetermined, like Schrodinger's cat. So if God is omniscient, that means He holds no false beliefs. So if God thinks that "I will not go to the store tomorrow", He would be wrong, even if I don't go to the store, He would still be wrong if He believed it today, but today the statement isn't true, but undetermined. He would know what will probably happen, and much more accurately than we would, but we couldn't actually know, because that would be Him knowing something false.<br />
<br />
Now if you find this hard to swallow, don't worry, you are not alone. I'm not an Open Theist either. In fact my biggest issue with it is that it rejects foreknowledge, while the Bible teaches foreknowledge. However, the question here is whether or not it's true. Rather, we are considering that there are many who argue that Open Theism is a kind of Arminianism (such as Roger Olson, who I mentioned earlier, though he isn't an Open Theist either). So is it?<br />
<br />
Well, the first thing we should notice is that there is something wrong with the question. Open Theism is not a soteriological position, but a theory of omniscience. So the question isn't whether or not Open Theism is a <i>kind</i> of Arminianism, but if Open Theism is <i>compatible</i> with Arminianism.<br />
<br />
The compatibility question has to do with the strong implications both beliefs have on providence, and also the doctrine of election. In terms of providence, both beliefs strongly hold to libertarian free will. In classic Arminianism though, God knows what our free will decisions are going to be, even though He doesn't cause them. While that is a difference, it doesn't seem to be a sufficient difference since free will itself is intact (though perhaps understood differently).<br />
<br />
However, when we come to the doctrine of election, there comes a bigger problem. Classically, we understand certain passages referring to God elect people has Him knowing who they are. Where there is a difference between individual election Arminians and corporate election Arminians, we both agree that God does know who the elect are going to be. There are numerous Biblical verses that describe God relationship with the elect that seem to make little sense if He doesn't know who they are. In my opinion, that creates a fundamental difference of what it means to be part of the people of God, and therefore an Open Theist is too far away from Arminius to really be thought of as an Arminian.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>Molinism</i></span><br />
<br />
Molinism is the belief that there is a kind of truth statement called a counter-factual, which is a statement of what would have happened if things were different. For instance, "If I went to the store, I would have bought milk." What the Molinist claims is that such statements have truth values, and therefore God knows what theses truth values are. This would include the decisions made by libertarian free will creatures. Therefore when God created the world, He would therefore use this knowledge create the world in such a way to get precisely what He wanted out of it.<br />
<br />
Now again, this is not a soteriological doctrine, but rather a doctrine of omniscience, but also of providence. So again, the question isn't really whether or not it is a form of Arminianism, but whether or not it is compatible with it. Here, I see absolutely nothing in terms of the question of the process of salvation. The only real question is if it is compatible with libertarian free will.<br />
<br />
Now his depends a little bit on your definition of LFW. I use two different definitions for it, yet one makes Molinism seem inconsistent while the other one makes it seem consistent. Yet in my mind there isn't really a difference between the two definitions. If you are confused, that's OK, it'll make sense as we go on.<br />
<br />
The first definition of LFW I use is the standard one: it is possible that one could have done other than what one actually does. Here there does seem to be a discrepancy. After all, one could say that I do what I do because of the way that God created the world. He predicted how I would act, and created the world where i would be guaranteed to do what I do.<br />
<br />
However, things change when you consider my second definition: that (certain) events and ends are contingent on human decisions. So for instance, whether or not I end up going to the store is determined by whether or not I choose to go. And this understanding seems perfectly compatibile with Molinism. This is because on Molinism certain worlds are not feasible for creation because there doesn't exist a scenario where someone will make a certain choice, even though they are logically possible. So for instance, there is no world in which I would go to the store and buy hummus. It ain't happening. So if God wanted to create the world so that I would purchase hummus He wouldn't be able to do so while leaving it contingent on my will. Therefore it seems that LFW is intact.<br />
<br />
Now I personally take the first definition to be the subjective description of the objective second definition, so for me Molinism is compatible with Arminianism. However, not everyone sees it that way. However whether you agree with me that Molinism is a form of Arminianism or not, it is still relatively clear that it is both similar but not the standard model. (For the record, I am not a Molinist)<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Conclusion</span></b><br />
<b><br />
</b> So who speaks for Arminianism? Well, no one really. Human life is messy, and we need to deal with that. However, there is a standard for Arminianism to which any contenders should be judged, and that is the Articles of Remonstrance. To say that something is Arminianism, it must be at least similar to what is taught in that document and the beliefs of its authors (and Arminius). Likewise, any definition of Arminianism which would exclude them is clearly defunct. So even though it isn't clear where the line is, it is clear what the center is.<br />
<br />
<br />
______________________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"></a><sup>1</sup> And every single one of them got their definition from being a former Calvinist.<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"></a><sup>2</sup> Though his works are well worth a read. He was a brilliant theologian, and more importantly an ardent believer in Christ.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-58419253834651187632016-11-22T09:23:00.001-05:002018-08-09T21:45:26.096-04:00Richard Bushey's "A Few Of The Worst Arminian Arguments"<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBRNVd30w0n91kyVxSe4E_VjtU_Il2kfcsEOQCQjFD-4lNBY1fIfJ6OHb5czz68aXcaPtLcy63qhdGvaa-mXHswKaMVVjChgz9O5S4URzVgY7oCWNBbo55O3jeCIgOvsMxGNSLMlAIVvE/s1600/Wesley.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="179" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBRNVd30w0n91kyVxSe4E_VjtU_Il2kfcsEOQCQjFD-4lNBY1fIfJ6OHb5czz68aXcaPtLcy63qhdGvaa-mXHswKaMVVjChgz9O5S4URzVgY7oCWNBbo55O3jeCIgOvsMxGNSLMlAIVvE/s320/Wesley.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHOH9KA-wk-5d2pCY8nsVRW8f249hAOK32FFUCGg1NlsVe3Z26t5zT9P0bonrO5ofHjrK1hL5q_xTQFVWcHpmM_DEuDHJ9uQ9CR04ZFbfFIRhg02v6GXPNtvs13O1yDC1MEHCeZpMR3Wc/s1600/Richard+response+to+Wesley.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHOH9KA-wk-5d2pCY8nsVRW8f249hAOK32FFUCGg1NlsVe3Z26t5zT9P0bonrO5ofHjrK1hL5q_xTQFVWcHpmM_DEuDHJ9uQ9CR04ZFbfFIRhg02v6GXPNtvs13O1yDC1MEHCeZpMR3Wc/s1600/Richard+response+to+Wesley.bmp" /></a></div>
Richard Bushey has produced <a href="http://thereforegodexists.com/worst-arguments-arminian-theology/" target="_blank">another article</a> about Arminianism, and I felt that as a friend I should give it a pass over to give him some feedback. Here he has gone over five of what sees as the worst Arminian arguments, so let's see whether they are as bad as he thinks.<br />
<br />
Now, before we get into the details, it is worth reviewing a principle when responding to "bad arguments" posts. Let's call this the JSP, Joe Schmuck Principle. Now when I read these critiques, and I'm sorry to cut the suspense here but I think the point is important, my typical reaction is, "these are all straw men". I've heard many Arminians make arguments which fit the form of the subtitles, but they aren't really making the points that Richard then goes on to criticize. So, its simple: these are strawmen, and that's why they seem so bad. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhaSxVA_XbjguhKW_ohGKFRXTHjyQIE4BPPSqc10gEdjD-SrmRWMa9de1-EAaJx9cgv6tv_lURZ2Tb4Zs3KOXaUMGVsqc3256oMiwnPCUFV8sjE4cOo1XLJCdUgjDft4DQrctDfRm5qO0M/s1600/Batman+-+response+to+wesley.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhaSxVA_XbjguhKW_ohGKFRXTHjyQIE4BPPSqc10gEdjD-SrmRWMa9de1-EAaJx9cgv6tv_lURZ2Tb4Zs3KOXaUMGVsqc3256oMiwnPCUFV8sjE4cOo1XLJCdUgjDft4DQrctDfRm5qO0M/s1600/Batman+-+response+to+wesley.bmp" /></a></div>
Ah, but this is where JSP comes in. You see, for every good argument, there is going to be some Joe Schmuck, especially out there on the internet, who attempts to use that argument and then does it in a terrible way. Joe was convinced by the argument, but didn't fully understand it, and then uses it with only partial understanding. Richard after all isn't saying that these are some of the worst arguments <i>I've</i> made or that someone I know has made. These are arguments that Arminians <i>in general </i>have made. The problem is that even if these do not represent the way I would make these arguments, that doesn't mean that Richard isn't correctly describing the arguments of Joe Schmuck. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSyayMMqVJ9bdbcYm-C0VCkewlESe_JJVGjPDgQUK947lKlcVJg5xK6cOcbNzTDp2jxaJ8jYxemYlp3lcnCS0-6dO5ZKmWRWsCaTPPtllcVSjrjvmrEMQH77CbSWGMK9TiM7vPnmcbn30/s1600/Richard+response+to+Joe.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSyayMMqVJ9bdbcYm-C0VCkewlESe_JJVGjPDgQUK947lKlcVJg5xK6cOcbNzTDp2jxaJ8jYxemYlp3lcnCS0-6dO5ZKmWRWsCaTPPtllcVSjrjvmrEMQH77CbSWGMK9TiM7vPnmcbn30/s1600/Richard+response+to+Joe.bmp" /></a></div>
Therefore, rather than saying that these arguments are strawmen, I'll assume that they are accurate representations of arguments made by Joe Schmuck. So first I'll correct Joe's argument and then see how the proper argument holds up to Richard's point.<br />
<br />
Also, before I move on to the actual arguments, Richard does produce an analogy to describe Arminianism and Calvinism. I'm not impressed with this analogy, and I have told Richard why elsewhere, but I don't want to get sidetracked so I won't get into it here.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihu8L4y2QtUKemFNAOjAwJyChIlRLAWA_tsAJys0AKd8IezT-p51cUJbJ-NaWzmXwogI5ujpCGe3zCHLL5Hu8ubUVQCVpRv39cIUYK3XuylLUXBZMzG8CrlrFyU4rkV7zsCdKvQvbAPrM/s1600/Batman+-+response+to+Joe.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihu8L4y2QtUKemFNAOjAwJyChIlRLAWA_tsAJys0AKd8IezT-p51cUJbJ-NaWzmXwogI5ujpCGe3zCHLL5Hu8ubUVQCVpRv39cIUYK3XuylLUXBZMzG8CrlrFyU4rkV7zsCdKvQvbAPrM/s1600/Batman+-+response+to+Joe.bmp" /></a></div>
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">God Is Forcing People To Sin</span></b><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Apart from God himself, anthropology is the centerpiece of Reformed Theology. We believe, like our Arminian brethren, that man is dead in his sin. Sin is so reprehensible to God that he cannot have it in his presence. God is a righteous judge, and he must condemn the wicked. The one who justifies wicked men is an abomination (Proverbs 17:15). This is where the Arminian will mount their attack. For if God is condemning the wicked, the wicked need to truly be morally responsible. If God determines who will go to Hell, then he is forcing people to sin and then condemning them for the sin that he forced them to do. At face value, this may seem like a compelling argument. But that is only when you load Arminian presuppositions into Calvinist theology. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">The Arminian is assuming that man has libertarian free will (the freedom to choose something other than what God has ordained). If man has libertarian free will, then God’s election would be a forced election, and sin would be forced, against the will of the transgressor. It is almost as though the wicked desperately want to do what is right, but they are struggling against the will of God who is forcing them into sin. That is not Reformed Theology. On Reformed Theology, man only wants sin. He hates righteousness. To say that God is forcing man to do something implies that man is being carried along against his will.</span></blockquote>
Well, the problem here is that Joe's argument isn't really fully formed. He says, <br />
1. If God determines who goes to Hell (H) then He is forcing people to sin (F) and then condemning them for what He did.(I for 'injustice') H -> (F ^ I)<br />
<br />
This clearly makes no sense. There is no connection between God choosing to condemn people and Him forcing them to sin. That is just nonsense. What Joe should say is that combatibilist free will amounts to God causing people to sin (F), and if God causes someone to do something and then condemns that person for what what He caused them to do, then <i>that </i>would be perversion of how the Bible describes justice. (H ^ F) -> I. <br />
<br />
[H -> (F ^ I)] is a very different claim than [(F ^ H) -> I], and far more coherent. And note how this argument wouldn't be assuming libertarian free will. It is, in essence, a critique of combatilist free will. Therefore Richard's first objection to Joe's argument would be circular if applied to the proper argument.<br />
<br />
Also note that I prefer the word 'cause'. 'Force' is more emotionally evocative, but also less accurate. This is because 'force' often implies that it is done against a person's will. This is precisely why Richard notices Joe's circular reasoning. 'Cause' on the other hand simply notes that God brought it about, which should be uncontroversial to the Calvinist, yet leaves the point of the good Arminian argument fully intact.<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">The second point worth noting is that this is a moral objection to a <b><i>"</i></b>biblical<b><i>"</i></b> account of God. It presumes to say that God owes some debt to man, and he is not fulfilling that debt. God could only create a world in which everyone had a fair chance. There is no way around denying that this objection assumes that at the very least, God owes a fair chance to everyone. The landlord owes all of the tenants a free choice, that he will pay their debt on their behalf. Think of how much more significant the sacrifice of Christ is than the sacrifice of the landlord. The Son of God was slaughtered. If God owes everyone a fair chance, if he owes us an indeterministic universe, then it would follow that the cross was something owed to us. The Son of God was paying a debt not for mankind, but to mankind. So even if we concede the point (on the basis of my first objection, we ought not), this is still among a few of the worst arguments in Arminian theology.</span><br />
<i>-Quotation marks added by me</i></blockquote>
Certainly Joe Schmuck does think that man deserves a fair chance, but the average Arminian doesn't. Rather, the problem isn't that God would be immoral, but that God would be unloving. Now one could say that love is a moral principle, and that is hard to disagree with given that Jesus says as much, but it has nothing to do with what people deserve. Joe, surely influenced by American values, has misread the basis of biblical ethics. However, when you do have an understanding of biblical ethics, there is still something very fishy with abandoning your children, while saying you love them.<br />
<br />
SEA recently put up a video by Jerry Walls that makes this exact point. You can watch it here: <a href="http://evangelicalarminians.org/jerry-walls-calvinism-the-god-of-love/">http://evangelicalarminians.org/jerry-walls-calvinism-the-god-of-love/</a><br />
<br />
There is another question embedded here. Do moral arguments have a place in theology? Well, yes! We believe that God is good. That is one of His defining attributes, He is omnibenevolent. Now people can take that too far and impose on God their own morals, and we should avoid that. However, the Bible has quite a lot to say about what is right and what is wrong. And if a theological position posits that God does something which is in contradiction to how <i>the Bible</i> defines ethics, it is worth pointing out that logical contradiction. <br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Whatever It Means, It Cannot Mean That</span></b><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">I do not know how many times that this has happened in church history. An Arminian mounts the moral attack against God in the last section and a Calvinist responds by directing the Arminian to Scripture. They read through some of the seminal texts of the Protestant Reformation, such as John 6, Romans 9, or Ephesians 1, and the Arminian waves dismissively. He redirects you to his moral objection, and around and around you go. He might tell you the old Wesleyan slogan, “Whatever it means, it cannot mean that.” That entails that a passage like Romans 9 absolutely cannot mean that the landlord is choosing to pay the debt of only some tenants because of the moral objection to that premise. The only solution is to reinterpret the text until you come across a viable, Arminian alternative.</span></blockquote>
OK, note John Wesley is not Joe Schmuck. Joe might misquote Wesley, but we can go back to Wesley and see what <i>he</i> actually meant. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #08760d;">This is the blasphemy clearly contained in the horrible decree of predestination! And here I fix my foot. On this I join issue with every assertor of it. You represent God as worse than the devil; more false, more cruel, more unjust. But you say you will prove it by scripture. Hold! What will you prove by Scripture that God is worse than the devil I cannot be. Whatever that Scripture proves, it never an prove this; whatever its true meaning be. This cannot be its true meaning. Do you ask, "What is its true meaning then" If I say, " I know not," you have gained nothing; for there are many scriptures the true sense whereof neither you nor I shall know till death is swallowed up in victory. But this I know, better it were to say it had no sense, than to say it had such a sense as this. It cannot mean, whatever it mean besides, that the God of truth is a liar. Let it mean what it will it cannot mean that the Judge of all the world is unjust. No scripture can mean that God is not love, or that his mercy is not over all his works; that is, whatever it prove beside, no scripture can prove predestination. </span><br />
-John Wesley, <a href="http://wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/the-sermons-of-john-wesley-1872-edition/sermon-128-free-grace/" target="_blank">Sermon 128</a>, paragraph 26</blockquote>
Note how Wesley isn't actually dealing with a specific Bible passage. This isn't his answer to Romans 9 or Ephesians 1. To that he gives actual exegetical analysis elsewhere. Rather he specifically says that the Bible cannot mean that "God is worse than the devil". Most Calvinists would agree with that basic statement: the Bible cannot mean that God is worse than the devil. Now, they would disagree that their theology <i>implies</i> that God is worse than the devil, granted. And certainly Wesley's language is quite strong here. But Calvinists insist that God is good and therefore they agree with Wesley's basic point. Any theology that teaches that the Bible teaches that God is evil must be misinterpreting it.<br />
<br />
And we can sum up Wesley's point as a hermeneutical principle thusly: biblical consistency. We hold that all of the Bible agrees with itself, and if a difficult passage seems to contradict the meaning of clearer passages we check our assumptions and reassess. Indeed, just three paragraphs earlier, Wesley lays this principle out plainly: "Thus manifestly does this doctrine tend to overthrow the whole Christian Revelation, by making it contradict itself; by giving such an interpretation of some texts, as flatly contradicts all the other texts, and indeed the whole scope and tenor of Scripture;". In addition to this comment, the vast majority of the text just before this is laden with Scriptural quotation grounding his theology in the Bible. Therefore, Wesley here is not responding to a particular Calvinist quoting a particular text, but is describing the principle of biblical consistency. I know no Calvinist who rejects this principle.<br />
<br />
Indeed, Richard himself says something similar in his article <a href="http://thereforegodexists.com/5-commonly-misused-bible-verses/">"5 Commonly Misused Bible Verses"</a>: "As we interact with our brothers in Christ, we may hear them reciting verses from the Bible, and we begin to think that what they are saying does not really sound right... But when we look more closely, it is revealed that the Bible is not saying what they want it to say at all." I've heard many Calvinists say similar things. And I don't point this out to say, "you are just as guilty." Rather I'm pointing out that what Wesley said is perfectly fine, and you are simply misunderstanding him.<br />
<br />
Now yes, Joe Schmuck often misuses this passage to dismiss Calvinist interpretations instead of dealing with them directly. This is because he's a Schmuck. It's a family trait. But if one means what Wesley means by it, there isn't a problem.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgchNByWSDWQQrZX-w343xPV4MUp_FK6KBjqUb-dcWRGKyjnPsDI_Semj_9EwAsZD2o8b9sxT3epOmxuTNV-yniExLoEWHYLP2m0xVNipYI_uIr59afJyY891HuQ99_ErWFzrAbYAPyXD8/s1600/Joe+in+action.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="209" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgchNByWSDWQQrZX-w343xPV4MUp_FK6KBjqUb-dcWRGKyjnPsDI_Semj_9EwAsZD2o8b9sxT3epOmxuTNV-yniExLoEWHYLP2m0xVNipYI_uIr59afJyY891HuQ99_ErWFzrAbYAPyXD8/s320/Joe+in+action.bmp" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">The problem with this approach is that it is not honest exegesis. The reader is not asking what the author is saying. He has determined what the author is saying before going to the text. He is like the scientist who assumes scientific conclusions before going to the data. That scientist would not be conducting true science. Similarly, the theologian who starts with the assumption that the Bible can never teach Calvinism is not conducting true exegesis. But isn’t the task of biblical theology to understand what the Bible is actually saying? Isn’t the task of the apologist to understand the Christian faith so that he can relay an accurate presentation to others? </span></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Suppose for a moment that while reading through the Bible, a theologian named Johnson came across challenging texts about God taking the lives of human beings. But Johnson was in denial. He said, “Whatever it means, it cannot mean that.” When Johnson is confronted with an atheist, he recites his favorite slogan and the atheist prevails in the argument. If Johnson were honest in his exegesis, he would have allowed the text to speak for itself and developed a more robust understanding of theodicy. The Arminian who recites this slogan is making precisely the same mistake. If he were honest in his exegesis, he would allow the text to speak for itself. When Calvinism is established, then you develop an understanding of theodicy. This Wesleyan slogan makes my list precisely because it disallows honest exegesis and takes an atheistic methodology to the text of Scripture.</span></blockquote>
Exactly right. Shame on Joe. Exegesis is more than just simply reciting slogans. You need to actually do the work of examining the text. However, if one quotes a slogan in the midst of a robust exegetical analysis, and uses it to merely point out the intuitive backing of the point that one is demonstrating through one's analysis, I see nothing wrong with that. Quote responsibly. <br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Calvinism Is A Prideful Theology</span></b><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Ah, so you are the special one. You are your parent’s favorites. The rest of us are on the outside, looking in, unable to come to God, unable to elevate ourselves to the upper echelons of spirituality. God has chosen his favorites and they may lift their heads in pride. That is essentially what Arminians will lodge against Calvinists. It is a prideful theology for people who need to feel like they are better than someone else in the world. Their ego is manifesting itself. While some may use Calvinism as an outlet for their ego, this would be an abuse of the theology. It would be a malfunction, not a function, of proper Reformed Theology.</span></blockquote>
Now I found this section to be rather interesting since Richard didn't point out the obvious problem with the argument, namely that Joe sometimes uses it as an ad hominem. However, Richard really does present the argument fairly here. This wouldn't show that Calvinism is false, but it does show a danger in Calvinism in that it can lead to pride. I appreciate that Calvinist's resist this tendency by Holy Scripture, but I would argue that this is in spite of the theology not because of it. <br />
<br />
However, I would point out that in my experience, the main reason for Arminians pointing this out is because of either the experience that Arminians have had with Calvinist apologists or because of the Calvinist claim that Arminianism leads to pride. This point becomes ironic as we proceed. But I would agree on the merits of the argument, that TULIP, not sufficiently balanced with other points of Reformed Theology, can lead someone to pride and I would insist that it most certainly does not protect against pride. I will concede though that this is merely an analysis of TULIP, and not an analysis of the full Reformed Tradition. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">In fact, Reformed Theology leaves no solace for the man of pride. In addition to outrightly condemning the prideful heart, Reformed Theology teaches that there is nothing in yourself that caused God to move on you. There is no worth, esteem, or merit that beckoned God to you. God did not recognize that you were better than everyone else and therefore elected you. He did not recognize your intellect or performance or zeal and elect you. He only saw a pitiful, worthless, wretched creature whose days are marked by a sinful heart pursuing the lusts of the world. You are saved only by the regenerating grace of God. That is a proper way to view Reformed Theology. It is only in Arminian circles that one will hear Reformed Theology characterized as a manifestation of pride.</span></blockquote>
Now here, we get to why I made a distinction between TULIP and the Reformed Tradition. The question of whether or not this is argued within Reformed circles is irrelevant to the question, because no theology lives in a vacuum. Hallelujah that the Reformed Tradition has historically avoided this problem. But I would argue that the shield for this is Sola Scriptura, not what Richard points out. <br />
<br />
This is because Richard is making a very simple mistake: accomplishment is not the only possible source of pride. Certainly, a Reformed person would not think that they <i>earned</i> salvation, but people feel pride from any source of superiority, not just accomplishment. Therefore, his counterargument is quite besides the point. You can see this in the way in which he makes our argument in the first paragraph. None of the premises that he presents there are countered here. He only counters the conclusion, not the premises. Overall, I think that Richard's reasoning is guilty of what is called, in logic, denying the antecedent, and it is a formal fallacy. Let me demonstrate:<br />
<ol>
<li>If a person accomplishes something, they'll be prideful about it [A -> P]</li>
<li>A person can't accomplish election [~(A|E)]</li>
<li>Therefore a person cannot feel pride about election [~(P|E)]</li>
</ol>
This is blatantly invalid. The question that arises is, is it possible for someone to feel pride in something else? The answer to this question is yes. People can feel pride based on status. An excellent example of a person who is given a high status without accomplishment is a prince. Nobility is not granted to a prince for what they have accomplished, but for what their parents accomplished. And despite the fact that princes are given their status unconditionally, they are hardly the paragons of humility.<br />
<br />
So here's the question in regards to Calvinism (i.e. TULIP): do the elect have a superior status to the reprobate? I think the clear answer to that question is yes. Therefore TULIP is no shield to pride.<br />
<br />
Note to Joe: None of this PROVES that Calvinism inevitably leads to pride. I've pointed out to Richard before that I don't like bet-hedging or slipperly slope arguments since they are rarely sound. All this shows is that Calvinism is not a shield to pride, and other doctrines (perhaps even the false belief that pride only comes from accomplishment) are necessary to maintain humility. If a Calvinist is honest about that, and does seek humility for those other reasons, there is no reason they can't be a humble Calvinist. However, I do think that if a Calvinist is not encouraged to pursue humility, and is merely left with TULIP, pride will most likely follow.<br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">In fact, ironically, one could see how Arminian theology could also manifest as a source of pride. If you are going to point out how Reformed Theology is vulnerable to abuse, it is probably appropriate to point out how Arminian theology is vulnerable to abuse. If the landlord offered to pay the debt of all of the tenants and some refused out of pride, but you accepted the gift, that will make a significant statement about you. It will say that you were wise enough to see that accepting the gift was in your best interest. If you are drowning and somebody throws you a rope, to those who refuse to grab the rope, you may say, “What is wrong with those people?” Accepting the free gift of God can be a source of pride if you were wise enough to accept it. If you are going to point out the way that Reformed Theology can be abused and count it as a demerit, then it seems equally valid to point out the way Arminian theology has been abused and count it as a demerit.</span></blockquote>
*cough* tu quoque *cough*<br />
<br />
But in all seriousness, let's take Richard's point here at its best and assume he's making the same point here as I did above; namely that Arminianism is not a shield to pride. Well.... <br />
<br />
Certainly conditional election is not. One can claim that any condition is a kind of accomplishment (though not necessarily meritorious. We can discuss that distinction another day). I would also concede his point that an accomplishment <i>can </i>give someone a sense of pride. Now I can counter this with the point that some instances of that pride would be ridiculous, like thinking that you somehow saved yourself when grabbing onto a rope... However, unless they are Joe Schmuck, an Arminian wouldn't ground our rejection of pride in the nature of election. We ground it in the nature of faith (as does Paul in Ephesians 2:8-9).<br />
<br />
Faith is not simply intellectual assent. It is a trusting disposition towards another. When I say I have faith in my wife, I do not mean that I believe she exists, or that I believe that she is my wife. It means I trust her. And not simply in a specific matter. It means I trust her in our relationship to be committed to our covenant. Faith in Christ is trusting in Christ to save you and command your life. Because of this, faith is an inherently humble disposition towards Christ. You cannot brag about faith for the same reason you cannot brag about humility: if you brag about it, you don't have it. Even if I were to simply brag in me trusting Christ as opposed to those silly heathens, that still would be ingratitude of Christ's act within me and a sign that I have faith in myself rather than in Christ. Thus, I wouldn't have faith.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">You’re Not A Robot, Are You?</span></b><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Since the free will theodicy has been popularized, many people will use it as sort of a reflex against Calvinist theology. God does not want robots, so he created a world in which there was free choice. When people hear about Calvinism, they will think that it does not contain a model of free will. So, they will suggest that if Calvinism were true, then God must have created a world of robots. In a world of robots, there is no love, moral responsibility, meaning, and the cross would have ultimately been for nothing because everybody just does as they are programmed. Is that the case? </span></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Unfortunately, many Calvinists do not have a thorough understanding of their own theology. They presented an anthropology that only discusses the doctrine of total depravity, wherein we do what is in accord with our greatest desire. While that is certainly the case, it is not broad enough to encompass the entire doctrine of compatibilism. Compatibilism is the doctrine that determinism and free will are compatible with one another. This is the majority view among Reformed thinkers and the prevailing view among the Reformed Confessions of Faith. So, Calvinists do believe in freedom of the will. But we also believe in determinism. We believe that these two concepts can be maintained fully and consistently. So, when an Arminian says that Calvinists believe in a world of robots, they are essentially misunderstanding Reformed theology. They have not apprehended that we do have a doctrine of free will.</span></blockquote>
Richard is basically correct. When Joe argues that Calvinists <i>believe</i> that we are robots, he is misrepresenting them. That said, I would argue that compatiblism doesn't actually work, which would imply that we would be robots if Calvinism were true, but it would be an error to say that Calvinists agree with that analysis. <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">Now, before you suggest that there is some problem with the doctrine of compatibilism, I must point out that this is irrelevant to the discussion. The objection that Calvinism creates a world of robots is an objection to what Calvinists believe. It is based on poorly expressed and bastardized versions of compatibilism. But if you assess what Calvinists believe, you cannot say that it entails that we live in a world of robots. You might be able to raise logical problems with the doctrine of compatibilism, but these logical problems would not salvage the robot objection.</span></blockquote>
Well, I agree with most of this paragraph with the exception of one sentence: "But if you assess what Calvinists believe, you cannot say that it entails that we live in a world of robots." Yes, actually, we can say this. We can say that your beliefs are logically incoherent, and that this is the logical implications of your beliefs. But I do agree with your basic point that we need to actually make that argument, and not simply claim it, or tell others that you believe in something you don't just because we think you should. So, I agree with Richard here about 90%, and that 10% might simply be me misunderstanding him. <br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><br />
</span> <b><span style="color: #b45f06;">God Is Still Sovereign</span></b><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">If you are a Calvinist visiting a strange town and you want to find a suitable church, you could probably find a Reformed church by conducting a Google search for the words “Sovereign church near me.” Calvinist churches often emphasize the concept of sovereignty. That is because sovereignty very much centralizes Calvinism. It emerges in our discussion, piety, and study of the Bible. God is sovereign over all things, from the movement of a quantum particle, to the falling of a leaf from a tree, to the wicked decisions of men, to the salvation of men. One of our major objections to Arminian theology is that it seems to compromise the sovereignty of God. He is not in control of all things. He allows the free will of mankind to even contradict his will and his decree. But, still, Arminians will still say that God is sovereign. This is among the worst arguments that Arminians will apply.</span></blockquote>
Hold on. This isn't an Arminian argument. It's a Calvinist argument, and we are simply defending ourselves. What is this even doing here? <br />
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">If we were to discuss a text like Genesis 50:20 with Arminians, they will likely propose an alternative view of sovereignty. While the text says, “What man intended for evil, God intended for good,” Arminians will suggest that what man intended for evil, God merely used for his good purposes. He is being reactive rather than active. But to say that this is an act of sovereignty would seem to raise serious questions about what sovereignty is. Arminian theology often focuses on God’s foreknowledge. God knows what men are going to do and he reacts to that, planning to use it for his purposes. But in this case, God would not be sovereign as much as he would be a fortune teller. Just consider the question: is God sovereign over man’s wicked heart? Is he sovereign over sin? If the answer is no, then one must say that God is not sovereign over all things. Therefore, God is not sovereign. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<span style="color: #38761d;">If the answer is yes, then the Arminian probably means to communicate that God knows how to use what man did for his own purposes. With that being the case, then God is not truly sovereign over what man did. It is an old cliche that disaster will serve as an opportunity for growth. If a governmental force exploits that opportunity, generating good out of some evil that occurred, you would not say that they were sovereign over the evil that occurred. You would say that they were shrewd opportunists. To say that God is simply taking advantage of what is happening is to either deny his sovereignty or to redefine it as something that is not even recognizable. To the Arminians reading: keep your theology, but please, do not say that God is sovereign on your theology. Own your theology.</span></blockquote>
Considering the previous section, I find this whole section to be extremely hypocritical. Yes, we have a different vision of what sovereignty means (which he doesn't come anywhere close to articulating here), just like Calvinists have a different vision of what free will means. Therefore, we need to ask what do we actually mean by the term, and then assess to see whether or not that vision is tenable, rather than simply pointing out the very obvious observation that Arminians are saying something different. <br />
<br />
So what does sovereignty mean? I mean in general, not in theology. Dictionary.com gives us these definitions: <br />
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>the quality or state of being sovereign, or of having supreme power or authority.</li>
<li>the status, dominion, power, or authority of a sovereign;royal rank or position; royalty.</li>
<li>supreme and independent power or authority in government as possessed or claimed by a state or community.</li>
<li>rightful status, independence, or prerogative.</li>
<li>a sovereign or independent state, community, or political unit.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
Note how none of these definitions say that a sovereign gets everything he wants. Now it may be possible to argue that, for God, He must get everything He wants to be truly sovereign, but again you would need to make that argument, not simply say it. Sovereignty is, basically, the right and power to act. But that also implies that a sovereign is not obligated to act.<br />
<br />
No Arminian that I've ever met actually says that a person can go against what God directly decrees to happen. That's an impossibility. But we can go against His will because God does not decree everything He wants. Let's say that I want my son to go to bed, because I want to watch a show. However, because I don't actually command him to, he decides to stay up. Therefore, he has gone against my will: something other than what I wanted has occurred, and I had the power and right to have gotten what I wanted. However, this does absolutely nothing to undermine my sovereignty over my son because <i><b>I</b></i> choose not to enforce my will. We do not differ in terms of God sovereignty, but we differ in terms of God's choices.<br />
<br />
But this is all besides the point, because at the end of the day, he is simply treating us the way he demands we not treat him in the previous section. If he wants to say that our vision is incoherent, then he has to actually interact with our vision of sovereignty instead of assuming his own. But of course we are going to say that God is sovereign because the Bible says that God is sovereign. If he actually convinced me that my understanding of sovereignty was incoherent, then I wouldn't simply own it. I would leave Arminianism. However, he fails to do that if he doesn't even properly describe what our vision of sovereignty is.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Conclusion</span></b><br />
<b><br />
</b> I think that we can see that Joe Schmuck has a tendency to really make a mess of things. It can be really difficult to separate out the chaff from the wheat in terms of the quality of our debate partners. I am certainly glad that Richard has given me this chance to clear up some of the mistakes that Joe has made, and I hope that Arminians and Calvinists can come together, and worship the Lord Jesus as the people of God.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOJhzAVS2XAwZlSo-LDUCp2MKYBSTwtYcQIB0DBlj8N0t4XTpPZOtqgWV7x2McimAFccwtjWugybPjFCQrxgplWTioAnHWen9him5EkyZqtE7QLERCe95IgCIlt_u04lXowDAWgMWAfco/s1600/Biden.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="209" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOJhzAVS2XAwZlSo-LDUCp2MKYBSTwtYcQIB0DBlj8N0t4XTpPZOtqgWV7x2McimAFccwtjWugybPjFCQrxgplWTioAnHWen9him5EkyZqtE7QLERCe95IgCIlt_u04lXowDAWgMWAfco/s320/Biden.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-52921607608404066612016-11-15T18:20:00.000-05:002016-11-15T18:20:37.649-05:00Why I Dislike The Term BiblicistThis will be a fairly quick post, but I hope that it is helpful in thinking through what words are for. There are many people who like to refer to themselves as "biblicists". Personally, I never do. I do refer to myself as an infallibilist, because that is articulating a view of biblical authority that I affirm. But what does 'biblicist' actually mean?<br />
<br />
Well, very little. I guess it could mean that someone accepts the Bible as an authority. However, most Christians do. You could use this to distinguish yourself from liberalism, but there are lots of other ways of doing this. Additionally, the term is rarely used that way. Usually it is used to distance oneself from official theological labels. Now I have <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2010/08/so-are-you-into-labels.html" target="_blank">discussed such labels</a> here before, and I think that labels are important and valuable. I also think that someone should insist on being allowed to label oneself.<br />
<br />
However, labels have to actually be meaningful. If we are discussing Arminianism for instance, and you say that you are not an Arminian but a biblicist, how have you differentiated your view from Arminianism? Arminianism is a stance on soteriology, and it compatible with most views of Scriptural authority. What's more it views itself to be a description of what the Bible teaches. So how are you clarifying your position?<br />
<br />
In reality you're not. You are distancing yourself from the conversation. Now, that is fine, but if you are going to do that, you need to do it honestly.<br />
<br />
One of the things I have noticed about our culture is that we feel like we have to justify why we don't want to talk about something. Often this justification is there to make us feel like we are better people than those who do discuss it. But this is dishonest, and insulting for those of us that do care. If you don't want to get involved, simply say that you don't want to be involved. I often step out of political conversations this way, and no one looks down on me for saying so. And, ironically, if I did dismiss such conversations, that's when they would actually look down on me. <br />
<br />
In short, calling yourself a "Biblicist" doesn't mean that you are biblical. It simply means you are ignorant or disinterested in theology. In my opinion you would do better to simply say so.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-67732356213682905812016-10-12T00:07:00.002-04:002016-10-17T15:53:14.299-04:00The Teleological Argument for the Existance of Libertarian Free Will<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Is Libertarian Free Will Cogent? </span></b><span style="color: #b45f06;"><b>Preliminaries</b></span><br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
One of the arguments that Calvinists argue is that the very notion of Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is incoherent. "It simply doesn't make sense," they say. However, I think that the notion of LFW is important for any theist to hold, and Calvinists shoot their theology in the foot by denying its cogency. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Now for a definition. Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is usually defined as the ability to do other than what one actually does. So if I chose to have pizza for supper, I actually could have chosen burgers. It was a real option. This is to contrasted to Compatibalist Free Will, which says the will is free if a person does what a person wants. So if I chose to have pizza for super, that is considered free as long as I truly wanted pizza. However, we can also look at LFW as agent contingency. By agent contingency I mean that certain events and ends are contingent upon whether an agent makes a certain choice. Another way of saying this is that agents have a real effect on the outcomes of their lives and historical events. Agent contingency exists if and only if those agents have LFW. Otherwise, those events and ends will actually be contingent on those things which caused the person to choose what they do. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
One final point before we move on. Since Calvinists are determinists, it would seem evident that they would reject LFW. However, this is why I used agent contingency as opposed to human contingency. I am not going to be arguing here whether or not humans have LFW. I am merely interested, in this post anyway, whether or not LFW exists. It could be that humans have CFW and God has LFW and Calvinism could till be true. Furthermore, the argument here is just in regards to God's will, not human will. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
So before I can give the argument itself, I must explain the teological argument for the existence of God and the Calvinist argument against the cogency of LFW. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Teleological Argument</span></b><b><br />
</b></div>
<div>
The teleological argument means the argument from purpose. The fundamental argument is that when we look around us at the world, it appears to have a purpose for its existence. However, this endued purpose implies a designer of some sort. Finally, the best designer one can propose is God. The most popular version of the argument right now is the argument from fine tuning. It is typically argued as follows:</div>
<div>
<ol>
<li>The fine-tuning of the universe can be explained by necessity, chance, or design.</li>
<li>It cannot be explained by necessity.</li>
<li>It cannot be explained by chance.</li>
<li>Therefore it must be explained by design. </li>
</ol>
<div>
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Calvinist Argument Against Libertarian Free Will</span></b></div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Before we can look at the argument, we need to say something about compatibilism (CFW). According to compatibilism, our decisions are the results of internal calculations. With Atheism, it is usually understood as the processes of the brain. For the Calvinist it, can be understood in this sense, but it is more typically understood in terms of various wants and desires that exist within the person's soul, and the strongest desire wins out.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/10/the-teological-argument-for-existance.html#1" target="_blank">1</a></sup> Now in my mind, this doesn't really solve the problem since there is still the issue of how these desires become weighted the way that they do. Most Calvinists would probably argue that God weighs them, or a combination of this and the atheist understanding. Anyway that's besides the point. What is the point is that Calvinists define free will in this sense, and they feel that this offers more of an explanation of how the will works than LFW.<br />
<br />
They present what I am calling here the argument against randomness. This argument seeks to set up as a dilemma either compatibilism or the idea that our choices are random. The argument seems to go like this:</div>
<ol type="a">
<li>Our decisions must either come from strongest desire or are random</li>
<li>Our decisions are not random</li>
<li>Therefore, our decisions must come from strongest desire</li>
</ol>
Now LFW clearly rejects the first premise, since we do not hold to either compatibilism or that our choices are random. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">Putting the Two Together</span></strong><br />
<br />
Now my argument in this post is to simply intended to show that if you accept one of the two above arguments (the teleological and randomness), you must reject the other. One can reject the teleological argument of course, but I think that many Calvinists would be disinclined to do so.<br />
<br />
In essence, my argument is simply a recognition that the two arguments are referring to the same concepts in different terms. The most obvious is chance and randomness. These are clearly synonyms. What's less clear is that 'strongest desire' is the same as necessity. However, I don't think it can be seriously denied. By strongest desire, it is meant that our wills are mechanical. It is the stance that we make our decisions because it is the necessary result of the conditions leading up to that decision. <br />
<br />
Thus the Calvinist argument becomes:<br />
<ol type="a">
<li>Our decisions are a result of necessity or chance</li>
<li>Our decisions are not from chance</li>
<li>Therefore, our decisions are a result of necessity</li>
</ol>
Therefore, what Calvinists have actually done is simply ruled out design as a distinct kind of causation from necessity or chance. Therefore, if the two arguments are incompatible. They are either both plausible or neither of them are. <br />
<br />
And if you think about this, it makes sense. If there is no libertarian free will, then God does not have libertarian free will. If God does not have libertarian free will, then every decision He makes is a manifestation of His nature. Since His nature is what it is necessarily, than everything that God does happens out of necessity. Therefore, without LFW, design is simply a form of necessity, even if we consider them true and free choices.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Calvinist Solutions</span></b><br />
<br />
This leaves the compatibilists with three options.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/10/the-teological-argument-for-existance.html#2" target="_blank">2</a></sup> First, the boring choice is simply to drop the argument against libertarian free will. And this is perfectly fair! After all, just because an argument is bad, it doesn't mean that the position is wrong.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/10/the-teological-argument-for-existance.html#3" target="_blank">3</a> </sup>This does leave us with a possible aseity problem, but I'll get to that later.<br />
<br />
The second is to reject the teleological argument. Now again, one may do so. There is nothing that says that a Christian needs to agree to the teleological argument. However, I think there is an even more serious problem here when it comes to aseity. So what is aseity?<br />
<br />
Aseity is an attribute of God which means that He exists as Himself (or "a se" in the Latin). This means that God needs nothing else to explain His existence and (and this is the important part here) He can exist by Himself. However, when you consider cause and effect, if there is a sufficient cause for something, then the effect will also exist. This would mean that if everything that God does is an expression of His nature, and everything that God does then happens by necessity, then creation exists necessarily. It means that God could not have not created. It means that God didn't simply want to create us, but He <i>needed</i> to. In my mind, that's a problem.<br />
<br />
Now if you go with the first option, the problem doesn't magically go away either. You still have the basic issue of how is it possible that God's decisions come from His nature and yet aren't necessary. How do you explain compatibilism in such a way that distinguishes it from necessity? This is why I say that it is a possible problem, since, at this point, the ball would be in the Calvinists' court.<br />
<br />
But I think the best solution for the Calvinist to deal with this problem is to simply let go of the compatibilist claim. Rather they can simply claim that God has LFW and we don't. After all, I don't think that dogs or cats or birds have LFW. There is nothing that says that if God has free will we must.<br />
<br />
"Now hold on", one might say, "A Calvinist may claim that just because the argument fails, that doesn't mean their position that LFW is impossible fails. So you are missing the option that they can drop this particular argument but still say that LFW fails for other reasons." Well, yes, technically that claim is correct<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/10/the-teological-argument-for-existance.html#3" target="_blank">3</a></sup>. However, the argument doesn't merely fail. It doesn't merely suffer from this aseity problem. What it does is expose the aseity problem that is already there. Indeed, I think you can conclude that God must have LFW from the cosmological argument. To be frank, I can make this aseity point without any reference to either the cosmological argument <i>or</i> the teleological argument.<br />
<br />
So no, I go with my original assessment. The best solution for the Calvinist is to say that God possesses LFW and we don't. This wouldn't actually affect their theology in any way. And if they say refuse the option only because it would give Arminianism an in, then they need to ask themselves, "are you more interested in winning a debate or are you more interested in truth?<br />
<br />
<br />
____________________________________________<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1">1</a></sup> It is worth pointing out that libertarians don't really reject the notion that we choose our greatest desire. This seems obvious. The question is, as I somewhat imply above, what makes that desire the greatest desire. However, due to brevity, I don't really try to reword the Calvinist claim here too much and use their language. But I do find the language unhelpful if not downright objectionable. <br />
<sup><a 2="" href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="">2</a></sup> Well three reasonable options. One can always choose to be irrational. <br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="3">3</a></sup>See Fallacy Fallacy.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-23769287170072363582016-09-28T02:23:00.000-04:002016-09-28T02:25:33.504-04:00CALVINIST RHETORIC: Piety Or "Being A Friend To Job"<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What I Mean by Rhetorical Piety</span></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"><br /></span></b>
It is important to note that I am not suggesting that Calvinists are doing anything deceptive here. So when I mean piety, I don't mean false piety. More simply, what I mean is presenting one's beliefs as the properly pious belief.<br />
<br />
It is unfortunate that the word 'pious' has lost its true meaning. Often we take it to mean someone with a sense of spiritual superiority. As C. S. Lewis once said using the character of Screwtape, if you destroy the word you destroy the idea. However, piety is simply the attitude of giving God His due respect, and every Christian should strive to be pious.<br />
<br />
Let me remind you than in this series, I am not necessarily accusing Calvinists of doing anything wrong, and this is especially true here. There is nothing wrong with striving to be pious in one's theology, or how one expresses it. My intention is to point out what they are doing and its effect.<br />
That being said, it is important that we distinguish pious rhetoric with actual piety. Actual piety is an attitude, and isn’t determined by the actual words we use. Rather it has to do with the heart behind those words. We can have the words of a pious person but lack actual piety. Likewise one can sound completely impious, yet, because their devotion to God is resolute, there are full of true piety (think Psalm 88 or Psalm 13).<br />
<br />
This is why we need to be careful when we attach piety to ideas. It doesn’t belong there. Certainly, we should seek to express devotion to God when we express our ideas, and our devotion to God necessarily implies a pursuit of truth. But believing the right thing isn’t what piety is. Piety is a personal quality describing your relationship with God.<br />
<br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Orthopathy vs Orthodoxy</span></i><br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;"><br /></span></i>
One of the things I’ve talked about often is the three orthos. First is Orthopraxy, or “correct practice”. It includes both moral activity as well as ritual. The second is Orthodoxy, or “correct doctrine”. It refers to the beliefs that we have about God, humanity, and the world. The third is Orthopathy, or “correct attitudes or passions”.<br />
<br />
In general, the most important aspects of the Christian life have to do with orthopathy, and the greatest errors are when people try to make orthopraxy or orthodoxy (things we humans can actually measure and control in others) more important. Emphasis on orthopraxy leads to legalism and oppression, while an emphasis on orthodoxy leads to fideism and schism. Even faith is often confused as an intellectual concept (putting it in the realm of orthodoxy) instead of a personal interactive concept (putting it in the realm of orthopathy).<br />
<br />
I bring this up because piety is also an orthopathic concept. It has to do with our attitude toward God.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Rhetorical Piety In Action</span></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"><br /></span></b>
When we read the book of Job, we read of Job’s three friends. At the end of the book, we know that God rejects their teaching so it is good to look at their teaching to avoid error, and one of the fascinating things to note about their teaching is their pious language. It is everywhere in their speeches. They ground their teaching in the wisdom of those who came before them, and in God’s absolute and indisputable sovereignty. <br />
<br />
Now I’m not claiming that they were Calvinists. Their teaching had to do with the reward/punishment system connected to our actions in this life, rather than the nature of grace, atonement, and salvation. However the similarity of their rhetoric is striking, especially since none of this pious talk is technically wrong, but rather the conclusions they draw from it.<br />
<br />
We see a lot of this in the language of Calvinists. The idea that determinism is intimately implied by the notion of sovereignty, and that anything less than Calvinism is a rejection of the sovereignty of God are clear examples of precisely this kind of rhetoric. “If you believe in A, then you must believe in B. If you reject at, then you despise God and exalt man.” But such assertions are based not off of the interconnections of Arminian beliefs, but a firm internal belief by Calvinists that they must be Calvinist to be truly pious.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">The End Result</span></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"><br /></span></b>
The basic end result of pious rhetoric that isn’t held in check by humility is a combination if vilification and straw man. And I say held in check because, again, there is nothing wrong with seeking to bring God glory by your theology, nor praising how it does so. Rather it needs to be held in check by the desire to seek God’s sense of glory, and not project our own sense of glory on Him. I have often been told, “Who are you, O man, to speak back to God”, yet they fail to realize that I am not speaking back to God, but speaking back to them.<br />
<br />
A rejection of our conclusions doesn’t mean a rejection of all of our premises. I certainly have trouble seeing how God could be all loving and good on Calvinism, but I would never claim that Calvinists reject His goodness or love. And when Arminians do this, they are committing the same kind of rhetoric. What Calvinists need to realize is that it other premises of their belief that we are rejecting, rather than a belief in God’s sovereignty or the effectualness of the atonement. This can only start by separating out the laudable goal of declaring God’s glory from our theology, from tying God’s glory to it. <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="background-color: #ffffcc; color: #32527a; font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 13px;">For series index, click </span><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2011/08/calvinist-rhetoric-series.html" style="background: rgb(255, 255, 204); color: #6f3c1b; font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 13px; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">here</a><span style="background-color: #ffffcc; color: #32527a; font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 13px;">. </span>Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-67859973561664483702016-07-02T08:30:00.000-04:002016-07-23T12:55:26.907-04:00Causal vs Social CenteredPart VI: Security<ul>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html">Part I: Glory</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html">Part II: Election</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html">Part III: Atonement</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.depravity.html">Part IV: Depravity</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html">Part V: Grace</a></li>
<li>Part VI: Security</li>
</ul>
<br />
So what is the debate about security really about? Well, there are two realms within which this debate takes place: pastoral and theological. So instead of looking at the two positions in succession, we'll being looking at these two realms instead, once we define the positions in play. <br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"></span></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Definitions</span></b><br />
<br />
So the Calvinist position goes by several names, but it is worth distinguishing between three concepts. First there is the idea of <i>eternal security</i> or ES. This is the belief that once a person has been regenerated, justified, and elect, it is impossible for those works of God to be undone and for a person to return to a depraved state. Second, there is the position of what I call <i>Once Saved Always Saved</i> or OSAS. This is the belief that once a person has accepted Jesus in their heart, that they remained saved regardless of what they do. OSAS is considered to be an aberrant take on the eternal security doctrine, and isn't considered to be proper Calvinism. I would also personally call it heresy, and I believe most Calvinists are in agreement with me on that. Finally there is the doctrine of <i>Perseverance of the Saints</i> or PS. PS is the belief that if we are ever saved, then you will remain faithful for your entire life. Thus those that do fall away were never truly saved to begin with. <br />
So we can see OSAS and PS as two different interpretations of ES<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#1">1</a></sup> . Since the average Calvinist typically rejects OSAS<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#2">2</a></sup>, from here on out, when I am referring to eternal security, I really just mean PS. <br />
<br />
Arminians instead focus on the notion of present assurance. This is the belief that it is possible to know whether or not you are truly saved by the internal witness of the Spirit and the demonstration of His fruit in your life. Also, we stress that our sense of security comes from our relational knowledge of God Himself instead of unknowable decrees. This said, some Arminians hold to eternal security and some do not. <br />
<br />
However, those of us who don't, myself included, believe in what is known as conditional security. That is, you will remain protected against all of the wiles of the enemy as long as you have faith in Christ. It is important to note that security is conditioned on the same ground as election. <br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Pastoral Concerns</span></b><br />
<br />
The pastoral concern comes from the person who comes into the pastor's office and asks, "Am I saved?" Let's call this person Leonard. So what is the pastor to say? <br />
<br />
Well, let's talk about Leonard really quick. Leonard accepted Christ when he was 19. He has been in Bible study every week since then. He has been the first volunteer for every evangelistic outreach. He demonstrates all of the fruits of the Spirit. Therefore, it is easy for the pastor to say, "of course you are. Don't you remember Christ coming into your heart?"<br />
<br />
Now here comes the key confession. Leonard replies, "Yes. And I know that Christ is real. But I have a secret sin in my life, and I am afraid that God has rejected me because of it. I can't feel His Spirit as I once did." So what is the pastor to say. <br />
<br />
Let's look at the response of the eternal security pastor first: "Leonard, you have to remember that you were born again in Christ. Take comfort in that. Our salvation doesn't hinge upon our daily commitment to some law. It isn't something that comes one day and is gone the next. If you were born again, then you are saved. This is simply something God is working out through you, and this fear that you have is God's conviction, bringing you into a deeper level of sanctity."<br />
<br />
That sounds really good. That is the kind of encouragement Leonard needs. The problem of course is that it is kind of a lie. The truth is that given the doctrine of perseverance of the saints, neither Leonard or the pastor has any real reason to believe the key premise in the argument: that Leonard is born again. They have no idea. Therefore, for the theologically reflective person, this word of comfort is rather hollow. <br />
<br />
Now the causal aspect of things doesn't really factor in here<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#3">3</a></sup> , but I'll get to it in the second section. However, when we come to the Arminian perspective, our social centeredness comes in strong. Here is how the conditional security pastor would answer:<br />
<br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"Leonard, who do you go to when you are feeling guilty?"</span><br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"Well, you. God."</span><br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"So you pray when you feel guilty. Why? Do you believe that God is the only one that can right your sin?"</span><br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"Yes, of course"</span><br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"Do you believe that He is the only one who can give you assurance that you are saved?"</span><br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"Yes."</span><br />
<span style="color: #38761d;">"Then you are saved. Yes you are sinning, but God is convicting you of that sin, drawing you to repentance and wholeness. But if you weren't saved, your sin would cause you to curse God, not run to Him. Remember, our salvation doesn't hinge upon our daily commitment to some law. It is our faith that God looks at. Our trust in Him. If you believe that God can deliver you from the sin, then you have a penitent heart, and your faith in Him is intact. That's the key to salvation: not our perfection, but Christ's perfection."<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#4">4</a></sup></span> <br />
<br />
This is key. It isn't some event that happened in the past, or some declaration in heaven that we appeal to. It is the person's relationship with God. It is who they are in Christ that matters, for it is Christ who saves. That gives the person assurance, and it is assurance, not security, that they really need. To give a person a sense of security by sacrificing assurance is like selling the car for the gas: it gets you no where. Instead, teach faith, for salvation is free.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Theological Concerns</span></b><br />
<br />
The principle concern that Arminians have is the present assurance issue mentioned above. There is a secondary concern, and that has to do with security being grounded in decrees rather than in Christ Himself. However, I'm not really going to address that concern here because I don't think it speaks to the issue at hand."<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#5">5</a></sup><br />
<sup></sup><br />
However the Calvinist does have an issue here which is worth pointing out. It is similar to the defeat issue mentioned in the <a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html">Atonement</a> installment of this series.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#6">6</a></sup> Here they'll say that if God has saved the person, then how can that be undone? That seems to imply a kind of weakness in God's salvation. <br />
Now again, notice the emphasis on power. This is, again, a very causal concern. Indeed if we look deeper we'll see that the casual nature is still there. They'll often point out certain acts such as regeneration, election, or predestination, and ask how these can be undone. The emphasis here is on the nature of the actions! The actions accomplish a certain thing, so some kind of equally powerful counter action would have to undo it. <br />
<br />
Now, to me, I have trouble seeing the issue. Election for instance is simply understood completely different by me.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#7">7</a></sup> And predestination isn't undone, but it isn't presently experienced either, so it simply isn't in the purview of the discussion.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html#8">8</a></sup> <br />
<br />
The real issue is regeneration from what I can see. We can define an apostate as one who has been regenerated, and yet turns away from God. Such a person will not inherit eternal life. The Calvinist says that this person wasn't truly regenerate, but I just don't see why. I see nothing about the concept of being reborn which entails that you cannot re-die. And I've never really had a Calvinist point out why they think this is the case. <br />
<br />
Now it may be connected to the idea of Total Depravity. If Total Depravity implies one is unable to turn towards God, and regeneration is the opposite, then it should imply the opposite. But again, I don't see the entailment here. Especially since every Calvinist I know will fully admit that a regenerated person is capable of sinning, even though they would say a depraved person cannot do good. So I'm not sure if that is what they are thinking here, and I don't want to put words in their mouth. <br />
<br />
But I do think that this emphasis on ability is what is really motivating the Calvinist. In other words, there is no <i>logical </i>implication going on here, but a casual concern about giving humanity the ability to leave God. I believe that they are afraid that if this is true, than apostasy is somehow inevitable (though I don't see why since our depravity is gone). Here, I simply have to give my skepticism. Other than their vehement insistence on this point, I see no real argument. Indeed, in terms of ability, I don't see how the regenerate is any different than Adam and Eve. <br />
<br />
However, the concern is something that we as Arminians should take seriously. If we are going to convince a Calvinist of their error, we cannot be dismissive of their concerns, but we must seek to understand them, and show <b><i>why</i></b> they are unimportant or how Arminianism satisfies the concern better. <br />
<br />
And this is really been the point of this exercise. To understand our opponents so we can be effective in communicating with them. I'm not interested in simply winning debates. I'm interested in spreading God's truth and protecting the church from error. This means not out arguing the Calvinist, but <i>convincing</i> them. I hope that this series has been helpful for you in doing precisely that.<br />
<br />
_________________________________________<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1">1</a></sup> It occurred to me as I wrote this sentence that every one of these acronyms ended with an S. Never noticed that before. I've learned something today.<br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2">2</a></sup> And rightly so. <br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="3">3</a></sup> Unless you consider the idea of finding comfort in mechanical inevitability, trying to be assured of salvation as one is of one's car starting in the morning. Meanwhile, the kind of assurance that God grants us is more of the kind of a child trusting his father to catch him at the bottom of a slide.<br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="4">4</a></sup> It is worth pointing out that this is a real conversation I had with someone some 6 or 7 years ago. It was with the mother of a friend of mine who had spent her entire life wrestling with trying to be good enough for the church and for God, coming out of the holiness movement. The husband had actually stopped going to church because she was addicted to serving the church to the point of self-detriment. <br />
<br />
After the conversation above, she was shocked, never hearing an answer like that before. A year later, when I saw them again, the husband thanked me, telling me that she had never been more sure of her salvation in her life. This was with her speaking to many Calvinist pastors before she had spoken to me. I'm not saying this because I think I did a good job. I'm saying this because simple Arminian theology really works! Calvinists who claim that we have no words of comfort to give to such a person simply doesn't understand what Arminian theology is. <br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="5">5</a></sup> Namely the centeredness of the theologies. <br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="6">6</a></sup> Indeed they often will also point out the defeat issue here as well, but since I already went over this I saw no reason to repeat it. <br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="7">7</a></sup>And may I note that corporate election is very socially centered. We are the family or people of God! <br />
<sup></sup><br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="8">8</a></sup> This would of course depend on your definition of predestination. Calvinists basically use it as another name for election, or the effects of election. Arminians typically have two definitions that we tend to use, depending on which Greek verb is in context, and to some degree which Arminian you talk to.<br />
<br />
One definition we can call "being preset", which is simply to say that you are on a kind of established path to a destination. So like a train is preset towards a certain destination: it isn't simply an open field. However, this clearly could be changed. One could change tracks or get derailed (or shipwrecked :-)). The other definition we can call "foreknown". God simply knows what our ultimate destiny is going to be. Clearly, this can't change for God does not change His mind. But we don't have access to the Book of Life. But that isn't really what one is talking about when we are talking about apostasy, so it strikes me as moot. <br />
<br />
Above I have used the second defintion. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-37982575523430465302016-07-01T08:00:00.000-04:002016-07-23T12:57:03.778-04:00Causal vs Social CenteredPart V: Grace<ul>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html">Part I: Glory</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html">Part II: Election</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html">Part III: Atonement</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.depravity.html">Part IV: Depravity</a></li>
<li>Part V: Grace</li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html">Part VI: Security</a></li>
</ul>
<br />
The fourth point immediately follows from the doctrine of depravity. If we are born depraved, separated from God, and incapable of coming to Christ on our own, then God is the one that needs to act first. Furthermore, our depravity also means that we do not deserve God helping us either. This makes whatever act God does to help us to be "grace". <br />
<br />
However, Arminians understand grace very differently. And it probably won't surprise you that I believe the difference is a causal understanding vs a social understanding. <br />
<b></b><br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><b>Irresistible Grace</b></span><br />
<br />
So how do Calvinists understand the concept of grace? With a misnomer like "The Doctrines of Grace" you would expect a pretty detailed account of what grace is. However, I find grace to be unrecognizable within Calvinism.<br />
<br />
For the Calvinists, grace is basically what God does to save us. There isn't anything necessarily wrong with that, however it is a rather incomplete conception of grace. I'll get into why later. If you look at the way that Calvinists treat it though, they treat it simply as a cause. Most interestingly, grace in the Calvinist system is extremely mechanical. <br />
<br />
The way I picture it is that in Calvinism there is this grace package, and once the package comes to you, it does everything that it is supposed to do. You're walking around, being depraved and what not and then God sends His grace upon you. You become regenerated, then you have faith, and then you are justified, and then you are saved. Bam! Bam! Bam! It happens in a flash. One thing causes the next, and it happens the same way to every person. Now I might be exaggerating a little here<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html#1">1</a></sup>, but this is how a Calvinist sounds to me when they talk about it.<br />
<br />
This has always struck me as bizarre. When I think of the concept of grace, I think about two people, where one is betrayed and yet is kind and forgiving to the other person. To me grace is a relational term: it describes the relationship between two people. Grace on the Calvinist view seems to cut out the personal nature of the term. Now I know deep down Calvinists affirm its personal nature. When they talk about grace apart from the theology, it is clear that the word carries intense personal weight for them. But that doesn't seem to me to be connected to the actual theology.<br />
<br />
But none of this is necessarily wrong or bad. It merely strikes me as odd. Where I think that the Calvinist goes wrong here is that they seem to think that any expression that isn't like this isn't truly grace. But this makes no real sense. We never experience grace between people that is like this. Now, this point doesn't mean of course that the Calvinist view is not grace, but it does mean that their definition is too restrictive.<br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Enabling Grace</span></b><br />
<br />
Calvinists really, and I mean <i>really</i>, misunderstand the Arminian view of grace. Indeed, their analysis of our view of grace is so baffling that it was my trying to understand their criticisms that allowed me to recognize their causal centeredness. <br />
<br />
Typically, myself included, Arminians say that prevenient grace is God preparing and enabling a depraved person, freeing their will to be able to do good, and encouraging them to come to the truth of the Gospel (which is Christ's lordship and atoning power). I've always considered that a rather sufficient definition, and I still do for most people. But it is too ambiguous for the Calvinists because they make some assumptions of our view that the above definition doesn't clarify.<br />
<br />
Calvinists talk about Arminian grace in the same way as they talk about their own view of grace. They assume that we have a similar grace package concept, but that we think this package is extended to all people at the beginning of their life. Additionally, in their perception of our view, there's less stuff in the package, in the sense that it merely make a person neutral, rather than radically transforming them. However, this is completely alien to Arminians. It is not at all what we actually thinking. I think they get it so wrong because they are attempting to describe our view from a causally centered thought process, and we simply don't think that way.<br />
<br />
We see grace as a kind of quality of an act, rather than a type of causation. For instance, I could ask someone what the word "sweet" means. One person answers, "it means that there are simple and cheap carbohydrates in your food that your body can readily use as fuel". Another can answer, "It is a kind of flavor. One that we associate with desserts, treats, and junk foods." Note how both are correct in a sense, but one is more like the way we commonly use the term. For us, you can have two actions that are completely the same, but one is gracious and the other not because of the reasons and motivations of the one doing it. Therefore, it isn't what an act does that necessarily makes it grace, but the heart of the person performing the action.<br />
<br />
More simply though, prevenient grace is not an act of God. It is a set of acts that God does throughout a person's life, not bringing them to "life", but keeping them "alive". Some of these acts are resistible, but some are actually irresistible. It depends on the person because God does not do the same acts of grace in every person's life. Rather what God does is based on where our relationship with Him is and who we are and our circumstances. They are personal intimate acts of one wooing His beloved to come to Him like Hosea. It is merely the final offer of the gospel that is never presented in an irresistible way. <br />
<br />
Think of a child who doesn't know how to swim in a pool with her father. His father holds the child in the water. He doesn't simply make the child buoyant, but stays there, holding his child until she starts to swim on her own, instructing her, loving her. It is constant and dynamic. The father holding the child doesn't show a change of state in the child, for the child is the same before the father holds her and while the father holds her. However, it is the father's hands that enables her to swim and rescues her from drowning.<a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html#2"><sup>2</sup></a><br />
<br />
What makes it grace isn't that we are passive, but that we don't deserve it. We deserve to be condemned and rejected by God. Instead, He woos us anyway. That's grace! Undeserved favor! The only way this isn't grace is to so restrict one's definition of the word that it looses all semblance with the act of love and care that should come with the term. <br />
___________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"><sup>1</sup></a> Emphasis on "might". This is literally what the Calvinist sounds like to me, but I want to give them the benefit of the doubt here. <br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"><sup>2</sup></a> Be careful not to overextend the metaphor here. This metaphor isn't meant to describe salvation. The metaphor is simply meant to describe how enablement doesn't entail the idea of a change in state.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-18647800910916841662016-06-30T08:30:00.000-04:002016-07-23T12:59:25.917-04:00Causal vs Social CenteredPart IV: Depravity<ul>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html">Part I: Glory</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html">Part II: Election</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html">Part III: Atonement</a></li>
<li>Part IV: Depravity</li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html">Part V: Grace</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html">Part VI: Security</a></li>
</ul>
<br />
The differences in Depravity are perhaps the most interesting for our topic since both Calvinists and Arminians agree on the basic concept. However, I do think we think about Total Depravity a bit differently, in that it plays a slightly different role. And this can be seen the most clearly in how we interpret the Biblical phrase of being "dead in sin". <br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;"></span></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Emphasis</span></b><br />
<br />
Both of us understand Total Depravity to mean that we are incapable of doing any true good apart from the grace of God, including having saving faith. However, the Calvinist stresses this incapacity idea. To the Calvinist it is our lack of power that is the ultimate issue.To the Arminian, Total Depravity isn't as (ironically enough) human focused. Rather for us, the point of the doctrine is to stress our need for God. It is much more about that brokenness between the human and God. <br />
<br />
To put it more simply, the Calvinist is saying that we can't do it, and the Arminian is saying that we need help. Now one implies the other, and I want to stress that there is no difference of actual doctrine here. Arminians admit that we can't save ourselves; that's why we <i>need help</i>! Likewise the Calvinist will admit that we need help; after all, <i>we can't do it</i>! But while the Arminian is more concerned with what it means for our relationship for God, and explaining the need for prevenient grace, the Calvinist is more concerned about ensuring that humanity doesn't get credit for salvation and that the power ultimately comes from God Himself. Same belief, but we think about it differently, and the role it plays in our theology is a bit different. <br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Dead Men Can't Do Nothing Right</span></b><br />
<br />
Probably the most interesting difference is the way we interpret the "dead in sin" phrase in Scripture. Calvinists compare a human in the the depraved state as being dead: unable to act. They stress the complete immobility of a corpse. Now I don't necessarily have a problem with this analogy, seeing how I believe in human inability, but it's not what the Scripture means. This is apparent in two ways. First, Jesus uses this same term in the parable of the Prodigal Son, and there is no way it could mean that in that context. Second, in Romans, which really stresses the relationship between death and sin, in chapter six it describes us as being dead <i>to</i> sin, and yet no Calvinists believes this means that Christians are unable to sin. <br />
<br />
It is more accurate to think about this relationally. When your grandfather dies, you generally don't interact with him much anymore. You relationship with him is severed. This is where the expression "you're dead to me" comes from, and it seems to be how Scripture is using the term as well. To be dead in sin is to be cut off from God because of your sin. There is no relationship there to work with. This is more consistent with the Prodigal Son text and Romans 6:11, and also perfectly consistent with all other texts where the imagery is used. To be spiritually dead is to be cut off from God. And this is of course why we need God. <br />
<br />
Next we'll be talking about the most complicated topic of this series: grace.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-37287070295252062782016-06-29T10:00:00.000-04:002016-07-23T13:01:26.727-04:00Causal vs Social CenteredPart III: Atonement<ul>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html">Part I: Glory</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html">Part II: Election</a></li>
<li>Part III: Atonement</li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.depravity.html">Part IV: Depravity</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html">Part V: Grace</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html">Part VI: Security</a></li>
</ul>
<br />
The atonement debate is really interesting to me because to some degree it is a red herring. Both sides seem to think that the issue has to do with the nature of the Atonement. However it doesn't. Consider the following:<br />
<ol>
<li>Both agree that a person is not born justified</li>
<li>Both sides agree that a person becomes justified when they have faith</li>
<li>Both sides agree that a person is completely justified once the atonement is applied to them<ul>
<li>So we agree on efficacy</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Both sides agree that Christ's atonement was substitutionary</li>
<li>Both sides agree that Christ's atonement of infinite in power<ul>
<li>So no difference in "spilt blood"</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Both sides agree that it is particular in application</li>
</ol>
So... what's the actual difference? The difference has to do with the texts in Scripture that teach that Christ died for all. We have to deal with the fact that Christ died to save all, yet not all are saved. We differ in how we deal with this discrepancy.<br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Limited Atonement</span></b><br />
<br />
When talking about being casually centered, what we are talking about is a concern a about cause and effect relationships. There are two aspects of casual centeredness that come into play with the issue of the atonement. One is a concern for power. Since power is the ability to cause things, naturally power is a casual concern. More on this later. The second issue is a tendency to describe things in mechanical ways. In a machine, this gear causes that gear to move, which causes that doohickey to do the thing, and voila, the clock works. We can certainly see this in the way they describe the will. <br />
<br />
We see this clearly in the way they often handle the Scriptural passages regarding the universality of the atonement. For their view to be correct, they must somehow qualify the statements that God wanted to save everyone to affirm the Scripture. Historically they've done this in a couple of ways<a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html#1"><sup>1</sup></a>, but for our purposes of displaying the mechanical nature of their thought, we are going to focus on the most popular approach today: the two-will theory. <br />
<br />
The two-will theory is the idea that God's will is complicated. There is a part of His will that really does want to save everyone, but there is another part of His will that only wants to save the elect. Therefore, it is fine for God to express that first desire, even if it is the second desire that He desires more. So it is true that God wants to save the whole world, but He wants to save only the elect even more. <br />
<br />
Now look at the way in which the will of God is treated. It is segmented, and the question of which segment brings about action is emphasized. Now mostly I see this as a theological trick to get around a hermeneutical problem, <i>but</i> the intriguing thing to me is that it treats God's will kind of like a machine with parts that have different functions.<br />
<br />
Before we move one, I do want to make an apologetic point. First I don't think this idea is as mysterious as the Calvinist makes it out to be. We experience this kind of thing all the time. It's called ambivalence: the wanting of two contradictory things at the same time. It's not really a more "complex" will than ours<a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html#2"><sup>2</sup></a>. It's just ambivalence. <br />
<br />
Now if you remember at the top of this section I said that there were two issues, and one was a concern about power. Here I am going to get back to that. While the above is an explanation of how they justify Limited Atonement with Scripture, it isn't <em>why</em> Calvinists think Limited Atonement is important. That is the power concern. This has to do with whether or not God can be defeated.<br />
<br />
Now for most of us, I don't see why there is a problem, but I think we need to hear what the Calvinist is thinking here. If God is acting with the intention of accomplish something, and what He wants doesn't happen, it appears that He has been overpowered. If God is overpowered, than He is not omnipotent. Now, Calvinists don't frame it this way, but this is the legitimate concern behind their thinking, and I think we need to answer it. So how?<br />
<br />
Well, I think the Calvinists are on the right track when it comes to the notion of a complex desire, but I don't think ambivalence is the correct kind of complexity. A better way to think about it is a contextualized desire. This is when you want something, but you want it in a certain way and under certain conditions. <br />
<br />
So, for instance, Lebron James may want to put the basketball through the hoop. However, he doesn't use his full range of power to try to achieve this goal. He doesn't punch the other players, knock the hoop down to reach it better, or get a ladder, or anything else like this which is clearly within his physical abilities. Rather he chooses to try and put the ball in the hoop under certain constraints. Why? Because he isn't <i>just</i> interested in putting the ball through the hoop. He is interested in playing a basketball game and "putting a ball in the hoop" falls into the context of that game, but with certain parameters. <br />
<br />
Now the above analogy isn't really designed to explain what is going on with the atonement, since someone stuffing James's shot would be him being defeated.."<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html#3">3</a></sup> The analogy is simply designed to explain what is meant by a contextualized desire in a causal manner. The way that Arminians actually understand this is much more, well, social. <br />
<br />
The key here is love. God doesn't simply want to save us. He wants us to love Him. Here I'm going to used a tired Arminian analogy, but it is tired for a reason. This is the fact that when you fall in love with someone, you don't really want to force that person to love you back. You want them to love you back <i>on their own</i>. Even if you had access to some kind of pill that could make them believe that they loved you, it wouldn't be true love. If God desires us to truly love Him as He loves us, it makes sense that He doesn't simply want to save all, but to save those who return His love. And someone refusing to love Him isn't Him being defeated; it is simply them choosing their own way. As Paul says in Romans 1, God gives them over to their desires, even though they are destructive. <br />
So defeat isn't the right way of looking at it. It is that God wants to save within a particular context which includes free will. This makes it a contextualized desire. <br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Unlimited Atonement</span></b><br />
<br />
Being socially centered, Arminians are more focused on personal attributes, and one of those is God's character. God's character is consistently good. When it comes to the atonement, as I said before, the difference here isn't really on the nature of the atonement. Rather the difference is God's intention and His honesty. For the Arminian, principle concern is the authenticity of God's offer of salvation. Limited Atonement seems to make God a liar. <br />
<br />
Often the Calvinist would counter that they don't know who the elect are, so therefore it isn't inauthentic. Well, it is true that it doesn't make <i>them </i>a liar. But it would make God a liar when Scripture says things like "We have put our hope in the living God, who is the Savior of all men and especially of those who believe" or "So by the grace of God He might taste death for each one" or "He is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance"... etc. These texts are not contextualized with His will to display justice or whatever purpose the Calvinist proposes He has for allowing some to be damned. <br />
<br />
When it is contextualized, it is contextualized with the condition of faith, not God's greater desire. We would expect it to be contextualized by God's greater desire if these are examples of ambivolence. For instance, let's say I really want to eat some pizza. However, I also really want to lose weight. So I have to decide which is more important. Afterwards, if I were to express regret at not eating the pizza, I'll say, "Oh, I really wish I had that pizza. But I'm glad I won't have the extra calories." It is the other option that qualified the choice.<br />
<br />
This is what we would expect in the text if these expressions were out of ambivalence. But we don't receive this. Rather we receive an open invitation to any who would believe. If Calvinism were true, this just strikes us as deceptive. Now God has the sovereign right to be deceptive if He wants, but it wouldn't be <i>good </i>of Him. It seems clear to us that God truly does want to save every single person, and He acts towards the salvation of all, even those who ultimately are damned. Now, this means that He must be acting in a way that allows them the ability to resist Him, for He is powerful enough to cause them to comply if need be. But their damnation is on their own shoulders, not God's.<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, I don't know too well how a Calvinist would really respond to this. I usually get an answer back in the fashion of "who are you oh man to challenge God" or "that is a man-centered concerned", so I cant really show how Calvinists would approach this from a causal-centered direction. Rather, it seems to me that Calvinists have trouble recognizing that there is a problem. This doesn't show causal-centeredness, but it does show that we think about things very differently. <br />
<br />
________________________________________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"></a><sup>1</sup> One is to quibble on the meaning of terms like 'world' and 'all'. Another is to take Calvin's route, and not understand these terms literally, but rather as God accommodating to our language and limited understanding. I find these mostly to be hermeneutical tricks and rather unconvincing, and they don't really show the causal-centeredness of Calvinist thought anyway. <br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"></a><sup>2</sup>Now I do think that God's will is different than ours. God is eternal and doesn't deliberate like we do. Likewise, He is taking more into account for His choices than we do. I just don't think that this two-will theory constitutes a difference. <br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="3"></a><sup>3</sup>Mutumbo's smiling right now.Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-12111722722342570292016-06-28T09:39:00.000-04:002016-07-23T13:03:32.836-04:00Causal vs Social CenteredPart II: Election<ul>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html">Part I: Glory</a></li>
<li>Part II: Election</li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html">Part III: Atonement</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.depravity.html">Part IV: Depravity</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html">Part V: Grace</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html">Part VI: Security</a></li>
</ul>
<br />
The question of election isn't whether or not God chooses who to save, but whether or not He does so unconditionally. The question is whether or not our differences on this question are grounded in a causal vs social dynamic.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Unconditional Election</span></b><br />
<br />
The Calvinist thrust on the question of election is the fact that it is entirely unconditional. This means that there is no quality or action which distinguishes the elect from the non-elect save election itself. So why is this so important to the Calvinists.<br />
<br />
The answer has to do with who causes election. The Calvinist feels that if there is a condition for election, than obtaining that condition causes God to elect the person. This would mean that the human causes God's election. Therefore, since God's glory should be grounded on Him having power over things, this would certainly apply to His own choices.<br />
<br />
Arminians of course don't see it that way. First of all, I don't see why obtaining a condition for election would cause election if A)God still has to actually make the choice and isn't forced to and B)God is sovereign over what conditions He cares about. My preference of sausage over pepperoni doesn't mean that sausage pizza has control over me. However, notice the social dynamic of my point. The Calvinist view sees conditionality as a cause; I see it as a reason. Causes are physical concepts, while reasons are personal concepts. Saul was the cause of the spear being thrown, but jealousy was the reason. If faith caused God to choose us, then the Calvinist would have a point. Rather faith is the reason why God chooses us, and that is an entirely different matter. <br />
<br />
Second of all, the principle issue that we have with unconditionality is that it makes God's choice arbitrary. Now most Calvinists object to this, but to me unconditional and arbitrary are synonyms. The second simply sounds worse. I don't mind the idea of God having no particular reason to save me, but I do have issue with God having no particular reason to not save someone else. Yes, He doesn't <i>have</i> to save anyone, but then I'm not claiming He has to. That's a causal concern. My issue is one of character. If He loves them, why would He abandon them without a reason? That simply isn't love, which is a social issue. <br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Conditional Election</span></b><br />
<br />
Arminians believe that God chooses who to save based on faith. He does this because He wants to establish relationship with us, and faith is something that He values in His friends. It is also important to note that Arminians tend to be very insistent that faith is not intellectual assent to a set of beliefs. Rather faith is trust in Jesus Christ saving us. Faith is a social rather than epistemic term.<a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html#1"><sup>1</sup></a> This is why faith prevents one from boasting; if you trust in your faith then you aren't trusting in Jesus Himself. To boast about it is to prove that you don't have it.<a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html#2"><sup>2</sup></a><br />
<br />
The Calvinist concern here is basically what I said above about why they believe unconditional election. However, let me run their most common argument here so I can give them some space. They often argue that if you have faith, and someone else doesn't, then there must be some cause for you having faith that the other person doesn't have. Either you are smarter, or nicer, or something else. Therefore there is something making you superior, and that is what is really causing God to choose you. <br />
<br />
Well... This ignores the social aspect of faith. The idea behind this is that faith requires a cause, but while it is true that there may have been some reason why a person comes to faith, that reason may vary dramatically. Sure John may have faith in Christ because he is simply a trusting sort, but Paul believes in Him because of an over-whelming experience, and Peter by intellectual reasoning. It doesn't matter how faith came about; merely its presence matters. Because of this, the reason for one's faith isn't actually a factor in God's election at all. Just faith is. <br />
<br />
And so what if God chooses the faithful. He chooses them because He wants us to be faithful. He didn't have to choose the faithful. Nothing is forcing His hand here. Indeed, if I have all the faith I have right now, and God still chooses to condemn me, He would do me no wrong. Ultimately my assurance isn't grounded in my faith, but in God's promises. I struggle to even appreciate the concern here. But then, I don't think like a Calvinist does.<br />
<br />
________________________________________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"></a><sup>1</sup>I have not provided a causal-centered definition of faith here because, to be honest, I'm not sure how to. Ultimately, I don't think that Calvinism needs to be committed to a particular definition of faith since their concern would remain for any condition. <br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"></a><sup>2</sup>Like humility. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-58286247653100274312016-06-27T11:10:00.003-04:002018-12-24T03:59:31.179-05:00Causal vs Social CenteredPart I: Glory<ul>
<li>Part I: Glory</li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.election.html">Part II: Election</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.atonement.html">Part III: Atonement</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/cvs.depravity.html">Part IV: Depravity</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.grace.html">Part V: Grace</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/07/cvs.security.html">Part VI: Security</a></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What Is Centeredness</span></b><br />
<strong></strong><br />
I have often heard it said by Calvinists that they are God centered while we are man centered. Now as far as I have seen, they've never really given a definition about what it means for a theology to be "centered" on something. This has left us to guess what it is that they mean, which makes it very difficult to counter the accusation.<a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html#1"><sup>1</sup></a> Now I have attempted to guess what they mean by this in the past, but after much analysis I think I now have a really good idea what they mean, and how the two theologies are truly centered.<br />
<br />
I think my first mistake was that centering involved a central doctrine; that is some kind of central belief. However, I think that Calvinists mean more of a central theme. Also I don't think that centeredness necessarily has to be something that is consciously at the heart of someone's theology. Rather, I think it has to do with how a theology is developed or constructed. So let me give this basic definition:<br />
<blockquote>
<b>Centeredness</b> refers to the controlling theme or idea that shapes the way someone thinks about a particular topic.</blockquote>
So, what do they mean by <i>God</i>-centered and <i>man</i>-centered? Well here I think they are intentionally vague because I doubt that they are really that consistent on it. I do think that by "God-centered" they basically mean <i>Soli Deo Gloria</i>: that every aspect of their theology is designed to give God glory. Likewise, "man-centered" must mean the opposite. <br />
<br />
However, if this is true, both of us are God-centered. This is because I think one of the central differences between us is what we think gives God glory. Both of us are equally focused on <i>Soli Deo Gloria</i>. After all, Calvinists are most concerned with God's sovereignty while we are most concerned with God's character. But both traits have God as their subject.<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/06/causal-vs-social-centered-part-i-glory.html#2">2</a></sup> So I think this scheme is seriously lacking.<br />
<br />
I propose then a different scheme: causal centered vs socially centered.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What is Causally-centered?</span></b><br />
<br />
To be causally centered is to be concerned with questions of causation and power. By 'power' I don't mean anything pejorative: I don't mean power hungry or anything else like that. Rather power is simply defined as the ability to get things done. Calvinists, in my estimation, are principally focused on how things in salvation are caused. Therefore we can think of power or causal-centeredness as when someone defines terms or weighs doctrine on questions of cause and effect. <br />
<br />
Therefore it is little wonder that the Calvinist would understand 'glory' in terms of sovereignty and determinism. If their greatest concern is how things are accomplished, then it stands to reason that giving God the credit for everything that happens would give Him the most glory. <br />
<br />
It also makes some sense that they would think that LFW gives human's glory. We don't think about it in that way, but to the Calvinist LFW means that you get to be the cause of what happens in the world. That is a little taste of glory to them. Therefore since humans have more power in Arminianism than they do in Calvinism, Arminianism would be more "man-centered". However, this is a causally-centered analysis, and has nothing to do with how Arminians think or even develop their theology. Because it doesn't represent how Arminians actually think, it can't be accurate. Rather it is Calvinists reading their own interests into Arminian theology. <br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">What is Socially-centered?</span></b><br />
<br />
By social, what I mean is that we ask questions about how God has relationships with other things. This also includes Himself within the Trinity. Having relationships is what defines a being as being personal. So it is more these personal ideas that drives our thinking. This is why our core ideas are God's personal attributes such as love and goodness. <br />
<br />
Therefore, it is of little wonder that we would understand 'glory' in terms of goodness. To us, it is declaring God as good which gives him the most honor and glory. Indeed, power based glory strikes me as cheap and human. When the Jews expected to see the glory of the Messiah, they expected Him to come in power and defeat Rome. Rather He died on the cross out of love for the world. (I Corinthians 1:18-31)<br />
<br />
In fact, determinism strikes me as dishonoring to God. I think that humans do tend to define glory in terms of power, and us expecting God to do the same is thinking of God like He's a human. Now I wouldn't call this "man-centered", but I do think that it dishonors Him, making Him more like us, rather than us trying to be more like His Son.<br />
<b></b><br />
<b><span style="color: #b45f06;">Subsequent posts</span></b><br />
<br />
My next few posts will be taking us through the 5 points in the order of the Articles to see how my theory may help clarify our differences. While I will be arguing for Arminianism in these posts though, I don't really think of this as exposing the underbelly of Calvinism. Calvinists can embrace this distinction and argue that we should be more causal-centered. My actual hope is to develop a more helpful distinction that will facilitate communication between. A foghorn so we don't merely pass each other in the night. <br />
<br />
So Calvinists, please don't take this distinction as criticism, but an attempt at understanding each other. We are brothers, and it is my greatest hope that this sibling rivalry would stop distracting us with the mission for the kingdom. <br />
________________________________________________<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1"></a><sup>1</sup>Note how it isn't difficult to counter due to any merits of the argument. It is simply ambiguous.<br />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2"></a><sup></sup><br />
<sup>2</sup>A Calvinist may argue that being focused on God's character is still man-centered because it has to do with how God treats man. Man is the object of God's love ("God loves man": God-subject; love-verb; man-object). However, the same can be said about sovereignty since it is man that God is sovereign over ("God rules man": God-subject; rule-verb; man-object). And as an Arminian, I'm not just concerned with His love for us, but also about His love for Himself within the Godhead. Now it is true that this doesn't come up that much within soteriology, but that is because man is the object of salvation ("God saves man": God-subject; save-verb; man-object).This really makes it impossible to avoid. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-38770505932417779922016-04-14T23:54:00.005-04:002016-04-15T00:13:45.192-04:00Kevin Scharp's Divine Psychology CritiqueSo recently William Lane Craig participated in a "debate"<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/04/kevin-scharps-divine-psychology-critique.html#1" target="_blank">1</a></sup> with one Keven Scharp on the question of the existence of God. Scharp was one of the more solid opponents that I've seen Craig have. One, while his argument for Atheism wasn't an argument for God's non-existence, it wasn't just the standard Atheist special pleading either. Rather He made an argument for the rationality of the belief in the non-existence of God that reminds me somewhat of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology, though I don't think as robust. Truly very engaging. <br />
<br />
However, he also makes a rather interesting new counter-argument<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/04/kevin-scharps-divine-psychology-critique.html#2">2</a></sup> against the arguments for God's existence. This had to do with what he called "divine psychology". In this, he says that any argument that relies on our understanding or predicting God's reasons for doing something is inherently flawed because there is no way for us to know that. This is why, according to him, POE fails to critique theism. While I agree with him on POE anyway, he attempts to expand this same problem to the cosmological, teological, resurrection, and transcendental<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/04/kevin-scharps-divine-psychology-critique.html#3">3</a></sup> arguments. <br />
<br />
However, I think this obviously fails. Well, I'm not sure if it is generally obvious, but it is obvious to me anyway. This is because the arguments do not assume that we know God's motives. Rather they argue back to certain attributes that a creator must have, and those attributes sound an awful lot like God. But we don't need to argue that God must have wanted to create the universe for such and such a reason in order for the argument to be successful. I remember Scharp once asked Craig, "Well, what evidence do we have that this God would even want to create the universe." I wanted to respond, "The fact that the universe exists!" I mean, seriously!<br />
<br />
Here's an analogy for anyone who thinks that Scharp's argument is any good<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/04/kevin-scharps-divine-psychology-critique.html#4">4</a></sup>: We all are aware that Stonehenge was made by people. We know this because of the clear signs of shaping of the rocks, their unnatural arrangement, and the design of the surrounding region. However, we have no clue as to their psychology. We don't know <i>why</i> they created Stonehenge, or even how it was used. But this doesn't prevent us from inferring that it had to have been made by some cause, or that it was designed. Indeed, how could it be anything else. <br />
<br />
The same goes for these similar arguments for God. There is no appeal to God's plans or God's psychology in the arguments<sup><a href="http://jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2016/04/kevin-scharps-divine-psychology-critique.html#1">5</a></sup>. They don't conclude to Him due to His reasons, but due to His attributes. He may have created the world to have a relationship with humans. He may have created it to play skeetball. Who cares. That doesn't change the fact that the universe needed to have a creator who is an incorporeal, eternal, intelligent, transcendent, morally foundational, and personal being. The cause of the universe must have those attributes regardless of what His reasons were for creating the universe. <br />
________________________________________<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="1">1</a></sup> I say debate loosely here. There were no rebuttals or anything else like that. Simply two speeches, some clarifying questions for each other, and then a Q&A. There wasn't really any engagement with each others' arguments. <br />
<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="2">2</a></sup> Not the weakness argument. That wasn't particularly interesting since it doesn't show an <i>inherent</i> weakness in the arguments themselves. It was more a criticism of Craig's description of how deductive arguments work. But that doesn't change the fact that if the premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows. <br />
<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="3">3</a></sup> The family of arguments to which the Moral Argument belongs. Though, ironically, he doesn't apply it to the Moral Argument. <br />
<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="4">4</a></sup>This technically only applies to the teological and transcendental argument, but the flaw it exposes protects the other arguments too if you think it through. <br />
<sup></sup><br />
<br />
<sup><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="5">5</a></sup> This also includes the resurrection argument, since we don't need to know why God would raise Christ from the dead to conclude that the historical evidence suggests that He was raised from the dead. However, with this argument we DO have sufficient reason to know God's psychology on the matter because Jesus TOLD us why, and self-disclosure is the basis of all psychology. Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-49712627614228361752016-03-12T17:18:00.000-05:002016-05-12T15:17:47.663-04:00Outline For Studying the Abortion Debate<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">Introduction</span></strong><br />
<strong></strong><br />
I've been thinking a lot about the abortion debate lately. As with most debates there is a lot of talking past each other, and someone who is really interested in <em>how</em> things are communicated, I figured that there was a lot from the other side I was probably missing with all of the heavy-handed emotional rhetoric. So in an attempt to get past this, and think about the issue thoroughly, I've developed an outline about how to approach the subject. The levels should be thought about in order, since the upper levels inform the conversation on the lower levels.<br />
<br />
One section that I did leave out is a section on ethical grounding. This is because it is such a big issue that if that is where the issue really lies, we really need to have a different conversation first. But for the sake of the discussion, I've assumed an ethical position that is grounded on innate human dignity and worth. <br />
<br />
Please notice that I have not stated any conclusions below. This is just an outline about <em>how</em> to talk about the issue. For any comments, please keep it to that subject instead of taking stances on any particular section. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Outline</span></strong><br />
<strong></strong><br />
<strong>Level O: Ethical Theory</strong><br />
<em>While this isn't technically part of the abortion debate (hence 0), often the differences of our conclusions are caused by the differences of our ethical theories.</em><br />
<ol type="A">
<li><b>Objective vs Subjective<br /> </b><i>Is morality determined by human societies, personal opinion, or is it grounded outside of human beliefs?</i></li>
<li><b>Moral Grounding</b><br /><i>What standards should we use to come to our ethical conclusions?</i></li>
</ol>
<strong>Level 1: Identity</strong><br />
<em>Different referents have different moral relevance. Shooting a tree is different than shooting a dog which is different than shooting a person. The question here is whether or not there is anything that distinguishes the mother from the fetus that makes one of them more morally relevant than the other.</em><br />
<ol type="A">
<li><strong>Adult vs. child</strong><div>
<em>We usually believe that it is more important to protect a child over an adult. Also, we consider it more tragic when a child dies. So is a child more morally relevant than an adult?</em></div>
<div>
</div>
</li>
<li><strong>Human or not human</strong><div>
<em>Classic question of when a fetus is a human person.</em></div>
<div>
</div>
</li>
</ol>
<strong>Level 2: Rights</strong><br />
<i>Here we are talking about natural inalienable rights, not constitutional or international human rights which are merely based off of them. This is still a ethical question, not a legal one.</i><br />
<ol type="A">
<li><strong>Identification</strong><div>
<i>The rights I believe are at play</i></div>
<div>
</div>
</li>
<ol type="i">
<li> <strong>Mother</strong><blockquote>
<strong>α: Self-autonomy</strong><br />
<i>Every person has the right to make their own choices in life. Forcing a woman to have a child would be a violation of this.</i> <br />
<strong>β: Privacy/Property</strong><br />
<i>While the fetus's body is not part of the woman's property, the fetus is within the woman's body which is her property. Like with one's home, a right to property extends to what can be called the right to privacy, protecting not just one's right to house itself, but also what goes on within it. This would also extend to one's body, and what happens within that body.</i> </blockquote>
</li>
<li><strong>Fetus</strong><blockquote>
<strong>γ: recognition of humanity</strong><br />
<i>A fetus has the right to be seen and therefore treated with human dignity. This refers to how the fetus is talked about, and even treated when deceased. </i><br />
<strong>δ: Life</strong><br />
<i>A person has the right to be given a chance of life, and to defend their own life.</i></blockquote>
</li>
</ol>
<li><strong>Supersession</strong><div>
<em>Since both parties have rights which are at risk, the question here is not the protection of certain rights, but supersession. When two </em><em>sets of rights are in conflict, either one set of rights supersede the rights of the other, or we are at an ethical impasse. So under what conditions can each of these rights be superseded (if they can)</em></div>
<blockquote>
<strong>α: Self-autonomy</strong><br />
<strong>β: Privacy/Property</strong><br />
<strong>γ: recognition of humanity</strong><br />
<strong>δ: Life</strong></blockquote>
</li>
<li><strong>C. General Case</strong><div>
<em>At this point, we can come to a conclusion about whether or not abortion is generally right or wrong apart from other factors.</em> </div>
<div>
</div>
<ol type="i">
<li><strong>Definition</strong><div>
<em>Defining what is meant by the general case.</em></div>
</li>
<li><strong>Verdict</strong></li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<strong>Level 3- Situational Ethics</strong><br />
<ol type="A">
<li><strong>A. Counter Anti Abortion</strong><div>
<em>Given a anti-abortion conclusion for the general case, these are some situations under which abortion might still be justified</em></div>
<div>
</div>
<ol type="i">
<li><strong>Danger for Mother</strong></li>
<li><strong>Danger for Child</strong></li>
<li><strong>Euthanasia</strong></li>
<li><strong>forced pregancy</strong><div>
</div>
<ol type="a">
<li><strong>rape</strong></li>
</ol>
</li>
<li><strong>poverty</strong></li>
<li><strong>societal stigma</strong></li>
</ol>
</li>
<li><strong>B Counter Pro Abortion</strong><div>
<em>Given a pro-abortion conclusion for the general case, these are some situations under which denying an abortion might still be justified</em></div>
<div>
</div>
<ol>
<li><strong>i Population Loss</strong></li>
<li><strong>ii Psychological distress</strong></li>
<li><strong>iii Possible </strong><b>Prodigy</b></li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<strong>Level 4- Legal</strong> <br />
<em>Everything up until this point has been about ethics, not legality. What is moral does not always perfectly transfer over to what should be legal. So the question remains how do we ethically interact with the law given our conclusions.</em><br />
<ol type="A">
<li><strong>Relationship between ethics and law</strong></li>
<li><strong>What can be enforced</strong></li>
<li><strong>Prohibition effects</strong></li>
<li><b>Implementation of Situational Ethics</b><br />
<i>Simply because we reach a moral conclusion in these situations doesn't mean that it'll necessarily extend the same legally each time. So the question needs to be addressed of whether our ethical conclusions are influenced by jurisdiction concerns of the state when it comes to legal implementation.</i></li>
<li><strong>Ramifications on other laws</strong><br />
<ol type="i">
<li><strong>i fetal abuse laws</strong><br />
<em>This is where a person can be charged with endangering a fetus by their actions. This includes the mother who drinks or smokes while pregnant.</em></li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5021346565171482910.post-91029234468368741222015-10-11T23:56:00.000-04:002015-10-11T23:56:29.023-04:00Response to Richard Bushey's "Critique of Arminianism"<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAg5DboXFptEgtDmVHR2wrWrMoGRMDamomdUh3kBdZdR-SwuN_YBm5Acfxw9ymwfVhyphenhyphenK6pswF1nmkRkzNdyeP-koCjs-HNGhiIt9DNU4yss-YGdAqezb0OszBynG6WQbv8CrcVDFtAlnQ/s1600/opening.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAg5DboXFptEgtDmVHR2wrWrMoGRMDamomdUh3kBdZdR-SwuN_YBm5Acfxw9ymwfVhyphenhyphenK6pswF1nmkRkzNdyeP-koCjs-HNGhiIt9DNU4yss-YGdAqezb0OszBynG6WQbv8CrcVDFtAlnQ/s1600/opening.jpg" /></a>Hello, it's been awhile. I don't have the internet right now, so maintaining the blog has been basically impossible. I'm hoping to get my internet back eventually, but I have no idea when.<br />
<br />
That said, I am still on facebook, and I made a friend recently by the name of Richard Bushey who is a "Reformed Molinist". Basically someone who takes a Calvinist view on salvation, but a Molinist view on providence and free will. Anyway, he's written <a href="http://thereforegodexists.com/critique-of-arminian-soteriology/" target="_blank">a post critiquing Arminianism</a>, and I promised him that I would respond to it. But it's been awhile since then, and I wanted to provide a full critique of his post. So I am writing this. Because he objects to the term "Calvinist", and I reserve the term "Reformed" to refer to an ecclesial tradition rather than a soteriological position, I'll be referring to his position as Dortian, meaning an adherence to the five points of Dort often popularized as TULIP.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgfDjkz88sQcPa2VtDHTR8NOKU6b1bO5pJZCtAYp0vygJV7jXOP3dPSAElAimp_-7QQCXmvRuw0W_0fbqTv0ZygTa22JyvFXDq9ubJ2RFKdL10RzzuvZC5GQT-1B-kddx8rSknLcbDG1gE/s1600/Response1.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgfDjkz88sQcPa2VtDHTR8NOKU6b1bO5pJZCtAYp0vygJV7jXOP3dPSAElAimp_-7QQCXmvRuw0W_0fbqTv0ZygTa22JyvFXDq9ubJ2RFKdL10RzzuvZC5GQT-1B-kddx8rSknLcbDG1gE/s1600/Response1.bmp" /></a>Now, to Richard in particular, some of my critique in what follows is rather strong. I have no intention of attacking you personally, for I have great respect for you. But I do go after your thinking on some of these points, and I hope you take my words as criticism and not insults. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">I would rather honor God too much than honor man too much.</span></strong><br />
<br />
I would rather get theology right than get theology wrong. This little meme above is just silly, and I have no patience for it even from a friend. I want to glorify God to the highest degree that is possible, which is WHY I'm an Arminian. I want to get God right, and I assume that the truth will glorify God greater than my most brilliant theological imagination. To choose a theological system based off of one's <em>perception</em> of glory misses the whole point of theology: to know who God truly is. There is no greater glory than that for God. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1lR4tghqm63EpX5JS7a-RsAQY6qb7QlJ18BGiaOV7kny7KcI6M-7gJgpjsOASH1jGzCDGoVyuegCKtCk9BKJY3GGZWUSJETy5k49F1jyOTzhr1djO1RAjEJtm9P6ik5OOvgYK0zNSEhU/s1600/Defense.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1lR4tghqm63EpX5JS7a-RsAQY6qb7QlJ18BGiaOV7kny7KcI6M-7gJgpjsOASH1jGzCDGoVyuegCKtCk9BKJY3GGZWUSJETy5k49F1jyOTzhr1djO1RAjEJtm9P6ik5OOvgYK0zNSEhU/s1600/Defense.jpg" /></a></div>
Personally, I don't care about giving honor to man or taking it away. Why? Because I don't care about man. God's glory is at the center of my theology, and man falls where he will. And then there is this bizarre idea that somehow God's glory and man's glory are inversely related. Why is that? God created man for His glory. If man is properly understood, than God's glory will be maximized. Certainly if we glorify man beyond his due, than there is some sense where man will not be glorifying God correctly. It is that incorrect feature though that diminishes the glory, not the oppulance. Indeed, if we lower man to an ant, we do damage to His glory as well for we are made in His image. We trample on something that God has done. Should we agree with the Muslims, than man is a mere dog? I don't think any Dortian wants to go there. In fact, even when we consider the giving of man excessive glory, the problem lies in man being in God's image. Again we would be misrepresenting Him, and any misrepresentation of God is less glorious than His true nature. So again, we should be focused on getting it right. In the end, this is simply hedging your bets, a tactic which I take to be a fallacious and lazy way of thinking in general. <br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkL3MpoH88qjDfWO3CTaE6xOJk-1QNLcj5QqbrUWiozakELjU3Ec5r6FzXu92gZYcFnFIofO1y1VFyFEGA39wGUyn3KEvR4wbleKME8euTPePpT6Stve_n8F14LKeRHcq4CQQWmeIJavk/s1600/Response2.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkL3MpoH88qjDfWO3CTaE6xOJk-1QNLcj5QqbrUWiozakELjU3Ec5r6FzXu92gZYcFnFIofO1y1VFyFEGA39wGUyn3KEvR4wbleKME8euTPePpT6Stve_n8F14LKeRHcq4CQQWmeIJavk/s1600/Response2.bmp" /></a><br />
What is also bizarre about this meme is that Arminians believe in Total Depravity, which Richard talks about later. We believe in the human need for God, and our complete insufficiency. Indeed, the only honor I give man is that He is God's instrument in the world, but Dortians don't even disagree with that. We ascribe no higher honor to man in soteriology, so what is the complaint even about? <br />
<br />
Well it seems to be connected to power. There is no question that Arminian theology ascribes more power to man than Dortian theology does. Indeed Richard comments that Arminians teach that man is a least able to "grab the rope". While I personally reject the analogy, I don't really object to its use here since it helps us see what Richard is concerned about. He is concerned about the human's ability to affect the outcome of their own salvation. However, the concern here is NOT honor; it's power. Power does not necessarily translate to honor. I don't want to say that there is no relationship, but one does not necessarily entail the other. For instance, if a general gives an order to take a bunker, how much honor does the courier receive for relaying that instruction? Yet the courier has the power to change the order, or simply not relay it if he so chose. Yet no one in their right mind would ever say that the bunker was taken due to the work of the courier. It was the general who gets the credit and rightly so. <br />
<br />
In Arminianism, we may say that a person can resist God's actions, but not a single Arminian would ever say that a person should receive some kind of credit for that submission. We do not ascribe honor to them. Therefore, it is not that Arminians have a higher view of man, but that we have a different view of power. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">Arminian soteriology is the foundation for sacramental soteriology</span></strong><br />
<br />
So Richard certainly gets points here on originaliality. However, I am not very moved by the argument. First of all, this is another example of bet hedging, so I'm already not very impressed. However, I'm not sure if sacramentology constitutes a proper attack anyway because I'm don't really agree with his analysis of sacraments or its relationship to Arminianism. <br />
<br />
Now first off, I am both a Zwinglian and a credobaptist, so I'm not too keen on defending sacraments. As such it is difficult for me to decide how to approach this. However, for Richard's argument to go through, it requires three components: A) sacraments are bad, B) There is a real connection between Arminianism and sacraments and C) Calvinism protects from it. I don't think Richard has given a sufficient argument for A, B, or C. However, I have no real desire to defend sacraments, so I'll grant him A for the sack of the argument. <br />
<br />
B. So, what is the connection between Arminianism and sacramentism that Richard proposes? We might be able to consider that he is making some kind of historical argument that all sacramental systems also hold to Arminian theology, but considering that sacraments only came into existance once, and that this connection has more to do with the early church than anything elsewe must consider that this historical argument is, at best, nothing more than mere correlation (and not enough data), which is insufficent to demonstrate causation. So I don't really believe Richard is trying to make this argument. So does he ever really make an argument? <br />
<br />
"For if man is capable of turning to God in faith, and that action is necessary to salvation, we may easily understand why the Papists or the Campbellists would think to add other elements to this formula." This is really it. In fact, we just have this one sentence. First of all, to say that man is capable of turning to God is to misunderstand Arminian theology. We merely say that we are capable of turning away from Him, not toward Him. Nothing but God's grace can bring us toward Him. So this link is grounded in straw man. This is not a very good start. <br />
<br />
Worst yet, that papists ground their sacramentology on their ecclesiology, not their soteriology. They view it has the function of the church to dispense God's grace. So while this argument may sound plausible, it doesn't take catholic theology for its own word. As for the Campbellites, I cannot speak much on the movement. While aware of it, I have not studied the matter historically. I would be interested whether their commentment to sacramentialism though was grounded more in privitism rather than their libertarianism. Also, I do not know if they are even Arminian in their theology (Catholics certainly aren't). Here I would simply wonder what historical evidence Richard has that sacramentology formed the way he claims here. <br />
<br />
C. Here it is even harder to tell how he is trying to justify this (that is that Calvinism protects against sacraments). It is difficult to determine whether or not a general dismissal of sacramentalism by Dortists has to do with Dortism or their rejection of Catholicism (and devotion to Sola Scriptura). I suspect the latter. And many Arminians feel likewise. Sure, the Methodists tend to have sacraments, but that is because of their historical ties to Anglicanism, not their soteriology. But classicly Martin Luther and Augustine had similar soteriological views, and yet were passionate sacramentalists. Augustine was a major shaper of Catholic sacramentology. Even Calvin and Presbyrterians still hold to a sacramental view (though admittely weaker than other sacramental traditions). So this also strikes me as incredibly weak. <br />
<br />
In summary, I would say that this argument simply doesn't have any historical evidence, and doesn't seem to take seriously the actual theological positions that it is dealing with. Now possibly he has a point, but at this stage significantly more research is required for this argument to even have a prima facie case. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">Does Jesus save or make men saveable? </span></strong><br />
<br />
We hear this argument A LOT, and it is a terrible argument. First of all, when assessing the efficaciousness of the cross, there are two ways to approach it: a divine perspective, and a human perspective. The trick with this argument is to assess Dort from a divine perspective and Arminianism from a human perspective, which is exactly what I said it was: a trick. Now I am not saying that Richard is trying to trick anyone. This argument is so common that I'm sure he is repeating it because it was convinced by it. But at its heart, it is a rhetorical trick to turn Dort's biblically weakest link into something good and important. <br />
<br />
So since I like saving my more important points for last, let's look at both positions from a human perspective first. In both systems no one is <em>born</em> justified. So we start out unredeemed. In both systems, when we come to have faith in order to have Christ's atonement applied to us. In both systems, once the atonement is applied to us, we are completely justified. So the difference in the person's life is not the efficaiousness of the atonement, which does the same thing with the same power (and is considered infinite in both systems), but simply in the order with which things happen (regeneration->faith->justification vs faith->justification->regeneration). <br />
<br />
Now let's look at it from a divine perspective. Now here things are a bit tricky since there are two theories of election within Armianianism, but for the sake of simplicity I'm going to look at the traditional view held by Arminius. In both Classic Arminianism and Dortism, God knows exactly who He is going to save when Jesus is at the cross, and those exact persons' sins are atoned for at the moment. So again, no difference in terms of efficaciousness. <br />
<br />
So what's the <strong><em>real</em></strong> difference? The real difference is in election. In both systems justification comes by faith, but how faith comes about is different. And from the Arminian perspective, the issue is that anyone could be saved. Not everyone is, and God knows who will be because He is omniscient. So who is saved is certain. But it is not necessitated, and thus the offer of salvation to everyone is geniune. At least that's our issue anyway. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Bible favors the doctrine of Unconditional Election. </span></strong><br />
<br />
There is no way I can adequately respond to this here, but to some degree, I think this section is the most important. What really matters IS what does the Bible actually teach. Now, I don't think the Bible teaches unconditional election. Romans 9 is about God's soveriegnty over the conditions of election, not unconditionality (verse 20 is anticipating a Jew who is angry that God is saving Gentiles, not Arminianism). Ephesians 1 is saying that God has chosen to save us, but doesn't stipulate how He does so; so one has to read the rest of the book for that. John 6 is about how only those who were already believers amoung the Jews could recognize what God was revealing in Jesus, not about unconditional election. In fact, here are my links dealing with those subjects: <a href="https://www.blogger.com/www.jcfreak.blogspot.com/2013/07/why-i-am-arminian-part-v-unconvinced-by.html?m=1">proof-texts</a>, <a href="https://www.blogger.com/www.jcfreak.blogspot.com/2013/07/why-i-am-arminian-part-vi-convinced-by.html?m=1">biblical arguments</a>, and <a href="https://www.blogger.com/www.evangelicalarminians.org/category/election/">SEA on election</a>.<br />
<br />
However, all that said, attempting to settle the matter here will not do the conversation justice. My only real critique of this section then is the fact that Richard does nothing to engage with the Arminian responses to his incredibly common arguments. An issue I also have with the next section.<br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">The doctrine of total depravity causes problems for Arminian soteriology</span></strong><br />
<br />
First of all, a point about the rhetoric here. He says that Armians "often" or "usually" believe in Total Depravity. This is untrue. Arminians <strong>always</strong> believe in Total Depravity, though sometimes reject the language. The third article of the Remonstrance is quite clear on this. If you don't believe at least in what he describes here, that humanity "is unable to turn to God in and of himself", then you are not an Arminian. Additionally, to say that Arminians "just" employ prevenient grace is to say that Dortians "just" employ unconditional election. It's the defining doctrine of the entire position! <br />
<br />
Anyway, how does this cause a problem? He makes three arguments. The first is that it is ad hoc. Well, sorta. The theology is designed to balance the theological tensions that are in Scripture, and it does so well. But this is no less true than the Trinity. While the doctrine of prevenient grace is designed to pull together all of what Scripture says, it still is the best explanation of the evidence that we have. And it isn't really that ad hoc. It is a rather reasonable conclusion to what we know about God's character. Afterall, prevenient grace is nothing more than saying that God actively drawing people to Him from birth. It isn't really that complex. <br />
<br />
Second point is that what I typically call the technical argument. In this argument, the Total Depravity of man is never really experienced because God is always at work, so TD is merely "technical". However, I don't see this as a weakness, but as a strength. When we look around us, don't we see people trying to be good? Don't we see people being drawn to conviction and righteousness? In fact Reformed circles refer to this as "common grace", that is grace extended to the reprobate to hold back their sinful natures. And what is the problem with the understanding that God is always at work? Are we seriously suggesting here that the problem with Arminian theology is the ubiquity of God's providence? Um, darn?<br />
<br />
Third point is the "why does one person choose and another doesn't" argument. This confuses merit with condition, a point which I flesh out in more detail <a href="https://www.blogger.com/www.jcfreak73.blogspot.com/2014/03/may-i-have-a-cookie.html?m=0">here</a>. To sum up quickly, while merit implies conditionality, conditionality doesn't imply merit, and the question is merely a question of conditionality. Indeed, we could say, "Well if the condition is faith, then faith itself must be caused by a 'something'. What is that 'something'". Well, it varies from person to person. Indeed, as a Molinist, Richard should recognize that such a question actually assumes compatiblism, and thus doesn't really work with his own belief in libertarian free will. <br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">Evangelical Arminianism borrows from Calvinism</span></strong><br />
<br />
Well, this is a textbook genetic fallacy. However, even if we considered genetic fallacies legit, it still doesn't work considering historical details. First of all, yes Luther was a staunch Augustian, and certainly Arminians being Protestant inherit a good deal from him. However, Luther's successor, Philip Melchathon, held to a Semiaugustian position, and Luther stilll blessed him.<br />
<br />
What is Semiaugustianism you ask? Good question. Semiaugustinianism is basicly pre-reformation Arminianism, and what is important to note about this is that is was accepted over Augustianism at the Council of Orange (not one of the big 7 of course, but much more influential in its day than Dort). However, aren't we still in the same place since Semiaugustinianism is clearly based off of Augustinianism? Well, no, because Semiaugustinianism was <em>reconciling</em> Augustine with the church fathers that came before him. It is precisely in those areas that Dort is so proud of that put Augustine in conflict with every theologian prior. Now I don't want to say that this makes Augustine and therefore Dort wrong or unworthy. That would be a genetic fallacy. But my point is that Arminianism has a very good historical pedigree.<br />
<br />
<strong><span style="color: #b45f06;">Conclusion</span></strong><br />
<br />
So where do we stand? Section 1 is bet hedging, which is bad argumentation. Section 2 is also bet hedging and underdevelopped. Section 3 is just sophistry in my opinion. Section 4 is underdevelopped, but that might just be due to the nature of the article. Section 5 is simply unconvincing to me, but probably his best section apart from a bit of straw man. And finally section 6 is a genetic fallacy. Overall, I'm not very challenged in my Arminian faith, though I do thank Richard for sharing his thoughts and perspective on the issue. <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnpHQkfZYH3yoYO9KpbgU6fmJHYYFA9ok4SdcPF1s3yq65AZJWCBaXUQOL23E6MIDcSbHJpYV89kmMrZGBFtSmX-ME0rnBu7cdn-c5yInWT2K8PR_-x3UMsSUVaHPskLwrMrSBp5zjRUU/s1600/Batman.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnpHQkfZYH3yoYO9KpbgU6fmJHYYFA9ok4SdcPF1s3yq65AZJWCBaXUQOL23E6MIDcSbHJpYV89kmMrZGBFtSmX-ME0rnBu7cdn-c5yInWT2K8PR_-x3UMsSUVaHPskLwrMrSBp5zjRUU/s1600/Batman.jpg" /></a><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFmsynwKYqZqAgJpbi5LQXWBeyIxPijJFZDXIAgczgYHVvDSBJLjxW8YoaGC7D5knGxxGf8jYKg4hZ6Qsw1bdyZYcSODU30leut4qlRs8gN-4PMmzyOsyegJmupcleFAd1xYM7r42Woj0/s1600/Predator.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFmsynwKYqZqAgJpbi5LQXWBeyIxPijJFZDXIAgczgYHVvDSBJLjxW8YoaGC7D5knGxxGf8jYKg4hZ6Qsw1bdyZYcSODU30leut4qlRs8gN-4PMmzyOsyegJmupcleFAd1xYM7r42Woj0/s1600/Predator.jpg" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-4U3iwbQCtGerMzg0K5tQQmHlRM4wnd60-49XYYRqwYXd4VKyGDa7Cjrx6qDOryi5kww24IR9rTSah7SpSoSz65o3uUIRMRuzZiw8SK2h77iTXs2_Lmk3hw-rrpfAUrwh8iSb8ke3bxo/s1600/Silence.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-4U3iwbQCtGerMzg0K5tQQmHlRM4wnd60-49XYYRqwYXd4VKyGDa7Cjrx6qDOryi5kww24IR9rTSah7SpSoSz65o3uUIRMRuzZiw8SK2h77iTXs2_Lmk3hw-rrpfAUrwh8iSb8ke3bxo/s1600/Silence.jpg" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6a7PPPcXS8nRr7fCWopok4g6v5j0hwWrFxInCuWyIA6IMNpdb6ytFak1sxt1lQmOdzXPqpan13zR2mlh66bDuz5AM3dsYSVD9KSNGUMYgQokLe7eVhq_uo2vfboevJ7M0vvXbXLtGdMU/s1600/You%2527re+welcome.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6a7PPPcXS8nRr7fCWopok4g6v5j0hwWrFxInCuWyIA6IMNpdb6ytFak1sxt1lQmOdzXPqpan13zR2mlh66bDuz5AM3dsYSVD9KSNGUMYgQokLe7eVhq_uo2vfboevJ7M0vvXbXLtGdMU/s1600/You%2527re+welcome.jpg" /></a></div>
Jc_Freak:http://www.blogger.com/profile/14780031497091443526noreply@blogger.com0