Kevin Scharp's Divine Psychology Critique

So recently William Lane Craig participated in a "debate"¹ with one Keven Scharp on the question of the existence of God. Scharp was one of the more solid opponents that I've seen Craig have. One, while his argument for Atheism wasn't an argument for God's non-existence, it wasn't just the standard Atheist special pleading either. Rather He made an argument for the rationality of the belief in the non-existence of God that reminds me somewhat of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology, though I don't think as robust. Truly very engaging.

However, he also makes a rather interesting new counter-argument² against the arguments for God's existence. This had to do with what he called "divine psychology". In this, he says that any argument that relies on our understanding or predicting God's reasons for doing something is inherently flawed because there is no way for us to know that. This is why, according to him, POE fails to critique theism. While I agree with him on POE anyway, he attempts to expand this same problem to the cosmological, teological, resurrection, and transcendental³ arguments.

However, I think this obviously fails. Well, I'm not sure if it is generally obvious, but it is obvious to me anyway. This is because the arguments do not assume that we know God's motives. Rather they argue back to certain attributes that a creator must have, and those attributes sound an awful lot like God. But we don't need to argue that God must have wanted to create the universe for such and such a reason in order for the argument to be successful. I remember Scharp once asked Craig, "Well, what evidence do we have that this God would even want to create the universe." I wanted to respond, "The fact that the universe exists!" I mean, seriously!

Here's an analogy for anyone who thinks that Scharp's argument is any good⁴: We all are aware that Stonehenge was made by people. We know this because of the clear signs of shaping of the rocks, their unnatural arrangement, and the design of the surrounding region. However, we have no clue as to their psychology. We don't know why they created Stonehenge, or even how it was used. But this doesn't prevent us from inferring that it had to have been made by some cause, or that it was designed. Indeed, how could it be anything else.

The same goes for these similar arguments for God. There is no appeal to God's plans or God's psychology in the arguments⁵. They don't conclude to Him due to His reasons, but due to His attributes. He may have created the world to have a relationship with humans. He may have created it to play skeetball. Who cares. That doesn't change the fact that the universe needed to have a creator who is an incorporeal, eternal, intelligent, transcendent, morally foundational, and personal being. The cause of the universe must have those attributes regardless of what His reasons were for creating the universe.
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¹ I say debate loosely here. There were no rebuttals or anything else like that. Simply two speeches, some clarifying questions for each other, and then a Q&A. There wasn't really any engagement with each others' arguments.

² Not the weakness argument. That wasn't particularly interesting since it doesn't show an inherent weakness in the arguments themselves. It was more a criticism of Craig's description of how deductive arguments work. But that doesn't change the fact that if the premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows.

³ The family of arguments to which the Moral Argument belongs. Though, ironically, he doesn't apply it to the Moral Argument.

⁴This technically only applies to the teological and transcendental argument, but the flaw it exposes protects the other arguments too if you think it through.


⁵ This also includes the resurrection argument, since we don't need to know why God would raise Christ from the dead to conclude that the historical evidence suggests that He was raised from the dead. However, with this argument we DO have sufficient reason to know God's psychology on the matter because Jesus TOLD us why, and self-disclosure is the basis of all psychology.

Outline For Studying the Abortion Debate

Introduction

I've been thinking a lot about the abortion debate lately. As with most debates there is a lot of talking past each other, and someone who is really interested in how things are communicated, I figured that there was a lot from the other side I was probably missing with all of the heavy-handed emotional rhetoric. So in an attempt to get past this, and think about the issue thoroughly, I've developed an outline about how to approach the subject. The levels should be thought about in order, since the upper levels inform the conversation on the lower levels.

One section that I did leave out is a section on ethical grounding. This is because it is such a big issue that if that is where the issue really lies, we really need to have a different conversation first. But for the sake of the discussion, I've assumed an ethical position that is grounded on innate human dignity and worth.

Please notice that I have not stated any conclusions below. This is just an outline about how to talk about the issue. For any comments, please keep it to that subject instead of taking stances on any particular section.

The Outline

Level O: Ethical Theory
While this isn't technically part of the abortion debate (hence 0), often the differences of our conclusions are caused by the differences of our ethical theories.

1. Objective vs Subjective
    Is morality determined by human societies, personal opinion, or is it grounded outside of human beliefs?
2. Moral Grounding
   What standards should we use to come to our ethical conclusions?

Level 1: Identity
Different referents have different moral relevance. Shooting a tree is different than shooting a dog which is different than shooting a person. The question here is whether or not there is anything that distinguishes the mother from the fetus that makes one of them more morally relevant than the other.

1. Adult vs. child
   We usually believe that it is more important to protect a child over an adult. Also, we consider it more tragic when a child dies. So is a child more morally relevant than an adult?
2. Human or not human
   Classic question of when a fetus is a human person.

Level 2: Rights
Here we are talking about natural inalienable rights, not constitutional or international human rights which are merely based off of them. This is still a ethical question, not a legal one.

1. Identification
   The rights I believe are at play
1. Mother

   α: Self-autonomy
   Every person has the right to make their own choices in life. Forcing a woman to have a child would be a violation of this.
   β: Privacy/Property
   While the fetus's body is not part of the woman's property, the fetus is within the woman's body which is her property. Like with one's home, a right to property extends to what can be called the right to privacy, protecting not just one's right to house itself, but also what goes on within it. This would also extend to one's body, and what happens within that body.

2. Fetus

   γ: recognition of humanity
   A fetus has the right to be seen and therefore treated with human dignity. This refers to how the fetus is talked about, and even treated when deceased.
   δ: Life
   A person has the right to be given a chance of life, and to defend their own life.

2. Supersession
   Since both parties have rights which are at risk, the question here is not the protection of certain rights, but supersession. When two sets of rights are in conflict, either one set of rights supersede the rights of the other, or we are at an ethical impasse. So under what conditions can each of these rights be superseded (if they can)

   α: Self-autonomy
   β: Privacy/Property
   γ: recognition of humanity
   δ: Life

3. C. General Case
   At this point, we can come to a conclusion about whether or not abortion is generally right or wrong apart from other factors.
   1. Definition
      Defining what is meant by the general case.
   2. Verdict

Level 3- Situational Ethics

1. A. Counter Anti Abortion
   Given a anti-abortion conclusion for the general case, these are some situations under which abortion might still be justified
   1. Danger for Mother
   2. Danger for Child
   3. Euthanasia
   4. forced pregancy
      1. rape
   5. poverty
   6. societal stigma
2. B Counter Pro Abortion
   Given a pro-abortion conclusion for the general case, these are some situations under which denying an abortion might still be justified
   1. i Population Loss
   2. ii Psychological distress
   3. iii Possible Prodigy

Level 4- Legal
Everything up until this point has been about ethics, not legality. What is moral does not always perfectly transfer over to what should be legal. So the question remains how do we ethically interact with the law given our conclusions.

1. Relationship between ethics and law
2. What can be enforced
3. Prohibition effects
4. Implementation of Situational Ethics
   Simply because we reach a moral conclusion in these situations doesn't mean that it'll necessarily extend the same legally each time. So the question needs to be addressed of whether our ethical conclusions are influenced by jurisdiction concerns of the state when it comes to legal implementation.
5. Ramifications on other laws
   
   1. i fetal abuse laws
      This is where a person can be charged with endangering a fetus by their actions. This includes the mother who drinks or smokes while pregnant.

Response to Richard Bushey's "Critique of Arminianism"

Hello, it's been awhile. I don't have the internet right now, so maintaining the blog has been basically impossible. I'm hoping to get my internet back eventually, but I have no idea when.

That said, I am still on facebook, and I made a friend recently by the name of Richard Bushey who is a "Reformed Molinist". Basically someone who takes a Calvinist view on salvation, but a Molinist view on providence and free will. Anyway, he's written a post critiquing Arminianism, and I promised him that I would respond to it. But it's been awhile since then, and I wanted to provide a full critique of his post. So I am writing this. Because he objects to the term "Calvinist", and I reserve the term "Reformed" to refer to an ecclesial tradition rather than a soteriological position, I'll be referring to his position as Dortian, meaning an adherence to the five points of Dort often popularized as TULIP.

Now, to Richard in particular, some of my critique in what follows is rather strong. I have no intention of attacking you personally, for I have great respect for you. But I do go after your thinking on some of these points, and I hope you take my words as criticism and not insults.

I would rather honor God too much than honor man too much.

I would rather get theology right than get theology wrong. This little meme above is just silly, and I have no patience for it even from a friend. I want to glorify God to the highest degree that is possible, which is WHY I'm an Arminian. I want to get God right, and I assume that the truth will glorify God greater than my most brilliant theological imagination. To choose a theological system based off of one's perception of glory misses the whole point of theology: to know who God truly is. There is no greater glory than that for God.

Personally, I don't care about giving honor to man or taking it away. Why? Because I don't care about man. God's glory is at the center of my theology, and man falls where he will. And then there is this bizarre idea that somehow God's glory and man's glory are inversely related. Why is that? God created man for His glory. If man is properly understood, than God's glory will be maximized. Certainly if we glorify man beyond his due, than there is some sense where man will not be glorifying God correctly. It is that incorrect feature though that diminishes the glory, not the oppulance. Indeed, if we lower man to an ant, we do damage to His glory as well for we are made in His image. We trample on something that God has done. Should we agree with the Muslims, than man is a mere dog? I don't think any Dortian wants to go there. In fact, even when we consider the giving of man excessive glory, the problem lies in man being in God's image. Again we would be misrepresenting Him, and any misrepresentation of God is less glorious than His true nature. So again, we should be focused on getting it right. In the end, this is simply hedging your bets, a tactic which I take to be a fallacious and lazy way of thinking in general.

What is also bizarre about this meme is that Arminians believe in Total Depravity, which Richard talks about later. We believe in the human need for God, and our complete insufficiency. Indeed, the only honor I give man is that He is God's instrument in the world, but Dortians don't even disagree with that. We ascribe no higher honor to man in soteriology, so what is the complaint even about?

Well it seems to be connected to power. There is no question that Arminian theology ascribes more power to man than Dortian theology does. Indeed Richard comments that Arminians teach that man is a least able to "grab the rope". While I personally reject the analogy, I don't really object to its use here since it helps us see what Richard is concerned about. He is concerned about the human's ability to affect the outcome of their own salvation. However, the concern here is NOT honor; it's power. Power does not necessarily translate to honor. I don't want to say that there is no relationship, but one does not necessarily entail the other. For instance, if a general gives an order to take a bunker, how much honor does the courier receive for relaying that instruction? Yet the courier has the power to change the order, or simply not relay it if he so chose. Yet no one in their right mind would ever say that the bunker was taken due to the work of the courier. It was the general who gets the credit and rightly so.

In Arminianism, we may say that a person can resist God's actions, but not a single Arminian would ever say that a person should receive some kind of credit for that submission. We do not ascribe honor to them. Therefore, it is not that Arminians have a higher view of man, but that we have a different view of power.

Arminian soteriology is the foundation for sacramental soteriology

So Richard certainly gets points here on originaliality. However, I am not very moved by the argument. First of all, this is another example of bet hedging, so I'm already not very impressed. However, I'm not sure if sacramentology constitutes a proper attack anyway because I'm don't really agree with his analysis of sacraments or its relationship to Arminianism.

Now first off, I am both a Zwinglian and a credobaptist, so I'm not too keen on defending sacraments. As such it is difficult for me to decide how to approach this. However, for Richard's argument to go through, it requires three components: A) sacraments are bad, B) There is a real connection between Arminianism and sacraments and C) Calvinism protects from it. I don't think Richard has given a sufficient argument for A, B, or C. However, I have no real desire to defend sacraments, so I'll grant him A for the sack of the argument.

B. So, what is the connection between Arminianism and sacramentism that Richard proposes? We might be able to consider that he is making some kind of historical argument that all sacramental systems also hold to Arminian theology, but considering that sacraments only came into existance once, and that this connection has more to do with the early church than anything elsewe must consider that this historical argument is, at best, nothing more than mere correlation (and not enough data), which is insufficent to demonstrate causation. So I don't really believe Richard is trying to make this argument. So does he ever really make an argument?

"For if man is capable of turning to God in faith, and that action is necessary to salvation, we may easily understand why the Papists or the Campbellists would think to add other elements to this formula." This is really it. In fact, we just have this one sentence. First of all, to say that man is capable of turning to God is to misunderstand Arminian theology. We merely say that we are capable of turning away from Him, not toward Him. Nothing but God's grace can bring us toward Him. So this link is grounded in straw man. This is not a very good start.

Worst yet, that papists ground their sacramentology on their ecclesiology, not their soteriology. They view it has the function of the church to dispense God's grace. So while this argument may sound plausible, it doesn't take catholic theology for its own word. As for the Campbellites, I cannot speak much on the movement. While aware of it, I have not studied the matter historically. I would be interested whether their commentment to sacramentialism though was grounded more in privitism rather than their libertarianism. Also, I do not know if they are even Arminian in their theology (Catholics certainly aren't). Here I would simply wonder what historical evidence Richard has that sacramentology formed the way he claims here.

C. Here it is even harder to tell how he is trying to justify this (that is that Calvinism protects against sacraments). It is difficult to determine whether or not a general dismissal of sacramentalism by Dortists has to do with Dortism or their rejection of Catholicism (and devotion to Sola Scriptura). I suspect the latter. And many Arminians feel likewise. Sure, the Methodists tend to have sacraments, but that is because of their historical ties to Anglicanism, not their soteriology. But classicly Martin Luther and Augustine had similar soteriological views, and yet were passionate sacramentalists. Augustine was a major shaper of Catholic sacramentology. Even Calvin and Presbyrterians still hold to a sacramental view (though admittely weaker than other sacramental traditions). So this also strikes me as incredibly weak.

In summary, I would say that this argument simply doesn't have any historical evidence, and doesn't seem to take seriously the actual theological positions that it is dealing with. Now possibly he has a point, but at this stage significantly more research is required for this argument to even have a prima facie case.

Does Jesus save or make men saveable?

We hear this argument A LOT, and it is a terrible argument. First of all, when assessing the efficaciousness of the cross, there are two ways to approach it: a divine perspective, and a human perspective. The trick with this argument is to assess Dort from a divine perspective and Arminianism from a human perspective, which is exactly what I said it was: a trick. Now I am not saying that Richard is trying to trick anyone. This argument is so common that I'm sure he is repeating it because it was convinced by it. But at its heart, it is a rhetorical trick to turn Dort's biblically weakest link into something good and important.

So since I like saving my more important points for last, let's look at both positions from a human perspective first. In both systems no one is born justified. So we start out unredeemed. In both systems, when we come to have faith in order to have Christ's atonement applied to us. In both systems, once the atonement is applied to us, we are completely justified. So the difference in the person's life is not the efficaiousness of the atonement, which does the same thing with the same power (and is considered infinite in both systems), but simply in the order with which things happen (regeneration->faith->justification vs faith->justification->regeneration).

Now let's look at it from a divine perspective. Now here things are a bit tricky since there are two theories of election within Armianianism, but for the sake of simplicity I'm going to look at the traditional view held by Arminius. In both Classic Arminianism and Dortism, God knows exactly who He is going to save when Jesus is at the cross, and those exact persons' sins are atoned for at the moment. So again, no difference in terms of efficaciousness.

So what's the real difference? The real difference is in election. In both systems justification comes by faith, but how faith comes about is different. And from the Arminian perspective, the issue is that anyone could be saved. Not everyone is, and God knows who will be because He is omniscient. So who is saved is certain. But it is not necessitated, and thus the offer of salvation to everyone is geniune. At least that's our issue anyway.

The Bible favors the doctrine of Unconditional Election.

There is no way I can adequately respond to this here, but to some degree, I think this section is the most important. What really matters IS what does the Bible actually teach. Now, I don't think the Bible teaches unconditional election. Romans 9 is about God's soveriegnty over the conditions of election, not unconditionality (verse 20 is anticipating a Jew who is angry that God is saving Gentiles, not Arminianism). Ephesians 1 is saying that God has chosen to save us, but doesn't stipulate how He does so; so one has to read the rest of the book for that. John 6 is about how only those who were already believers amoung the Jews could recognize what God was revealing in Jesus, not about unconditional election. In fact, here are my links dealing with those subjects: proof-texts, biblical arguments, and SEA on election.

However, all that said, attempting to settle the matter here will not do the conversation justice. My only real critique of this section then is the fact that Richard does nothing to engage with the Arminian responses to his incredibly common arguments. An issue I also have with the next section.

The doctrine of total depravity causes problems for Arminian soteriology

First of all, a point about the rhetoric here. He says that Armians "often" or "usually" believe in Total Depravity. This is untrue. Arminians always believe in Total Depravity, though sometimes reject the language. The third article of the Remonstrance is quite clear on this. If you don't believe at least in what he describes here, that humanity "is unable to turn to God in and of himself", then you are not an Arminian. Additionally, to say that Arminians "just" employ prevenient grace is to say that Dortians "just" employ unconditional election. It's the defining doctrine of the entire position!

Anyway, how does this cause a problem? He makes three arguments. The first is that it is ad hoc. Well, sorta. The theology is designed to balance the theological tensions that are in Scripture, and it does so well. But this is no less true than the Trinity. While the doctrine of prevenient grace is designed to pull together all of what Scripture says, it still is the best explanation of the evidence that we have. And it isn't really that ad hoc. It is a rather reasonable conclusion to what we know about God's character. Afterall, prevenient grace is nothing more than saying that God actively drawing people to Him from birth. It isn't really that complex.

Second point is that what I typically call the technical argument. In this argument, the Total Depravity of man is never really experienced because God is always at work, so TD is merely "technical". However, I don't see this as a weakness, but as a strength. When we look around us, don't we see people trying to be good? Don't we see people being drawn to conviction and righteousness? In fact Reformed circles refer to this as "common grace", that is grace extended to the reprobate to hold back their sinful natures. And what is the problem with the understanding that God is always at work? Are we seriously suggesting here that the problem with Arminian theology is the ubiquity of God's providence? Um, darn?

Third point is the "why does one person choose and another doesn't" argument. This confuses merit with condition, a point which I flesh out in more detail here. To sum up quickly, while merit implies conditionality, conditionality doesn't imply merit, and the question is merely a question of conditionality. Indeed, we could say, "Well if the condition is faith, then faith itself must be caused by a 'something'. What is that 'something'". Well, it varies from person to person. Indeed, as a Molinist, Richard should recognize that such a question actually assumes compatiblism, and thus doesn't really work with his own belief in libertarian free will.

Evangelical Arminianism borrows from Calvinism

Well, this is a textbook genetic fallacy. However, even if we considered genetic fallacies legit, it still doesn't work considering historical details. First of all, yes Luther was a staunch Augustian, and certainly Arminians being Protestant inherit a good deal from him. However, Luther's successor, Philip Melchathon, held to a Semiaugustian position, and Luther stilll blessed him.

What is Semiaugustianism you ask? Good question. Semiaugustinianism is basicly pre-reformation Arminianism, and what is important to note about this is that is was accepted over Augustianism at the Council of Orange (not one of the big 7 of course, but much more influential in its day than Dort). However, aren't we still in the same place since Semiaugustinianism is clearly based off of Augustinianism? Well, no, because Semiaugustinianism was reconciling Augustine with the church fathers that came before him. It is precisely in those areas that Dort is so proud of that put Augustine in conflict with every theologian prior. Now I don't want to say that this makes Augustine and therefore Dort wrong or unworthy. That would be a genetic fallacy. But my point is that Arminianism has a very good historical pedigree.

Conclusion

So where do we stand? Section 1 is bet hedging, which is bad argumentation. Section 2 is also bet hedging and underdevelopped. Section 3 is just sophistry in my opinion. Section 4 is underdevelopped, but that might just be due to the nature of the article. Section 5 is simply unconvincing to me, but probably his best section apart from a bit of straw man. And finally section 6 is a genetic fallacy. Overall, I'm not very challenged in my Arminian faith, though I do thank Richard for sharing his thoughts and perspective on the issue.

A Critique of "Do We Have Free Will?" by Geoff AshleyPART II: Considering the Considerations of the Objections

So last week I looked a short essay written by a Geoff Ashley that has apparently been making rounds through Calvinist circles as an explanation of the Calvinist perspective of the will.

I agree that the essay was quite articulate, and in that, it clarified to me why Calvinists don't seem to get it. So much of the discussion seemed redundant or off-topic in terms of what we are actually talking about when discussing libertarian free will and determinism.

However, I did not go over the last section where Geoff attempts to anticipate, and therein defend against, objections to his view. Let us look at those now.

Do we have a choice?

We do indeed have a choice and are free to choose as we wish, but the reality of our depravity reveals that we all choose poorly. Not one fallen man in a trillion will trust God unless God first overcomes his natural resistance. This God mercifully and graciously does for the elect.

I quote this section only in part because I feel the above segment is representative of his argument. Now here I have to ask the question if the objection being voiced is an "Arminian" objection or something else. I cannot assume that he is addressing me and my perspective here. I suppose that some postmoderns may be concerned about whether or not we get to act on our desires.

However, like I said last week, I doubt that is the case. I don't think anyone is truly asking whether or not I am capable of acting on my desires. Indeed, it seems self evident that I am, at least some of the time. Therefore we get this redundancy that we get last time. If we are addressing whether or not free will is a thing, that means that we must be comparing it to what the world would look like if it weren't a thing. And I don't think any advocates of LFW are saying that if free will weren't a thing, then I would want to do something, but end up doing something else entirely (and I mean in a more blatent and concrete sense than Romans 7).

What we are talking about is causation, not the actualization of desire. Free will is usually defined by the capacity to have chosen differently than one actually had. When we ask, "did I have a choice" what we mean is, "could I have done something else?"  And I think the answer to this question must be no from a Calvinist perspective. But since the author chooses to address a different question than the one really being asked of hin, one can only speculate.

Another way of looking at this is from the question of human continguancy. Is a particular event contingent on what a human chooses, or do all events happen necessarily? This is asking the question more from a divine perspective, rather than the human perspective. And again the Calvinst must say the latter, meaning that we don't have choice, at least not in the sense that LFW are talking about it.

Is this unfair?

If all man has known is sin and if it is universally inherited from Adam, how can one be considered culpable for sin? By nature man cannot not sin. If he cannot do otherwise, how can God judge him and hold him responsible?

Finally it seems the author has stumbled upon the topic. Let us see how he addresses it.

Jonathan Edwards provided a helpful approach to answering this in his distinction between natural and moral inability. According to Edwards, natural inability would be like a man who has been knocked unconscious and tied to a chair. He cannot stand up and should not be held responsible for not doing so since he is prevented from standing up by virtue of the ropes which bind him. Though he wants and wills to stand, he cannot do so.
This is not the type of inability that we possess. We possess a moral inability. Though we are truly bound, our bondage is a result of our own desires. We are responsible because we have willfully rebelled. We reject Christ not because we are restrained by rope, but because we are hindered by our hatred of God. We are shackled only by our own selfish loves.

OK, so he phrases the problem now in two ways, and than circumvents the problems instead of directly dealing with it. For instance, let us look at the analogy from Edwards. In the analogy he affirms the fundamental problem: a person tied to a chair is not culpable for his actions. The implication is that he wanted to do one thing, but had to do another. However, this isn't entirally the reason why the person isn't culpable. It is also tied to the idea that it is the person who tied him to the chair that is culpable.

And ultimately it fails because it doesn't go deeper into the incompatibilists thoughts. After all, where does the person's desire come from? It comes from God. This is true of the fallen man, and any other state that man finds himself in. It is the origin of that desire to sin that is culpable, and that origin is God.

This is why his second way of going after this doesn't work. He says that we are willfully rebellious. Well, yes, but God made us that way. God made us rebellious. That is the problem. It makes God culpable, even if it is only equally culpable (though I would say more so).

Furthermore we don't have to go back to Adam to make this charge as he later states. With every sin we commit, we evidence God’s decree of us casting our vote for Adam’s sin. You cannot complain about each sin we make as if God has no part of it if you are a compatibilist. God is giving you your desires, your selfish loves, and your sin nature. Focusing on the positive side of Calvinism like this ignores the complaint rather than answering it.

Conclusion

As I read this, it became very clear that Geoff simply doesn't understand what is being talked about when others talk about "free will". It is certainly true that one can come up with a new definition of the word that coincides with Calvinism, but that is hardly impressive. What isn't preserved is any reason to think that sin has its origin in mankind. Rather, on Calvinism, sin must have its origin in God. That is the issue, not the self-evident assertion that we don't "feel" forced.

Therefore, we can conclude that while Calvinism can affirm the existance of the will, they cannot affirm the existance of a "free will" without redefining it. Calvinists make a habit of only talking about one side of an issue, and this issue is no different. When God told us to walk the narrow path, He didn't mean that we walk through life with blinders on, only paying attention to those aspect of theology which affirm our current beliefs. You cannot offer a defense of your position when you are apparently ignorant of the very complaint you are trying to defend against.

A Critique of "Do We Have Free Will?" by Geoff Ashley

Recently, I was pointed to a presentation of the Calvinist view of the will that has been circling the internet (here). When I read it, I found it to be well written, and an excellent summary of my own understanding of Calvinist thought. So I thought it might be fun, and hopefully beneficial to others to go through it and give a basic breakdown of it from an Arminian perspective. Hopefully, the essay's clarity would allow me to be clearer on what the Arminian view of the will is.

Preliminaries

Before the essay really gets into it, it lays out a few preliminary comments. Rather than going over these directly, I felt it better to sum them up. He points out that the word 'freedom' has many different senses, and that he is only interested in how the concept operates within the bounds of soteriology (that is the study of salvation). Fair enough. As an Arminian, I fully concur that God is capable, and sometimes does, overpower the will for the sake of His general providence, but that He does not do so when it comes to an individual's salvation. Thus, I find this restriction convenient and appropriate, and I will likewise restrict my comments.

Also he says

Theological discussion of free will often includes historical and complex terms like Pelagianism, Arminianism, Calvinism, predestination, election, determinism and indeterminism, fate, compatibilism and incompatibilism, synergism, monergism, sovereignty and responsibility. We will try to avoid these terms for the sake of clarity and simply refer readers to the recommended resources if they desire a more scholarly discussion.

Again, fair enough. He is merely going to present the Calvinist view, and is in no way commenting on the Arminian view. Therefore, if I think he is implying something about the Arminian view, I would be incorrect since he could be implying something about many of these other views. So I will attempt to avoid jumping to conclusions about what he thinks about Arminianism, and assume that he is not interacting with it at all.

From here on out, I will be quoting him directly, and then merely commenting on each quote.

What Is The Will?

In order to understand “free will,” we must first understand the will. What is the will? Most simply, the will is the mechanism by which humans make choices. 

Human choices are made on the basis of preferences, pleasures, loves, affections, delights and desires. Choices may be (and often are) made with respect to a combination of various desires (some of which might even be in competition), but all choices ultimately boil down to preference. We choose what we find more valuable, enjoyable, pleasurable, etc. We choose what we most desire, what we want, what we “will.” 

If one wants to know what will be chosen, one simply needs to consider what he or she most prefers or loves. The concept of “free will” ultimately boils down to a question of desires. What does the human will most desire?

I think his basic definition of the will here is correct: the will is the mechanism of choice. However, I find his description of the will to be significantly wanting. He claims that it all comes down to desires. We will what we want. Well, duh. But that does absolutely nothing in terms of explaining how the will works. It is a bit like trying to explain how a car works by saying, "A car works by being driven." Well, OK. You've done nothing more than ascribe a verb which refers to it working. You haven't actually explained how it works. For that, you need to explain out the internal combustion engine and how it transforms that chemical power into mechanical power.

As for the will, we have no access to that level of explanation. We cannot get any deeper than the fact that decisions are in fact made. If we want, we can change the question, "How do we choose?" to "how do we prioritize our desires?" It is the same question merely rephrased. And we cannot completely generalize either, for not every human has the same priority of desires, or else we would be making the same choices. So where does that priority come from? Isn't that basically what choosing is? Determining which choice we really want?

What's worse here (that is worse than of the redundancy of the definition of the will) is that this is then called 'free will'. Now wait, where does freedom come in here? What is 'freedom'? How are you defining that? This is never really defined. Indeed, the various titles he gives to his sections implies that such a definition of forthcoming, but it never comes. Instead, 'free will' is merely equivocated with the word "will". But if 'free will' and 'will' mean the same thing, then why bother with the adjective? When Arminians say "free will', we are distinguishing from a deterministic view of the will. But what view of the will is Ashley contrasting against here?

Now, I do think that I have enough material here, and experience with other Calvinists, to perhaps answer this question. It seems that Calvinists are using the term 'free will' as it is often used colloquially. That is, "He did such and such by his own free will." By that, we usually mean that he actually chose it, as opposed to someone forcing him to do something that he didn't choose, that is against his will. However, this phrase doesn't distinguish between doing something by a 'free will' vs doing something be a 'determined will'. Rather, we are comparing doing something by your will vs against your will. So this seems to be a mistake.

Furthermore, this is an social answer to an ontological question. We are talking about what the will is and how the will works, not whether or not it followed. It seems they are saying that we have a 'free will' because we are able to do things that we want. But again, duh. No one is accusing the Calvinist of denying that. What we are asking is whether the origin of that want is intrinsically created by us, designed by God, or necessitated by chemistry/physics. But that question, rather than answered, seems entirely ignored.

Four Eras of Freedom

A final clarification before we can answer the question, “Do we have free will?” is to define who “we” are. Man is not as he once was, nor is he as he will always be. The Bible speaks of the nature of man in four distinct ways, corresponding to four movements of redemptive history: man as created, fallen, regenerate and glorified.We must be careful lest we confuse the freedom of the fallen state with the freedoms of the created, regenerate or glorified states. Each era is distinct, and the freedom possessed within each is subsequently distinct, as well.

• There is man as created. Man was originally created in a state of goodness and innocence. Though we do not know how long this condition lasted, it covers only two chapters of the Bible.
• Since Genesis 3, we see man as fallen. Fallen man is fundamentally different from man as he was originally created. He was no longer innocent or good.
• Though the condition of the Fall is universal in its effect upon all men, it is not permanent for all. There is a third way of understanding man, man as regenerate. Regeneration refers to the work of God to transfer a man or woman out of darkness and into light, out of death and into life. John 3 calls this reality being “born again.” The regenerate state is also a temporary condition awaiting the consummation of God’s work in eternity.
• Man as glorified describes the final state in which God’s work of redemption will be complete.

Given that our discussion of free will is restricted to the question of an unregenerate (fallen) human’s response to his Creator’s work of redemption, we will narrow our focus to the state in which man has found himself since the Fall.

Well, that seems fair enough. It is certainly true that our choices are limited in different ways in these different conditions. So there isn't too much here that I can directly disagree with, though I know that ultimately I am going to understand these states differently.

However, I would offer a brief caveat. In my experience, it seems to me that Calvinists usually make a stronger separation of these states than I do. While there is a significant difference in terms of what we are capable of in these states, ultimately, we are still us. Our humanity is still what it is. So our arms still work the same way, our legs still work the same way, and our wills still work the same way. The fall affects our wills by impediment, not by having it operating by a different paradigm. It is a corruption of what was already there, not something else entirely. I think a Calvinist would agree with my point as stated, so the difference is really where we draw the lines.

The last paragraph here in this section is: "What is the fallen human will like? Given that the will chooses on the basis of desires, we must therefore consider what a fallen, unregenerate person loves, desires, values and esteems." Well, ultimately here my disagreements on the above section rears its head. Certainly not all unregenerate people love, value, or esteem the same things. While we can generalize to some degree, it is worth asking, "how does each unregenerate person choose which sin to commit? It is self determined, God determined, or physically determined?" If that question is left unanswered, I doubt the real issues will be addressed.

The Reality of Unregenerate Bondage

This is where we really start getting into the meat of the article, so I am going to be taking things apart a bit more. However, I would advise you, before reading the following, that you read this section whole before seeing it in pieces. Ultimately, a commentary on a work only elucidates the work if, on some level, the work was already understood.

The human will universally inherited in Adam is not born into a state of neutrality and apathy. The fallen and unregenerate human will has natural loves, passions, desires, delights and pleasures. The will chooses on the basis of these desires, which are not neutral but, instead, absolutely and universally influenced toward evil. Sinners by nature desire rebellion, and thus their wills always incline toward rebellion. 

Fallen humanity is naturally (that is, by nature) broken and depraved. As Paul writes in Ephesians 2:3, we are “by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind.” This fallen nature has limitations. It cannot not sin. All it desires (wills) is sin.

Primarily, I would say that  there isn't a whole lot here that I formally disagree with. Certainly we are not born neutral, but born into fallenness. However, it simply says that we have "natural desires" but it doesn't really say why and where these desires even come from.

I would say it like this: immorality is like darkness; it is the absence of something, rather than the presence of something. Let's say you offer me three jelly beans: apple, cherry, and grape. I then chose grape. Does this mean that I have chosen the best kind of jelly bean? Of course not. All good and wholesome people know that licorice is the best. But that was simply not an option for me.

Likewise it is possible for us to say that one can have LFW, and still not be able to choose the good. This is because I can still do other than what I do. For instance, I could murder John instead of Jan. These are two different options, but both are sinful. However, options to actually do true good are not available in the fallen state.

This is because true morality comes from being in submission and love with God. But if one is separate from God, than good isn't really possible, or meaningful for that matter. Instead, we can only be in submission and love with humans, either our self or others (usually ourselves).

While this isn't in contradiction to what is said above, I felt it was worth mentioning here because it is going to be similar to what he says next:

This truth is foreign to modern thought. How can Christianity affirm that every action of fallen man is sinful while there exist evidenced examples of social kindness and love throughout the world? The biblical answer begins with an understanding of sin.6 Sin is not merely external action, but internal affections and motivations. Helping an elderly lady cross the street, giving to charitable causes, refraining from certain behaviors and engaging in others are not good in the fullest sense of the word. Nothing is good if not done from a posture of humble trust in God and a love for His glory. As the Bible states, anything done in unbelief (Romans 14:23) or done without respect to the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10:31) falls short of righteousness.

Fallen humans love sin. They desire sin. They will sin. They delight in sin. They crave sin. They prefer sin. They choose sin. We abhor the glory of God in lustful craving for our own exaltation and autonomy. We want to glorify ourselves, not our Creator. Because we will (desire) sin, we will (do) sin. We are “willing” participants in sin, and all we can do is sin.

As you can see, the definition of morality is the same: a focus on God. Thus sin is being defined the same way: not focusing on God. But there is no explanation here as to where these sinful desires come from. They are merely considered to be brute facts. This strikes me as so odd because the notion of LFW is offered precisely as that: as an origin to the sin nature. So how can he be offering an explanation of free will if he does not address that very issue that leads people to believe in it? Perhaps it is because he doesn't understand why people believe in it. Indeed, I would theorize that this is true.

However, perhaps I am assuming too much. Perhaps there are many people out there who merely believe in free will because it gives them a sense of power and control. Certainly this seems to be true of many Post-moderns and existentialists. However, this isn't the case for the traditional view of LFW within Christianity, so it still strikes me as odd, or at least incomplete, not to interact with it.

The question is not, “Can we do what we want?” but “What do we want?” Unless and until we come face to face with the radical depravity of fallen man, we will never truly understand who we are and what God has done in bringing us to Himself. As long as we conceive ourselves as neutral in our longings and desires, we will assume a false foundation for understanding the nature of our freedom or bondage.

Well, actually, neither of these is the question. The question is "do we have a free will?" which is more complex than either of these two questions. As long as we understand the question merely in terms of wants and not in terms of human nature, we will miss the entire point of the question.

The biblical depiction of fallen mankind is desperate, dark and dire. Consider the following descriptions of an unregenerate person:

• Our eyes are blind to the glories of the gospel (Matthew 13:14-15; John 12:39-40; 2 Corinthians 4:4).
• Our minds are darkened and hostile toward God (Romans 8:7; Ephesians 4:18; Colossians 1:21).
• Our ears are deaf to the call of our Creator (Matthew 13:14-15).
• Our hearts are darkened and deceitful (Jeremiah 17:9; Romans 1:21).
• We are enslaved to sin (John 8:34; Romans 6:17; Galatians 4:8).
• We are foolish (Romans 1:21; Titus 3:3).
• We hate God (John 3:19-20).
• We are dead (Ephesians 2:1; Colossians 2:13).

Is a blind man “free” to see Christ? Is a deaf man “free” to hear Christ? Is a dead man “free” to stand up and walk toward Christ? Is a slave “free” from slavery?

Well, this is rather interesting. The first part of this quote is something that don't debate at all. Certainly the unregenerate state is desperate, dark and dire. I also completely agree with the list that follows. However, when tying this issue into the discussion of free will, he seems to be making a critical mistake. These descriptions that are being quoted have nothing to do with the question of "freedom" (with the possible exception of slavery), at least not in the sense that we are describing it. Death to God has to do with estrangement. Deafness with stubburnness. Much of the material has more to do with hostility. None of these deal with question of whether or not humans have LFW.

Even if we consider enslavement to sin, which I would say definately is denoting a proclivity towards sin, all that is being said here is that the human being, without God, is driven by selfishness. It doesn't mean that the person is without choices. It merely means that the person's choices are limited to sinful selfish choices. But there are a plethora of sinful options available to the decripid man. There is no reason to conclude from the fact of the sinful nature that LFW is false.

Considering the biblical depiction of mankind, the type of freedom that many simply assume to be true is grounded in an unrealistic understanding of what has happened to man in the Fall. A deeper freedom was once possessed in “man as created,” but man is no longer as he was created. Our nature has changed, and with it the understanding of our liberty. Goodness and innocence fell from us at the Fall, and we forfeited some degree of freedom by eating of the fruit. Fallen freedom consists of the ability to do what one desires; though, those desires are universally directed away from Creator and toward creation.

Again, so much to agree and disagree with here. When he talks about "freedom which is assumed", I do not know to whom he is referring. Perhaps to certain postmodern groups. Still, the issue of free will isn't the question of whether we are able to do what we want, but whether we are able to make a different choice than we do. Again, his unwillingness to define freedom itself rears its ugly head.

Now, I'm going to stop here because this post is getting rather long. I'll pick up with the rest of the paper, where he attempts to deal with disagreements next week.

Thoughts on God's NOT Dead

OK, it took me awhile to watch it, but I finally did. And now a few weeks after watching it, I am commenting on it. However, for both of you who read my blog, you may note that my posting has been rather sporadic anyway due to my current schedule at work. So I apologize for my timing.

Now on to the movie. I loved this film. However, due to the ending, I only give it an A-. More on that later. My fear though is that many people are going to misunderstand exactly what the film is doing and who the film is for.
It is important to notice that the film is for Christians, and not for Atheists. If you show this film to an Atheist, they are likely to be unimpressed, and perhaps even a bit angered. However, this is more due to a misunderstanding of what the movie is doing. It is not offering arguments for God's existance, but offering counter arguments to the two main arguments we tend to get from Atheists. So in this sense, if the Atheist is angered, this is more likely due to them being unreflective of their own bad arguments, or to them misunderstanding what the film is doing (or perhaps at the bad ending, which I will get to. Promise).

So what are the two arguments being dealt with?

Counter Argument 1: Argument from Authority

This is what is really being countered by the main storyline. It is important to note that the Professor only offers this as an argument. Now from an Atheist perspective, this may seem to be a straw-man. However, there are many professors who do precisely this, and there is a lot of this form of bullying going on on-line.

So how does the movie counter? By exposing it as the fallacious argument that it is. Ultimately, an argument from authority is a fallacy because no human being, no matter their credentials knows everything and because ultimately it isn't the credentials that would make an expert right, but the evidence that had convinced that expert of their opinion. At some point, we need to examine the actual evidence.

The story does this with 2 plot moves. First, it portrays the professor as a bully. This is because that is what this argument is doing. It is bullying.

The second is by the Christian presenting good arguments. Now, he doesn't present them fully, but only an a kind of introductory way. This is because they are not really what the plot is about. Instead it about how this professor tries to defeat them merely by appeal to authority. I feel the apex of this counter-argument is with the Stephen Hawking quote. He is stumped by the appeal to authority, does his research, and counters with a second authority. After this, the appeal to authority is, within the movie, dead. We instead focus all of our attention on that second argument.

Counter Argument 2: The Argument from Evil

After the professor's defeat in regard to the Stephen Hawking quote, and his embarrassment, we get to the real reason why the professor is such a bully: he lost his mother. From his perspective, God would never let his mother die.

Now, there is a problem here that needs to be acknowledged. It is a common Evangelical Argument that Atheists are all simply hurt, and that is the only reason why the reject God. This is a bad argument and shouldn't be made. You shouldn't ask the question that the main character asks of his professor "What happened to you" to every Atheist that you encounter. It is belittling to their beliefs and, on the whole, ineffective for precisely that reason. Many Atheists are going to see that argument in the movie at this point, and that is unfortunate.

However, it isn't the professor's Atheism that causes the student to ask this question. It is his bullying. The professor is clearly angry. He hates Christianity and God and he demonstrates it by how he acts, not by what he espouses. Now the movie could still be advocating the above argument, but I do think that the character is justified asking the question when he does.

But in either case, this explicitly introduces the second argument: if there is suffering in the world, then God doesn't exist. While the student does present an intellectual answer to this, in the form of the free will argument, he barely gives any time to it. Instead, he merely asserts it, and then gets the professor to expose his own hypocracy. But we aren't left with too much of an answer.

Unless we broaden our scope to the rest of the movie. Most of the movie is a series of stories of individual people dealing with various problems. But if you notice, the theme of dealing with the evil in our lives is the common thread holding all of these stories together. Ulimately the counter-argument to the problem of evil isn't some intellectual argument, but the very fact that Christianity brings healing to the suffering. It is the multi-faceted nature of Christianity in reaching into those dark places of hurt and confusion and to hold and help us that is truly the answer to the question. Christianity doesn't ignore the question of evil. It solves it.

Two Criticisms

There are some criticisms that can be made of the film though that I feel are worth looking at. And warning: spoilers ahead.

First of all, due to it's conservative source, I am sure that it is going to be critiqued from minority voices. And, quite frankly, I don't think it does too well. When we look at it from a race perspective. every non-white character is a foreigner (with the exception of Michael Tate, but he's a celebrity). Now the Chinese student, the Arab teenager, and the African missionary are all portrayed in a positive light, but one could easily get a sense that Americans are all white from this film. Even the Arab father is portrayed positively in the sense that he is heart-broken by what he feels he must do. Indeed, the portrayal of Arab culture in that scene is quite accurate (though Arab culture is of course quite varied. I am assuming the family is Sunni). But from the perspective of an American minority, they could easily feel unrepresented.

The other critique would the professor's death. I could see many atheists being offended by how this was done. Indeed, I think it is a failure of the film. It isn't so much that they killed him, but that the atmosphere around his death was so happy. I get that it is showing that the professor is saved in the end, but it should have given the moment of his death more respect than it does.

Here is how I would of done it, and maybe you can see my point. I would have had the professor see the advert for the Newsboys and leave. Then I would show the scene with Duck Dynasty (though I wouldn't have used him, but whatever) talking about sending the text message. I then would have had the montage of the various texts going out, including the Arab girl texting her younger brother, but not having one go to the professor. The last one I would show would be the girlfriend sending her text to her brother. After she does, she sees the voicemail message, and exits the auditorium. We then cut to the professor walking down the street, with no music. We see the pastor and the missionary are there. Then the professor gets hit by the car, and the scene of his bed-side confession precedes the same, except continuously, and just the sound of rain. Then he dies, and we pause... with the pastor over his body, in the rain and his head down. Then the missionary puts his hand on his shoulder and starts giving his speach. As he does, we cut back and forth between him talking to the pastor, and the girlfriend listening the voicemail left by the professor (with the sound of the Newsboys coming in quietly). Then she sends the text message to him. The pastor hears it, picks up the phone, and reads the message. He smiles, and then we cut to the concert, which now can serve as a symbol of the celebration in heaven.

Do you see how that is more respective to the death? In the movie it feels, well, vengeful. There is no beauty in the moment. And it is at such a pivotal part of the movie (you know, the ending). Indeed, it feels like the promo of the film, that is the sending of the texts and of the Duck Dynasty guy, was more important than the story, and that is just a shame.

Wrap-up

Overall, if we understand this movie as inspiring Christians to be bold and not to be afraid, then I have to say the film succeeds, in spades. It definately could have been better, but considering the low budget, I would say that it does an excellent job. I highly recommend the film, and pray that you forgive it for its imperfections.

It does a very good job at pointing us to good arguments for God's existance, as well as telling thought provoking and probing morality stories to inspire us to think more deeply about pain and suffering. I especially like the point about the pastor not being on the side lines, but being on the front-lines, just like any missionary. Life is complicated, and one cannot be expected to answer its questions with pat answers to pat questions. We need to look deeper into the fundamental human experience and see God there, and I am thankful that the film reminds us of that.

Essential Attributes Verses Relational Attributes

What I want to say here is going to be a bit technical, so please hold your horses, but I think that this is important in terms of a particular argument that I hear from Calvinists as well as a classic argument that one hears from Atheists. This has to do with the kinds of attributes a thing can have.

Lifting Rocks

Let’s start with the Atheist argument because I think it is more familiar. It runs as follows:

• Can God create a rock so heavy that He cannot lift it?
• If He can’t, then He is not omnipotent since this is something that he cannot do.
• If He can, then lifting it is something He cannot do, and so again He is not omnipotent.
• Therefore omnipotence, as an attribute, is incoherent and God cannot be omnipotent (or God cannot exist though that would require some additional premises)

Now, theologians have consistently said that the phrase “create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it” is itself an incoherent phrase, and God is not beholden to be able to do something nonsensical. However, I think many have trouble seeing how this phrase is incoherent. We can see the incoherence by understanding the difference between essential attributes and relational attributes.

Simply defined, an essential attribute is a attribute something must have in order for it to be what it is. It is an aspect of its nature. A relational attribute is a attribute that something has in relation to something else.

Let’s take a rock. Let’s say the rock is five pounds. Is this rock heavy or light? Well, quite quickly you would say that it is light. You are able to lift it readily. However, imagine you are an ant. Now is it heavy or light? Well, clearly now it is heavy. But how can this be? We are talking about the same rock. The rock didn’t change; only the situation around the rock changed. So how could a attribute of the rock be different? The simple answer, according to the definitions given above, is that heaviness is a relational attribute, meaning that it is in relation to the power of the one attempting to lift or move it. But then, what is it that makes the rock heavy or light relative to me? It’s mass. Mass is not a relational attribute but an essential one.

Now this shows us the incoherence of the argument. Creation is the forming of something’s essence. As a process, creation is merely concerned with essential attributes, and does not form relational attributes. Likewise, the act of lifting is concerned with heaviness; it is not concerned with mass (Since I also could lift a rock of any mass given properly low gravity). Thus the two verbs in the sentence are acting on different attributes (creation --> mass | lifting --> heaviness). Therefore, the two verbs are themselves completely disconnected, and one cannot make demands on the other, making the sentence incoherent. God can create a rock of any mass and lift a rock of any heaviness. Therefore He is omnipotent.

Getting Justice

Now the problem with the Calvinist argument is much more subtle, but is answered by the exact same distinction. According to certain Calvinists (admittedly not all), God is justified in creating persons with the knowledge (and I would say intention) that He must condemn them because God needs to express His justice. Justice is a defining attribute of God, and if God did not express it, then He wouldn’t be God.

Well OK, but what kind of attribute is it? How do we determine whether justice is an essential attribute or a relational attribute? Is justice part of God's essence, or is it something God is in relation to something else? Well for that, let us return to the rock.

As you may recall, since it was two paragraphs ago, the mass is an essential attribute of a rock, since it is part of the rock's nature, and heaviness is a relational attribute of the rock, since it is defined in relation to something else (namely the power of the lifter and gravity). How did the atheist confuse these two things? Well because any relationship involves two entities, it is therefore connected to the attributes of those two things. So with heaviness, it is connected to the power that the lifter is able to generate and the mass of the rock (and of course the gravity). However, in everyday conversation, when we talk about relational attributes, we usually assume the context. For instance, we always simply assume Earth's gravity when talking about heaviness. Also we usually assume that the lifter is the one being spoken to, making the available power just as assumed Therefore, in everyday speech, heaviness is typically determined by the mass of the rock. Because the other referents are assumed, we think of it as a sole property of the rock even though in reality it is actually the rock's mass expressed within a particular context. Therefore, all relational attributes are basically the expression of an essential attribute within a particular context. We can therefore identify a relational attribute if it requires something else for expression and is reducible to some essential attribute. We can also identify an essential attribute if it requires nothing external for expression.

So let us turn this analysis onto justice. Is justice relational or essential? Well, immediately we see that this almost answers itself. The Calvinists’ own argument clearly shows that justice is relational, since it claims that the unrighteous are necessary in order for justice to be expressed. Well, since all relational attributes are reducible to some essential attribute, what do we reduce justice to? Again the answer is quite clear. Justice reduces to righteousness or goodness. In other words, justice is merely the expression of God’s goodness in the context of evil, just as heaviness was the expression of the rock’s mass in the context of the ant.

So where does this leave us in terms of assessing the Calvinist argument that God created us for the expression of His justice? Well for this, we will need to turn to another attribute of God: aseity.

Now the doctrine of aseity states that God is self-existent: He can exist by Himself and has existed by Himself and He needs nothing. Thus the Latins said that God exists “a se” or ‘himself’, hence aseity. So what does this mean? Well if God exists by Himself, then the only kind of attributes He must express are essential attributes. Indeed, we can say this stronger. We can in fact say that God must be able to not express any relational attributes. To deny this is to deny divine aseity. If God ever needs to express a relational attribute, then God needs something beyond Himself. In fact theologians of typically argued that God must exist as a Trinity in order for love to be an essential attribute of His, for He needs persons to love. Therefore God must express His goodness in all circumstances, but God also must be able to not express His justice. He must be able to exist without the existence of things to enact justice towards.

Does this mean that God is not necessarily just? Of course not. God is necessarily just within the context of evil. To ask if God can be just without evil is akin to asking if God can lift a rock so heavy He can’t lift it. It is meaningless. However, to ask if God could ever not be just when evil is present is like asking if the five pound rock could be anything but heavy to an ant. Therefore it only makes sense to ask is just within the context of evil, and within that context He must be because He is always just.

Therefore, considering the argument “God created wicked people for the expression of His justice”, we can draw two conclusions: one logical and one theological. First, the argument is incoherent. It is clear that justice as a concept is only valuable and meaningful in the context of evil, and cannot be used to justify the existence of evil itself. It is merely derivative of His goodness and does not require expression in of itself.

Second, the argument can make God dependent on His creation. If God must express any relational attribute, then He needs the existence of the thing it relates to, which in this case is us. What’s worse is God wouldn't require us per se, but would require our sin. This makes God not just dependent on humanity, but dependent on sin itself. Now a Calvinist might argue that God doesn't need to express justice, but that it is merely good for God to express justice. If that is true, then that good would have to be compared to the existence of evil itself. I fail to see how a world without justice because it is without evil is worse than a world with any amount of evil at all. Justification for the existence of evil must come from an attribute of creation itself which is not inherently evil but created for the good, such as free will. In the absence of just such a justification, Calvinism must either reexamine whether God is truly good, or better yet reexamine their Calvinism.